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COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

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COMPARATIVE LITERATURE

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GRACIÁN AND ALCIATO'S EMBLEMATA

KARL LUDWIG SELIG

IN THE STUDY of the diffusion and vogue of European emblem books and particularly Alciato's *Emblemata* among Spanish writers of the seventeenth century, the case of Gracián is quite special; for few prose writers cited emblems as frequently as he. Several possible reasons may be suggested to explain Gracián's predilection for emblematic literature. It is quite probable that he became interested in emblems through intellectual association with his Maecenas, D. Vincencio Juan de Lastanosa, who had established a splendid library and a rich museum in his native Huesca. Lastanosa himself was an expert in a field somewhat akin to emblems, namely numismatics, and was the author of an important treatise on the subject, the *Museo de las medallas desconocidas españolas* (Huesca, 1645), which he illustrated with reproductions of coins from his collection.[1] Some of these coins were found and given to him by Gracián, a fact which Lastanosa gratefully acknowledges in his treatise.[2]

That Gracián had a great respect for Lastanosa and admired the treasures of his collection can be seen from the following encomia:

> A ti me embia un cavallero cuyo nombre, ya fama, es Salastano, cuya casa es un teatro de prodigios, cuyo discreto empleo es lograr todas las maravillas, no sólo de la naturaleza y arte, pero más las de la fama, no olvidando las de la fortuna [*Criticón*, II, 62-63].

> ¡Oh, célebre museo y plausible teatro de toda esta antigua griega y romana cultura, así en estatuas como en piedras, ya en sellos anulares, ya en monedas, vasos, urnas, láminas y camafeos, el de nuestro mayor amigo, el culto y erudito

[1] Consult Ricardo del Arco y Garay, *La erudición aragonesa en el siglo XVII en torno a Lastanosa* (Madrid, 1934); see also my article, "Góngora and Numismatics," *MLN*, LXVII (1952), 47-50.

[2] *Museo*, p. 78.

don Vincencio Juan de Lastanosa, honor de los romanos por su memoria, gloria de los aragoneses por su ingenio! Quien quisiere lograr toda la curiosidad junta, frecuente su original museo, y quien quisiere admirar la docta erudición y rara de la antigüedad, solicite el que ha estampado de las monedas españolas desconcidas, asunto verdaderamente grande, por lo raro y por lo primero... [*El discreto*, p. 336].

... culto museo de nuestro mayor amigo don Vincencio Juan de Lastanosa, benemérito universal de todo lo curioso, selecto, gustoso, en libros, monedas, estatuas, piedras, antigüedades, pinturas, flores, y en una palabra, su casa es un emporio de la más agradable y curiosa variedad [*Agudeza*, p. 105].[3]

Through the patient research of Ricardo del Arco y Garay, we now have quite full information about the contents of Lastanosa's library. It is no surprise that the inventory lists various emblem books, among which are found the following:

Alciato, *Emblemata* (Paris, 1534).
Antonius á Burgundia, *Linguae vitia et remedia emblematice expressa*... (Antwerp, 1631).
Achille Bocchi, *Symbolicarum* (Bologna, 1555).
Paolo Giovio, *Dialogo delle imprese militari ed amorose* (Lyon, 1559).
Girolamo Ruscelli, *Le imprese illustri* (Venice, 1572).
Camillo Camilli, *Imprese illustri* (Venice, 1586).
Saavedra Fajardo, *Idea de un principe*... (Milan, 1642).
Solórzano Pereira, *Emblemata politica* (Madrid, 1655).
Andrea Palazzi, *Discorsi... sopra l'Imprese* (Bologna, 1575).
Alonso Remón, *Gobierno humano sacado del divino de sentencias y exemplos* (Madrid, 1624).[4]

Gracián certainly had in mind the library of Lastanosa when he described and presented the following list in the "Museo del Discreto":

Passaron ya, cortejados del Ingenio, por la de la Humanidad. Lograron muchas y fragantes flores, delicias de la Agudeza, que aquí asistía tan aliñada quan hermosa, leyéndolas en latín Erasmo, el Eborense y otros, y escogiéndolas en romance las floreštas españolas, las facecias italianas, las recreaciones del Guicciardino, hechos y dichos modernos del Botero, del solo Rufo seiscientas flores. los gustosos Palmirenos, las librerías del Doni, sentencias, dichos y hechos de varios, elogios, teatros, plaças, silvas, oficinas, geroglíficos, empresas, geniales, polianteas y fárragos [*Criticón*, II, 151-154].

It is very clear that these works—collections of proverbs, adages,

[3] All references to the works of Gracián are to the following editions: *El Criticón*, ed. M. Romera-Navarro (Philadelphia, 1938-40), 3 vols.; for his other works the *Obras completas*, ed. E. Correa Calderón (Madrid, Aguilar, 1944). Salastano in the first quotation is of course an anagram of Lastanosa.

[4] Arco y Garay, *op. cit.*, p. 259. The author lists and incorrectly identifies as an emblem book the *Refranes vulgares glosados* by Sebastián de Orozco. This is a collection of proverbs by the father of Sebastián de Horozco y Covarrubias, author of the *Emblemas morales*. See Emilio Cotarelo y Mori, *El licenciado Sebastián de Horozco y sus obras* (Madrid, 1916). Consult also Ricardo del Arco y Garay, "Noticias inéditas acerca de la famosa biblioteca de Don Vincencio Juan de Lastanosa," *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia*, LXV (1914), 316-342: "en diversos tomos, más de dos mil estampas de empresas, jeroglíficos, ingenios y trajes" (p. 333). See also *La erudición aragonesa*, p. 208. The work by Remón is not included in the *Bibliography of Emblem Books* by Professor Mario Praz.

aphorisms, *silvas*, devices, etc.—are miscellanea encompassing a wide variety and range of subject matter. Their common aim is to present some universal moral or truth expressed in a short, compressed form usually associated with a laconic and aphoristic style. Their common attributes are among the most salient characteristics of the total work of Gracián.[5]

On other occasions Gracián alludes to emblems in general in very favorable language:

> Para sacar una quinta essencia general, recogió todas las de Alciato, sin desechar una, y aunque las vió imitadas en algunos, pero eran contrahechas y sin la eficaz virtud de la moralidad ingeniosa [*Criticón*, II, 157-158].
>
> Las empresas del Jobio puso entre las olorosas y fragantes, que con su buen olor recrean el celebro [*Ibid.*, II, 160].[6]

The following quotations from the *Criticón* illustrate Gracián's

[5] M. Romera-Navarro carefully documents this passage and identifies the works listed (*Criticón*, II, 151-154). He gives, however, to the term *polianteas* the definition offered by the *Diccionario de autoridades*: "recolección o agregado de noticias en materias diferentes y de distintas classes," not realizing that the term may possibly refer to the *Polianthea* by Domenicus Nanus Mirabellius, a very popular miscellanea or commonplace book in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There were numerous editions of the work—Venice, 1507; Basel, 1512; Lyons, 1600, 1604; Frankfurt, 1607, 1612; Lyons 1613, 1620; Frankfurt, 1628; and others. The *Polianthea* contains a number of sections devoted to emblems and hieroglyphics; in the various editions we find many changes and elaborations which should be studied with great care. Consult Archer Taylor, *Renaissance Guides to Books* (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1945), pp. 106-107. The *geroglíficos* are identified as probably referring to the work of the poet Alonso de Ledesma, who was praised by Gracián (*Agudeza*, pp. 190, 245). The most common work dealing with hieroglyphics was the *Hierogylphica* by Horo Apollo and the treatise on this work by Pierio Valeriano. See Ludwig Volkmann, *Bilderschriften der Renaissance* (Leipzig, 1923); the critical edition of *Hori Apollinis Hieroglyphica* by F. Sbordone (Naples, 1940); *The Hieroglyphics of Horappollo*, tr. George Boas (New York, 1950). The *oficinas* cited in the passage may very well refer to a commonplace book entitled *Officina* (Basel, 1556) by Jean Tixier.

[6] Gracián also mentions the works of Saavedra Fajardo and of Solórzano Pereira in *Criticón*, III, 377. Another literary relation was with Juan Francisco Andrés de Uztarroz, another member of Lastanosa's circle. Andrés de Uztarroz translated the *Dialoghi piacevoli ... nelli quali si tratta ... delle impresse* (Venice, 1590) by Stefano Guazzo. Of this translation, dated 1634 and entitled *Traducción de las empresas que escribió en lengua italiana Esteban Guazo*, we have only a manuscript version. See Gallardo, *Ensayo*, I, 195, no. 191; Arturo Farinelli, "Gracián y la literatura de corte en Alemania," in *Ensayos y discursos* (Rome, 1925), II, 463 (the essay is dated 1896); Ricardo del Arco y Garay, *La erudición española en el siglo XVII y el cronista de Aragón Andrés de Uztarroz* (Madrid, 1950), II, 828. It should also be pointed out that Lastanosa and Andrés de Uztarroz were in communication with François Filhol, eminent French bibliophile, who was eulogized by Gracián (*Agudeza*, p. 288; *Discreto*, p. 336). Filhol was the owner of a splendid library, without doubt containing some emblem books, of which Andrés de Uztarroz wrote a description, *Diseño de la insigne i copiosa biblioteca* ... (Huesca, 1644). Consult Arco y Garay, *La erudición*, II, 829, 981-999; Gallardo, *Ensayo*, I, 198, no. 193; A. Coster, "Antiquaires d'autrefois: à propos de quelques lettres inédites de François Filhol, hebdomadier de Saint-Etienne de Toulouse, au chroniqueur d'Aragon Don Francisco Ximénez de Urrea," *Revue des Pyrénées*, XXIII (1911), 436-471.

acquaintance with the entire repertoire of emblems included in Alciato's *Emblemata*:[7]

Emblem XVIII, "Prudentes" [often referred to as "Janos bifrons"]:

—Según esso—dixo Critilo—todas las torres vendrán a serlo de confusión, y por no ser Janos de prudencia, les picarán las cigüeñas manuales señalándolos con el dedo... [*Criticón*, I, 187-188].

...y porque echamos comúnmente atrás lo que más nos importa, previno este descuydo haziendo Jano a todo cuerdo [*ibid.*, I, 268].

—Ya algunos—respondió Critilo—arguyeron a la naturaleza de tan imaginario descuydo y aun fingieron un hombre, a su parecer muy perfecto, con la vista duplicada; y no servía sino de ser hombre de dos caras, doblado más que duplicado [*ibid.*, I, 271].

Echávanles a todos un candado en la boca, un ojo en cada mano,[8] y otra cara janual... [*ibid.*, II, 43].

Y en una palabra, todos en la vegez somos Janos... [*ibid.*, III, 24].

...Andrenio entre horrores, y desta otra, Critilo entre honores, assistiendo entrambos ante la duplicada presencia de Vejecia, que como tenía dos caras januales, podía bien presidir a entrambos puestos... [*ibid.*, III, 49].[9]

Emblem XL, "Concordia insuperabilis" [showing a three-headed Geryones]:

Gerión de los enemigos, triplicado lazo de la libertad que difícilmente se rompe... [*ibid.*, I, 351].

Yo soi—me respondió—el de tres uno, aquel otro yo, idea de la amistad, norma de cómo han de ser los amigos; yo soi el tan nombrado Gerión [*ibid.*, II, 95].

Emblem XXXIV, "Sustine et abstine":

...¿dónde están aquellos dos aledaños de Epicteto, el *abstine* en el camino del deleyte y el *sustine* en el de la virtud? [*ibid.*, I, 175].

In Emblem XXXIV Alciato refers to this famous dictum attributed to Epictetus.

The following passage is reminiscent of Emblem VIII, "Qua Dij vocant, eundum," concerned with the famous image of Hercules at the crossroads: "y no es éste aquel tan sabido bibio donde el mismo Hércules se halló perplexo sobre quál de los dos caminos tomaría?" (*ibid.*, I, 174). Gracián refers to the same image in *El Discreto* (p. 349).[10]

Emblem CXXXII, "Ex litteratum studijs immortalitatem acquiri," presenting the well-known hieroglyphic of the snake biting its tail, symbolizes life, time, and the universe. Gracián refers to this image: "...que acaba el tiempo en círculo, mordiéndose la cola de serpiente: ingenioso geroglífico de la rueda de la vida humana" (*ibid.*, III, 303).

[7] All references to Alciato's *Emblemata* are to the following edition: *Emblemata V. Cl. Andreae Alciati*... (Padua, 1618).

[8] Here the reference is very probably to Emblem XVI, "sobrie vivendum et non temere credendum," which presents the figure of an eye in the palm of the hand.

[9] See also *Criticón*, III, 280; Professor Romera-Navarro refers to the emblem of "Janos bifrons" in his article, "Autores latinos en *El Criticón*," *HR*, II (1934), 110.

[10] In his monumental work, *Hercules am Scheidewege* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1930), Erwin Panofsky discusses the multiple representations of this image in the arts. Cf. Quevedo's use of it in *Las zahurdas de Plutón*, ed. J. Cejador (Madrid, 1931), pp. 96-97.

The sense of the following passage from the *Criticón* (I, 176-177) is suggestive of Emblem CLXXXVI, "Dicta septem sapientum": "Leyó Critilo el primer letrero, que con Oracio dezía: *Medio ay en las cosas: tú no vayas por los estremos. ... Huye en todo la demasía.*"

The essence and spirit of Emblem CXXVIII, "Male parta male dilabuntur," appears in: "Chupa la sangre del pobrecillo el ricazo de rapiña, mas después ¡con qué violencia la trueca al restituirla: dígalo la madre del milano!" (*ibid.*, I, 331).

The popular Emblem, "In Occasionem" (CXXXI), is frequently referred to by Gracián. Representative passages are the following, depicting Ocasión standing on a wheel or a small globe, winged, and with only a lock of hair on her forehead, but otherwise bald, so that one cannot seize her while passing:

La ocasión es calva [*Criticón*, I, 274].

Esto les iba ponderando a Critilo y Andrenio una agradable donzella, ministra de la Fortuna, de sus más allegadas, que compadecida de verlos en el común riesgo, estando ya para despeñarse, les assió del copete de la ocasión... [*ibid.*, II, 225].

Aqui estava también el que hazía almohada del chapín de la Fortuna, y a su lado el que del cogote de la Ocasión pretendía hazerse la barba... [*ibid.*, II, 290].

Pero lo que fué gran vista y espectáculo de mucho gusto, fué una gran rueda que baxava por toda la redondez de la tierra, desde el oriente al ocaso de la Ocasión [*ibid.*, III, 307].

For Gracián the owl is a symbol of wisdom (*Criticón*, I, 123), an attribute indicated by Alciato in Emblem XIX, "Prudens magis quam loquax."

One of the best known of all the emblems contained in the *Emblemata*, entitled "De Morte et Amore" (CLIV), tells the story of Love and Death exchanging their respective bows and arrows. Gracián refers to this emblem on several occasions: "Sin duda es aquello que dizen, que trocaste el arco con la muerte, y que desde entonces no te llaman ya amor, de amar, sino de morir: amor a morte" (*ibid.*, I, 146).[11]

Gracián was also much attracted to the image, theme, and symbolism of the chains of Hercules, depicted by Alciato in Emblem CLXXX, "Eloquentia fortitudine praestantior." Hercules not only represents physical force, but more—inspired by the muse, he conquers by the power of persuasion. He is represented as leading crowds of people by golden chains, "las cadenas del Tebano," stemming from his mouth and attached to his followers.

¡Mirad qué buena regla ésta para estos tiempos, quando no están ya las lenguas assidas al coraçón! [*ibid.*, I, 335].

Pero las que muchos celebran y las miran y aun llegan a tocarla con las manos,

[11] See *ibid.*, III, 356 and *Agudeza*, p. 199 for detailed explication of the emblem. Consult also J. G. Fucilla, "De Morte et Amore," *PQ*, XIV (1935), 97-104; Professor Fucilla (p. 102) cites another version of this theme and emblem in Ambrosio de Salazar, *Clavellinas de recreación* (Rouen, 1614), pp. 272-274.

son las mismas cadenillas de Hércules, que procediéndole a él de la lengua, aprisionavan a los demás de los oídos [*ibid.*, II, 65].

... teníalos en son de presos aherrojados de las orejas, no con las cadenillas de oro del Tebano, sino con bridas de hierro [*ibid.*, III. 137].

Gracián describes the image most eloquently in Section V of *El Discreto*:

Más triunfos le consiguío a Hércules su discreción que su valor; más plausible le hicieron las brillantes cadenillas de su boca que la formidable clava de su mano; con ésta rendía monstruos, con aquéllas aprisionaba entendidos, condenándolos a la dulce suspensión de su elocuencia, y, al fin, más se le rindieron al tebano discreto que valiente [p. 307].

He also refers to the subject in *El Héroe* (pp. 19-20) and *Agudeza* (p. 132).[12]

The *rémora*, a fish which is supposed to have the ability to stop or detain a large boat, mentioned by Alciato in Emblem LXXXII, "In facile a virtute desciscentes," is also referred to by Gracián: "¿Es acaso aquel pescadillo tan vil y tan sin jugo, sin sabor y sin ser, que en fe de su flaqueza ha detenido tantas vezes los navíos de alto bordo, las mismas capitanas reales, que iban viento en popa al puerto de su fama?" (*Criticón*, II, 80). However, such tales from natural history were frequently repeated and it would be difficult to attribute a precise source.

Gracián, referring to Alciato, Emblem CLXXXIX, "Dives indoctus," calls a rich man a "borrego con un vellón de oro" (*Agudeza*, p. 234; see also *Criticón*, III, 124).

Emblem CXLIV, "In Senatum boni principis," has an engraving depicting judges without hands and the president of the court blind. In *Criticón*, II, 82, Gracián writes: "Y al mismo tiempo les fué mostrando con el dedo un hombre de bien en estos tiempos, un oidor sin manos..."

Alciato's Emblem CLI, "In vitam humanam," shows Democritus and Heraclitus, the former laughing, the latter weeping. Gracián on several ocasions refers to the attributes of these philosophers:

De esso, yo más quiero reír con Demócrito que llorar con Heráclito [*Criticón*, I, 241].

Coronava toda esta máquina elegante la Felicidad muy serena, recodada en sus

[12] Consult also Karl Borinski, *Baltasar Gracián und die Hofliteratur in Deutschland* (Halle, 1894), p. 45; C. L. Nicolay, "Baltasar Gracián and the Chains of Hercules," *MLN*, XX (1905), 15-16; Eugenio Mele, "Il Gracián e alcuni Emblemata dell'Alciato," *Giornale storico della letteratura italiana*, LXXIX (1922), 373-376; cf. also the conclusion of Joachim du Bellay's *La Deffence et Illustration de la Langue françoyse*, ed. E. Lommatzsch and M. L. Wagner (Berlin, 1920), p. 72: "... Vous souvienne de votre ancienne Marseille, secondes Athenes, et de votre Hercule Gallique, tirant les peuples après luy par leurs oreilles avecque une chesne attachée à sa langue." One must, of course mention the reference to the golden chains of Hercules in Lucian's *Heracles* (London, 1813), pp. 63-67. Consult also the brilliant essay by Ludwig Edelstein, "The Golden Chain of Homer," in *Studies in Intellectual History* (Baltimore, 1953), pp. 48-66.

varones sabios y valerosos, ladeada también de sus dos estremos, el Llanto y la Risa, cuyos atlantes eran Eráclito y Demócrito llorando siempre aquél, y éste riendo [*ibid.*, I, 178].

Tenía uno en la mano, celebrando con lindo gusto, una redomilla llena de las lágrimas y suspiros de aquel filósofo llorón, que mas abría los ojos para llorar que para ver, quando de todo se lamentava [*ibid.*, II, 68].

Gracián paraphrases Emblem CXX, "Paupertatem summis ingeniis obesse, ne prouehantur," in the following passage (*ibid.*, II, 125): "Vine a tomar el buelo, que pudiendo levantarme a las más altas regiones en alas de mi ingenio, la embidiosa pobreza me tenía apesgado."

The poplar is referred to by Gracián in the following terms: "... frondosas plantas de Alcides, prometiéndole en sus hojas, por simbolos de los días, eternidades de fama" (*ibid.*, II, 66). Alciato in Emblem CCXI, "Populus alba," states that the poplar is dedicated to Hercules and explains the symbolism of time thus:

> Hercules crines bicolor quod populus ornet
> Temporis alternat noxque diesque vices.

In Emblem CLXXXVIII, "Mentem, non formam, plus pollere," is the fable of the fox who, having entered the house of an artist, finds a mask and exclaims in disappointment: "O quale caput est: sed cerebrum non habet." Gracián apparently refers to this Aesopian fable: "Sobre todo, guardáos no os vea la vulpeja, que dirá luego aquello de "hermosa *fachata*, mas sin celebro" (*ibid.*, II, 248).

Gracián quite obviously has in mind Alciato's Emblem CLXXXII, "Antiquissima quaeque commentitia," when he says: "—Aguardad, señor—le dixo Critilo—; mirad no fuesse el Conde Obscuros, quando no ay cosa más escura que los principios de las prosapias; a Alciato con esso, en su emblema de Proteo, donde pondera quán obscuros son los cimientos de las casas" (*ibid.*, III, 225-226). Bernardino Daza's translation of Alciato's emblem may be cited to explain the passage:

> Proteo que a'l paraçer representante
> Semejas, y otra vez fiera pareçes,
> Siendo otra vez a'l hombre semejante,
> Por que en diuersas formas tantas vezes
> Trasmudas y conuiertes tu semblante?
> Soy de la antiguedad a quien te offreçes
> Y d'el primero siglo suma y cuenta,
> D'el qual qualquiera como quiere inuenta.
> (*Emblemas*, Lyon, 1549, p. 150)

Agudeza y arte de ingenio,[13] Gracián's most technical work, the work

[13] For a discussion of the *Agudeza* consult E. Sarmiento, "Gracián's *Agudeza y arte de ingenio*," *MLR*, XXVII (1932), 280-292, 420-429; "Clasificación de algunos pasajes capitales para la estética de Baltasar Gracián," *Bulletin Hispanique*, XXXVII (1935), 27-56; "On Two Criticisms of Gracián's *Agudeza*," *HR*, III (1935), 23-35; T. E. May, "An Interpretation of Gracián's 'Agudeza y arte de ingenio,'" *HR*, XVI (1948), 275-300; "Gracián's Idea of the 'concepto,'" *HR*, XVIII (1950), 15-41. The fundamental article on Gracián and some of his con-

which can be considered to express most precisely his aesthetic and literary theories, is literally studded with citations of emblems to illustrate the various types of *agudeza*. In fact, the number of citations is so great that Professor Praz in his superb bibliography lists the *Agudeza* among emblem books.[14] The eulogistic language which Gracián employs when alluding to Alciato in the *Agudeza* is further proof of his high esteem and respect for the author of the *Emblemata*. He refers to him as "ingenioso" (pp. 81, 204), "juicioso" (pp. 104, 123), "prudente" (p. 108), "Alciato, que no perdonaba su gran ingenio a género alguno de sutileza" (p. 140), "... que fué ingenio de los de primera clase y universal en todo género de agudeza ..." (p. 128). Emblematic references in the *Agudeza*, with the source in Alciato, are listed below:

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81: "De la agudeza por ponderación misteriosa": Emblem CLXXXIV, "Musicam Diis curae esse."

100: "De las semejanzas por ponderación misteriosa, dificultad y reparo": Emblem CXII, "Fere simile ex Theocrito."

104: "De las ponderaciones y argumentos por semejanza sentenciosa": Emblem CLXV, "In eum, qui truculentia suorum perierit."

108: "De los conceptos por desemejanza": Emblem CXXIV, "In momentaneam felicitatem."

112: "De la agudeza por paridad conceptuosa": Emblem XXVIII, "Tandem tandem iustitia obtinet."

123: "De las ingeniosas transposiciones": Emblem LXXXVI, "In aulicos."

128: "De las prontas retorsiones": Emblem CXXVIII, "Male parta male dilabuntur."

135: "De los encarecimientos conceptuosos": Emblem CLXXVII, "Ex bello pax."

140: "De los encarecimientos condicionales fingidos y ayudados": Emblem CVII, "Vis amoris."

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temporary theoreticians, such as Tesauro and Pellegrini, is Benedetto Croce, "I trattatisti italiani del 'concettismo' e Baltasar Gracián," *Atti della Accademia Pontaniana*, XXIX, Series II, Vol. IV (Naples 1899), memoria no. 7, 1-32, later included in *Problemi di estetica*, 4th ed. (Bari, 1949), pp. 313-348. Consult also the three articles by Joseph A. Mazzeo, "Metaphysical Poetry and the Poetic of Correspondence," *JHI*, XIV (1953), 221-234; "A Critique of Some Modern Theories of Metaphysical Poetry," *MP*, L (1952), 88-96; "A Seventeenth Century Theory of Metaphysical Poetry," *RR*, XLII (1951), 245-255. It may be of interest that emblems are cited very infrequently in some of the Spanish imitations of Gracián's *Agudeza*, for example, such works as Francisco José de Artiga, *Epitome de la eloquencia española. Arte de discurrir y hablar con agudeza y elegancia en todo genero de assumptos* (Pamplona, 1726), Fernando de Velasco y Pimentel, *Deleyte de la discreción y fácil escuela de la agudeza* ... (Madrid, 1764). See also Pablo González Casanova, "Verdad y agudeza en Gracián," *Cuadernos Americanos*, XII, no. 4, (1953), 143-160; Adolphe Coster, "Baltasar Gracián, 1601-1658," *Revue Hispanique*, XXIX (1913), 573-649; Giulio Marzot, *L'ingegno e il genio del seicento* (Florence, 1944), pp. 37-64; Ernest Robert Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Bern, 1948), pp. 295-303.

[14] See my remarks in *MLN*, XLIV (1949), 203-204.

146: "De la agudeza paradoja": Emblem CLI, "In vitam humanam"; p. 147: Emblem LXXXII, "In facile a virtute desciscentes."

164: "De las crisis irrisorias": Emblem CVIII, "In studiosum captum amore."

177: "De la agudeza sentenciosa": Emblem CXXIX, "Semper praesto esse infortunia."

199: "De los conceptos por ficción": Emblem CLIV, "De Morte et Amore."

204: "De los argumentos conceptuosos": Emblem LIV, "Ei qui semel sua prodegerit, aliena credi non oportere."

234: "De la agudeza en apodos": "Emblem CLXXXIX, "Dives indoctus."

274: "De la ingeniosa aplicación y uso de la erudición noticiosa": Emblem LVIII, "In eos, qui supra vires quicquam audent."

Besides the "Museo del discreto," which reveals some of Gracián's literary preferences, there are still others than can be inferred from his writings. Gracián showed a strong liking for the *Conde Lucanor*, for aphorisms from Tacitus[15] and Seneca, and especially for the epigrams of Martial;[16] in general he preferred sententious and didactic literature written in a concise style.

There are other characteristics of emblem literature that may account for its appeal to Gracián. The device or emblem is generally enigmatic, mysterious, recondite, and erudite—all qualities which Gracián admired and considered vital ingredients and aspects of *agudeza*. The following passages illustrate this point:

Mucho promete el nombre, pero no corresponde la realidad de su perfección; quien dice misterio, dice preñez, verdad escondida y recóndita, y toda noticia que cuesta, es más estimada y gustosa... [*Agudeza*, p. 80].

Cuanto más escondida la razón, y cuesta más, hace más estimado el concepto, despiértase con el reparo la atención, solicítase la curiosidad, luego lo esquisito de la solución desempeña sazonadamente el misterio [*ibid.*, p. 83].

Cuanto más recóndida la razón del desempeño, es más bien recibida por erudita, y que arguye la gran perspicacia del ingenio [*ibid.*, pp. 90-91].

La verdad, cuanto más dificultosa, es más agradable, y el conocimiento que cuesta, es más estimado [*ibid.*, p. 85].

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[15] Cf. also the following passage from *El Criticón*, II 164: "Lograron muchas maneras de instruciones de hombres grandes a sus hijos, varios aforismos políticos sacados del Tácito..."

[16] Consult Fritz Schalk, "Baltasar Gracián und das Ende des siglo de oro," *Romanische Forschungen*, LIV (1940), 265-283, LV (1941), 113-127; for Gracián's interest in Martial, see Anthony A. Giulian, *Martial and the Epigram in Spain in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Philadelphia, (1930); E. Correa Calderón, "Sobre Gracián y su 'Agudeza y arte de ingenio,'" *Revista de Ideas Estéticas*, no. 6 (1944), 73-87, especially p. 81; S. Parga Pondal, "Marcial en la preceptiva de Gracián," *Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos*, X (1930), 219-247; J. M. de Cossío, "Gracián, critico literario," *Boletín de la Biblioteca Menéndez y Pelayo*, V (1923), 69-74, reprinted in *Notas y estudios de crítica literaria, siglo XVII* (Madrid, 1939), pp. 59-72. It is important to note that in the second version of *Agudeza* (1648) we find numerous emendations and the addition of many translations from Martial by Manuel de Salinas. Consult M. Romera-Navarro, *Estudios sobre Gracián* (Austin, Texas, 1959), pp. 11-14; A. Coster, *op. cit.*, pp. 621-623.

Siempre es menester que haya reparo en lo que se propone y que parezca dificultoso, para que la razón salga más y campee . . . [*ibid.*, p. 153].[17]

The emblem, lending itself to both personal and universal application, but expressed through an "agent"—a motto, picture, or epigram—also serves as a cloak, a mask, a disguise. Admiration for this quality is clearly reflected in Gracián's extreme preoccupation with the problem of *ser* versus *parecer*[18] (one should also note such phrases as "soy o no soy," *Criticón*, I, 112) and *verdad* versus *mentira*; he twice cites a long parable on the latter topic from *Guzmán de Alfarache* by Mateo Alemán, an author whom he greatly admired (*Agudeza*, pp. 170-172, 261-262).[19] Here are some pertinent passages that show this aspect of Gracián's aesthetic:

La destreza está en transfigurar los pensamientos en trasponer los asuntos, que siquiera se le debe el disíraz de la acomodación al segundo, y tal vez el aliño, que hay ingenios gitanos de agudeza [*Agudeza*, p. 290].

El ordinario modo de disfrazar la verdad para mejor insinuarla sin contraste, es el de las parábolas y alegorías . . . alguna de cuando en cuando, refresca el gusto y sale muy bien; si fuere moral, que tire al sublime desengaño, será bien recibida . . . [*ibid.*, p. 256].

A un mismo blanco de la filosófica verdad, asestaron todos los sabios, aunque por diferentes rumbos de la invención y agudeza. Homero con sus epopeyas, Esopo con sus fábulas, Séneca con sus sentencias, Ovidio con sus metamorfosis, Juvenal con sus sátiras, Pitágoras con sus enigmas, Luciano con sus diálogos, Alciato con sus emblemas, Erasmo con sus refranes, el Bocalino con sus alegorías y el príncipe don Manuel con sus cuentos. La semejanza es el fundamento de toda la invención fingida y la translación de lo mentido a lo verdadero es el alma de esta agudeza: propónese la fábula, emblema, o alegoría, y aplícase por la ajustada conveniencia [*ibid.*, p. 257].

In Gracián's work we have a decided fusion of the temporal and the eternal,[20] didacticism and teaching through aphorisms, on the one hand, and, on the other, an eluding of reality and a seeking of that which is not temporal and spatial.[21] To attain this fusion Gracián felt

[17] Cf. also "La alusión con su enigmático artificio parece que remeda la locución y la sutileza angélica" (*Agudeza*, p. 235); see also pp. 101, 104, 112, 105-106, 96, 208.

[18] "Créeme—dezía el enano—que todo passa en imagen, y aun en imaginación, en esta vida: hasta essa casa del saber toda ella es aparencia" (*Criticón*, II, 200). ". . . ni ai antojos de colores que assí alteren los objetos como los afectos" (*ibid.*, II, 55). ". . . sobre todo, el hazer parecer las cosas, que es el arte de las artes . . . (*ibid.*, I, 219)." "Válese de la conversión o transposición comúnmente, transformando las cosas en otras de lo que parecen, y cuando tercia la malicia crítica, es más agradable" (*Agudeza*, p. 128).

[19] See also *Criticón*, III, 110.

[20] See Karl Vossler, *La poesía de la soledad en España*, tr. Ramón de la Serna y Espina, (Buenos Aires, 1946), p. 317.

[21] José Manuel Blecua offers a most convincing stylistic analysis of the *Criticón* in "El estilo de 'El Criticón' de Gracián," *Archivo de Filología Aragonesa*, I, Series B (Zaragoza, 1945), 7-32; consult also Leo Spitzer, "Über die Eigennamen bei Gracián," *Romanische Stil- und Literaturstudien* (Marburg,

a great need for devices of abstraction. With his keen "lúdic" sense when he dealt with the meaning or double meaning and sounds of words, he availed himself in a very special way of his source material. Such resources as aphorisms and emblems were no longer mere static illustrative material but were integrated organically into his work. Professor Schalk (*loc. cit.*, p. 121) refers to "Die Sprache nicht als Form, sondern als Formendes, als Ausdruck einer stets weiter bildenden Energie . . ." The emblem, compressed and abstract in form, containing a message of both individual and universal nature and application, but expressed simultaneously in manifold ways, such as motto, picture, epigram, and at times even as exegesis, evidently had a special appeal for Gracián by virtue of its stylistic as well as its intellectual constituent elements, and in a way served as a model for the organic character of his work.

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1931), II, 181-188; Werner Krauss, *Graciáns Lebenslehre* (Frankfurt, 1947). pp. 119-126; in a review of this work (*HR*, XVII, 1949, 169-171), Arnold G. Reichenberger refers to Gracián's aphoristic and emblematic thinking.

ANTONIO CONTI AND ENGLISH AESTHETICS

VICTOR M. HAMM

MORE work needs to be done in the study of Anglo-Italian literary relations in the early eighteenth century, particularly with that phase of the topic which concerns criticism and aesthetics. Hugh Quigley's *Italy and the Rise of a New School of Criticism in the Eighteenth Century* (Perth, 1921) is, for this purpose, practically useless, and J. G. Robertson's *Studies in the Genesis of Romantic Theory in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1923), though erudite, is misleading.[1] The present essay is an attempt to remedy only a small part of this deficiency, being concerned merely with one aspect of the work of a single man: Antonio Conti.

Of the eighteenth-century Italian critics who have been grouped together by Robertson as precursors of romantic aesthetics, Conti is the only one who spent some time in England, and the only one who seems to have been well enough acquainted with contemporary English writers and critics to quote from them and even translate their work. Born in 1677 in Padua, of an ancient Venetian noble family, he had became a priest of the Oratory and an amateur scientist.[1a] After traveling and studying in Paris, he went to London in 1715, together with other continental scientists, to observe a total eclipse of the sun. The air of London did not agree with him, and he retired to "Kinsington." It was then that he first became interested in *belles lettres*, reading English authors, notably Shakespeare ("Sasper"), Milton, Buckingham ("Buckincam"), Prior, Dryden, Pope, Shaftesbury ("Safsburi"), Addison, and Hutcheson ("Utchtsonio"). Sometime during his stay in England (interrupted in 1716, when he went to Germany apparently at the invitation of George I, but resumed the following year, during which he visited Oxford and Cambridge, and terminated in 1718, when his asthma drove him to Paris) he translated into Italian "a large part of *Paradise Lost*," according to his literary executor Toaldo, Pope's *Rape of the Lock* and parts of the *Essay on Man*, poems by Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, and other things. He was also inspired by a reading of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* to write his own tragedy, *Cesare*. It does not appear from the material at our disposal that Conti met the literary lights of the day in

[1] Professor René Wellek has recently said that "Robertson's attempt to interpret [the Italian critics discussed in his book] as forerunners of romanticism seems to me completely mistaken" (*A History of Modern Criticism*, New Haven, 1955, I, 292).

[1a] For these and other biographical details we are indebted to the "Notizie intorno la vita e gli studj del sig. Abate Conti" by Giuseppe Toaldo, contributed to Vol. II of Conti's *Prose e poesie*, which he edited. Toaldo was professor of astronomy at the University of Padua.

London (he did meet Newton, and later quarreled with him). He had come to London as a scientist and his literary interests only awakened in England.

Before examining the English literary scene at the time of Conti's interest in it, and the Italian's relations with English criticism and aesthetics as evidenced by his writings, let us cast a brief glance over the landscape of Italian criticism of the time.

"The conception of the 'creative imagination'," writes Robertson, "with the help of which Europe emancipated herself from the pincers of pseudo-classicism, was virtually born in Italy, to come to full maturity in France and Germany."[2] And Quigley similarly identifies the beginnings of romantic aesthetics with the "new criticism" which grew up in Italy in the early years of the eighteenth century. The writers who are supposed to have ushered in this new criticism were the group composed of Gravina, Muratori, Conti, Martelli, Calepio, and Vico.

It was in Italy, of course, that modern criticism was born in the Renaissance. It would be agreeable if we were able to accept this generalization again for romantic criticism, to conceive, with Robertson and Quigley, of a new renascence of literary criticism in the eighteenth century in Italy, coming to its full flower in the aesthetic writings of Benedetto Croce in the twentieth. This, however, does not seem to have happened, the case of the long-neglected Vico excepted. In the others of the group there is nothing like the Vichian *scienza nuova*. The two most notable theoreticians among them, Gravina and Muratori, were Cartesians, as Robertson and Quigley admit, stressing truth and reason above imagination and demanding verisimilitude and morality of poetry.[3]

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[2] *Studies in the Genesis of Romantic Theory in the Eighteenth Century*, p. vi.

[3] Robertson, *op. cit.*, pp. 37 ff., 52 ff., 91 ff.: Quigley, *op. cit.*, pp. 30, 33. Typical of Gravina's point of view is the following passage (*Prose*, Florence, 1857, p. 5): "Rules precede every work, and reason precedes every rule: as every noble edifice is built according to the rules of architecture, and the rules of architecture have for their reason geometry, which gives the proper rationale for every work of art. Now, that rationale which geometry gives to architecture, the science of poetry gives to rules of poetic." Even the "amazing *Discorso sopra l'Endimione*," as Quigley calls it (p. 34), is intellectualistic: "Everyone has in himself the flint to provide the spark, but only he awakens the hidden flame who can govern and direct his intellect in a straight line through the intricate labyrinth of confused ideas, placing them in symmetry and exact location... in such a way that all ideas hang in order from a single point and are fixed and linked to the summit of a simple and universal ideal" (*Prose*, p. 251). Emil Reich, who has written the best monograph on Gravina ("Gian Vincenzo Gravina als Aesthetiker," *Sitzungsberichte der phil.-hist. Classe*, CXX, Vienna, 1890), concludes (pp. 38-39): "Nach den ersten Capiteln der Schrift hätte man glauben können, es hier mit einem Manne zu thun zu haben, welcher gewillt sei, die Phantasie als treibende Kraft der Aesthetik, als Schöpferin aller Kunst anzusehen, späterhin aber erkennt man mit Erstaunen, daß vielmehr die Vernunft unbedingte Herrschaft auf aesthetischem Gebiete haben solle, daß die anfänglich so große und freie Anschauung Gravinas immer kleinlicher und enger wird." Muratori, according to Croce (*Estetica*, Bari, 1912, p. 551), was "uno dei primi a sostenere l'esistenza di una regola del gusto e di un bello universale, di cui la Poetica dà le regole." Poetry, says Muratori (*Della per-*

Antonio Conti, according to both, also underwent the Cartesian influence. "The Cartesian philosophy," says Robertson, "burst upon Conti, as on so many leaders of Italian thought at this time, with the force of a new revelation."[4] And Quigley: "With Conti the Cartesian and purely rationalistic elements in the criticism of poetry come to maturity."[5] Strangely enough, he adds: "and gradually develop into a more modern, more romantic theory."

At this point it is fitting to remark the radical confusion about the meaning of the Cartesian influence on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century critics, which meets us in the volumes of Robertson and Quigley. To both this was equivalent to a liberation of thought in the direction of romanticism. But if anything characterizes romanticism, it is the concept of the autonomous imagination and the expansion of the feelings. Descartes, however, hardly leaves room for these faculties in his philosophy. His dualism clearly demarcated the field of consciousness into the region of clear and distinct ideas on the one hand—the important area where truth resides—and the region of obscure and confused ideas on the other. It is true that Baumgarten, with the help of Wolff's elaboration of the Cartesian epistemology, via Leibnitz, worked the latter field and so laid the groundwork of romantic aesthetics. But the Italian critics of the eighteenth century, always with the exception of Vico, did not.

We can, indeed, no longer hold Descartes solely responsible for the rationalism of neoclassical theory and literature, as Krantz did, since rationalism has older roots than the Cartesian.[6] "Après 1600, surtout en France," says Bray, "la raison prend une importance croissante, que décèle la doctrine cartésienne en philosophie."[7] But even less can we hold him up as a liberator of the poetic imagination. Lanson, we know, went so far as to say that Descartes "cut the throat of poetry," and in our day Croce wrote: "Lo spirito matematico, diffuso in Francia del cartesianismo, toglieva la possibilità di una seria considerazione della poesia

fetta poesia italiana, Milan, 1821, I, 95), is the daughter of ethics, less austere than history, and more pleasing than rhetoric. Its object is truth (p. 66), its end to delight the intellect (p. 67). His notion of the imagination is that of the old faculty psychology (pp. 203-204): "La potenza o faculta dell'anima che apprende e conosce questi oggetti sensibili, o, per meglio dire, le loro immagini, è la fantasia o immaginativa, la quale è posta, per nostro modo d'intendere, nella parte inferiore dell'anima." Robertson is therefore wrong when he says (p. 94): "Muratori gave the dominating role to the imagination." A Cartesian cannot give the dominating role to anything but reason, and Muratori, by all accounts, was a Cartesian.

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 97.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

[6] Emile Krantz's *Essai sur l'esthétique de Descartes* (1882). The thesis of this book, as Bray says of it (*Formation de la doctrine classique en France*, Paris, 1927, p. 115), "manquait de bases sérieuses; elle s'est depuis longtemps écroulée." Cf. also G. Lanson, "L'Influence de la philosophie cartésienne sur la littérature française," *Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale* (1896).

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 122.

e dell'arte. Il cartesianismo non poteva avere, dunque, un'Estetica della fantasia."[8]

We know Conti's views only through the two volumes of *Prose e poesie* published at Venice, the first in 1739, the second in 1756 after his death in 1749. The first volume is made up of his original poems and his translations of French, Latin, and Greek poems. The second volume contains his translations from English poetry, some French writings (particularly two letters, the first to Mme Ferrant, the second to Maffei), and an Italian letter to Msgr. Ceratti. It further contains the "Notizie intorno la vita e gli studj del Sig. Abate Conti" by Toaldo, and Toaldo's digests of, excerpts from, and running commentaries on, the manuscript essays which he found and tried to edit.[9] "If all the works which Conti undertook had been completed," says Toaldo, "we should have a species of encyclopaedia, few being the subjects on which he did not begin to write . . . The manuscripts which have come into our hands are generally only sketches and fragments."[10] These papers, he tells us, "were in extreme confusion, hard to read, repetitious, and mixed with extraneous matter"; but he nevertheless tried to give as exact a rendering of them as he could ("un saggio più esatto che sia possible"). Fortunately the document which is of greatest interest to the student of English criticism and aesthetics, the letter to Ceratti, is intact, and is apparently given *in extenso* by Toaldo.[11]

We do not know when this letter was written, but its preoccupation with the idea of beauty is already foreshadowed (or declared) in the "Prefazione" which Conti himself wrote for Vol. I of his *Prose e poesie*, and in which he outlines the work he has done and plans to do: "The nature, the properties, and the effects of beauty and virtue, which in this first part [i.e., Vol. I] I have expressed poetically in verse, I shall in the second part [Vol. II] examine and discuss philosophically in prose."[12] He left only fragments and sketches of this second part. But in the "Prefazione" he outlines his theory of beauty and art in some detail.

He will, Conti tells us there, review what has been written on the subject by Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Boethius, St. Clement of Alexan-

[8] *Estetica*, p. 238.

[9] The list of these MS essays as arranged by Toaldo, follows: (1) "Trattato dell'Imitazione." (2) "Trattato de' Fantasmi Poetici." (3) "Trattato della Poesia Greca." (4) "Allegoria dell'Eneide." (5) "Illustrazione dello Scudo di Enea." (6) "Illustrazione del Poema di Catullo intitolato le Nozze de Tetide e di Peleo." (7) "Dissertazione sopra la Tebaide di Stazio." (8) "Discorso sopra la Italiana Poesia." (9) "Illustrazione del Dialogo di Fracastoro intitolato il Navagero, o sia della Poesia." (10) "Dissertazione sopra la Ragion Poetica di Gravina." (11) "Trattato delle Potenze conoscitive dell'Anima." (12) "Trattato delle Fantasie Particolari."

[10] *Prose e poesie*, II, 107.

[11] *Ibid.*, II, cxli-clxxx.

[12] *Ibid.*, I, sig. b.

dria, St. Justin, St. Basil, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and the Scholastics. These theories he will compare with those of Torquato Tasso, "Mylord Safsburis" (Shaftesbury), Crousaz, "l'Uctosonio" (Hutcheson), and others. The general idea in which all these authors agree, he says, is that the beautiful consists in varied and multiplex unity, but they do not develop this idea systematically, nor do they make explicit the different degrees of the beautiful. Crousaz, of all of them, best applies the general idea of the beautiful to man, the world, the arts and sciences, virtue, and religion, but he often confuses his own opinions with those of the writers he discusses.

The second topic that occupies him is imitation. All the fine arts, says Conti (we are continuing with the "Prefazione"), converge in imitation as their common idea.[13] This common substratum remains in spite of differences in the materials, media, and modes of the arts. Aristotle and St. Augustine made much use of this concept, but no one has yet analyzed it philosophically. He himself intends first of all to determine in a philosophical manner the difference between resemblance and imitation, then to examine the nature of imitation, its media, modes, and species, particularly poetry.

We can see, from Conti's account and from the reports which Toaldo has left us of his manuscript essays, what form this analysis took or was to take.

It is evident that the chief problems of the neoclassicists as a whole were centered on these two ideas: imitation and the beautiful. If the principle of imitation, uninspiredly interpreted by most theorists and critics, was the base on which the whole neoclassical cultus was built up, the strong Renaissance tradition of Platonism and Neoplatonism intruded an element of abstract philosophizing about the essence of beauty that did not really mesh with the Aristotelian approach to art and poetry. This is evident in Leon Battista Alberti, for example, and in the *Naugerius* of Fracastoro.[14] Distracted, moreover, by their veneration for the ancients and by the tradition of rhetoric as the inclusive art, the early critics of poetry never subjected these ideas of imitation and the beautiful to thorough analysis. They were more concerned with cataloguing the kinds and reducing Aristotle's and Horace's poetics to a code of rules. It was the method of Descartes that prompted the eighteenth-century effort towards analysis. Here the Italians, notably Muratori, deserve pride of place. Before Crousaz (*Traité sur le beau*, 1715) and André (*Essai sur le beau*, 1724), Muratori had applied methodical analysis to the ideas of beauty and poetic truth in his *Della perfetta poesia italiana* (1706). Before the culmination of the analysis of the idea

[13] See also the letter to Maffei (II, cxxvii): "L'idée fondamentale de la poëtique est l'imitation; il faut s'arrêter là, et en developper l'idée."

[14] Gilbert and Kuhn, *History of Esthetics* (Bloomington, 1953), pp. 184 ff., 191 ff.

of imitation in Batteux's *Les beaux-arts réduits à un même principe* (1746), Conti, as we shall see, wrote trenchantly on the subject. However, like Muratori, Conti is equally concerned with the idea of beauty, and proceeds, in the manner of earlier Italians like Fracastoro (on whose *Naugerius* he wrote a commentary), from Platonic premises. His points of contact with British eighteenth-century critics are on these very topics. In his reference to Addison, the notion of imitation is in the foreground; in his critique of Hutcheson, the notion of the beautiful is the focal interest.

Since the present essay is concerned, not with the aesthetic and critical writings of Conti as a whole,[15] but with his orientation towards British writers in these fields, let us now turn to these writers.

Neoclassicism reigned in England with a less monolithic uniformity of domination than in France, but it reigned nevertheless. The French critics and Descartes had their influence, and Rymer and Dennis applied the rules.[16] Not Hobbes, but Locke, laid the foundation of a new aesthetics.[17] "It was Locke's method that Addison followed when he wrote his important papers for the *Spectator* on the 'Pleasures of the Imagination.' "[18] Addison and Hutcheson were at the headwaters of that subjectivism which led to romantic aesthetics.[19] The transition from intellectualistic and prescriptive criticism to an aesthetic of sensibility comes with the philosophy of Locke, which emphasized the intersubjectivity of mind and things.

In Spectator No. 413 Addison explicitly refers his readers to Book II, Chapter 18 of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* for an exposition of the "new theory" that colors, sounds, odors are in the imagination rather than in things.[20] This subjectivizing of sense data threatened the absolute and objective standing of the idea of beauty.

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[15] There are two extensive studies of Conti's literary work: G. Brognoligo, "L'opera letteraria di Antonio Conti," *Ateneo Veneto*, 1893, II, 162-179, 327-350; 1894, I, 137-209, 311-360; II, 49-84, 225-254; Michele Melillo, "L'opera filosofica di Antonio Conti," *Ateneo Veneto*, 1910, pp. 325-374; 1911, pp. 21-165.

[16] See, among others, A. F. B. Clark, *Boileau and the French Classical Critics in England* (1660-1830) (Paris, 1925); J. E. Spingarn, ed., *Seventeenth Century Critical Essays*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1908); J. W. H. Atkins, *English Literary Criticism: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (London, 1951).

[17] See Springarn, Introduction to Vol. I of *Seventeenth Century Critical Essays*. Clarence D. Thorpe, *The Aesthetic Theory of Thomas Hobbes* (Ann Arbor, 1940), pp. 8 ff., gives an opposite view.

[18] Gilbert and Kuhn, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

[19] On the identity of subjectivism and aesthetics, see Benedetto Groce, *Storia dell'Estetica* (Bari, 1942), p. 17: "Estetica e soggettivismo sono cosí strettamente congiunti da formare una cosa sola, e poiché soggettivismo o filosofia dello spirito vuol dire genuina e schietta filosofia."

[20] Addison's distinction between primary and secondary pleasures of imagination, however, is not the equivalent, on the aesthetic level, of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities of objects. See the present author's "Addison and the Pleasures of the Imagination," *MLN*, LII (1937), 498-500. See also note 35 below.

Addison nowhere analyzes the concepts of beauty or of imitation as such. As the papers on *Paradise Lost* and on tragedy show, he accepted Aristotelian premises in his practical criticism. In the second paper of the series on "Pleasures of Imagination" he glances at beauty as the chief cause or quality productive of imaginative delight: "There is nothing that makes its way more directly to the soul than beauty." He does not define the beautiful, however, except as the agreeable, a relative matter: "There is perhaps not any real beauty or deformity more in one piece of matter than another, because we must have been so made, that whatsoever now appears loathsome to us, might have shown itself agreeable." Every species of animal, he says, anticipating Burke, has its own idea of beauty. Such a notion can hardly be an affair of intellect.

Conti had read at least Addison's papers on the imagination. In the "Dissertazione sopra la Ragion Poetica di Gravina" he says:

> Addison reduces the characteristics of poetry to the grand, the novel, and the beautiful. But all these things, are they not included under variety reduced to unity, that is, to beauty? Moreover, the beautiful, the novel, the grand, what are these if not the wonderful? The novel certainly is nothing but a condition. Whom does the grand, the beautiful, the novel please without the impassioned? Addison characterizes the three major poems in terms of these qualities, namely, the *Iliad* in terms of grandeur, the *Aeneid* in terms of beauty, the *Metamorphoses* in terms of novelty. It is true that these qualities are particularly prominent in the three poems mentioned, but they do not appear reciprocally in all three, since for example the beauty of the *Metamorphoses* does not depend solely on novelty, but on grandeur equally, and on the wonderful, the impassioned, and on all the other characteristics of poetic phantasms combined.[21]

Toaldo tells us that Conti made an extensive examination of the poems mentioned by Addison, and of others as well, and then constructed his own definition of poetry as "the art of making a system of artificial phantasms supremely delightful both because of the objects imitated, the language, and the modes of the one and the other."[22] Is it extrapolating too far to suggest that Addison's essays on the "Pleasures of Imagination" stimulated Conti to undertake his studies in literary criticism and aesthetics, studies which resulted in the dissertations, sketches, and letters that come to us through Toaldo's redactions?[23]

In the "Trattato dell'Imitazione," the first in the list of dissertations left in manuscript by Conti, the author is concerned with the nature of imitation in general and of poetic imitation in particular. Like Addison, he makes use of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary

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[21] *Prose e poesie*, II, 265.

[22] "L'arte di fare un sistema di fantasmi artifiziosi sommamente dilettevole e per le cose e per le parole e per i modi dell'une e dell'altre" (II, 265).

[23] See Conti's own statement in the "Prefazione" (I, sig. i): "In tutto il corso della mia vita non mi applicai che alla Filosofia, alla Matematica, ed alla Teologia naturale e rivelata; ma sforzato di gravi infermità, che mi molestarono in Inghilterra ed in Francia, mi applicai alla Poesia per un accidente, che io chiamerò fortunato, perchè mi servì molto di sollievo."

qualities of bodies, but develops a keener analysis of the notion of resemblance, which Addison had left confused. Resemblance (*similiglianza*), he says, is nothing but "an illusion born of a precipitate judgment of our mind, since the more we reflect on things the less alike we find them."[24] He distinguishes various degrees of resemblance or falsity (*sic*) of judgment, the highest when we abandon ourselves to sensation without reflection, the lowest when reflection entirely corrects sensation.

He puts this in terms of theorems and corollaries: Theorem I: Resemblance is in direct ratio to sensation and in inverse ratio to reflection. Corollary 1: When the vivacity of the sensation in a given case is greater than any assignable quantity, resemblance degenerates into identity, and all distinction disappears. Corollary 2: Resemblance is lost when copies are multiplied. Corollary 3: Resemblance depends on original (or in Locke's terms, primary) qualities of bodies.[25] Theorem II: In the case of a present object related to a distant one in place of which the phantasm serves, the perceptions of resemblance are in direct ratio to the vivacity of the sensations and the phantasms. If the phantasm is weak, the resemblance is almost nil. Theorem III: In the case of phantasm compared with phantasm, the resemblance is in direct ratio to the sensations and to the multitude of phantasms gathered together and expressed, and in inverse ratio to the artifice employed by the artist.

This rigorous, almost mathematical, analysis does not recommend itself to the literary mind, but the philosopher must perform such processes, particularly if he is an eighteenth-century philosopher. Had anyone done this with the idea of resemblance before Conti?

The rest of the treatise concerns itself with imitation in nature and in the arts. There are two terms involved: the original and the copy. According to Toaldo, four chapters of the treatise are to be devoted to natural imitations, "namely, the infinite sorts of nature's jokes, in which perhaps our fancy works more than the reality of the similitude." Conti then classifies the arts in terms of their media, with particular attention to music and its power to imitate passions and emotions. (Later in the century music was removed from the category of imitative arts.)[26]

The last part of the treatise, says Toaldo, is "confusissimo."[27] Conti deduces the general idea of imitation, which is that "to imitate is nothing else than to represent in such a fashion that the representations will make on the sense organs and on the mind impressions analogous to those which the things themselves make." But human and natural objects have infinite facets and relations, and so they cannot be imitated

[24] Cf. Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, bk. II, chap. 11, paragraph 2; a passage quoted by Addison in *Spectator* No. 62 (on wit).

[25] II, 109 ff.

[26] Thomas Munro, *The Arts and their Interrelations* (New York, 1949), pp. 188 ff.

[27] II, 124.

by being represented in all their parts, circumstances, qualities, effects, and relations. Here, therefore, is the principal difference between works of nature and works of art. The more we examine, for example, animals and plants, the more we find remaining in them to discover; the more we examine works of art, the more we find lacking in them. In art some parts are chosen, others suppressed, and in this selection and rejection consist all the power and finesse of the artist, whose principal rule will be to select in conformity with his design ("scopo").

Not content with this exhaustive study, Conti planned a "Trattato de' Fantasmi Poetici," which might be translated "Treatise on Poetic Images." This work, which he outlined in his "Prefazione" to Vol. I, would have comprised, as his literary executor tells us, the whole corpus of the art of poetry. In his outline of the projected treatise, Conti frames a fuller definition of poetry than that already quoted above:

> I infer that poetry is nothing else than a system of supremely delightful phantasms, representative of things human and divine, sometimes allegorically but always enthusiastically and harmoniously expressed, and applied by the civil power in order to teach truth and virtue. This idea is complex, but it includes the matter, form, mode, and final cause of poetry.

He then takes as his point of departure Bacon's threefold ascription of the sciences to memory, imagination, and understanding.[28]

> If I do not deceive myself, the members of this division are neither adequate, nor opposed, since they enter the one into the other, by reason of the reciprocal and necessary assistance which these powers lend one another in their operation: there is no phantasm without memory, nor does the mind compare and understand the species of things, that is to say reason, independently of phantasms in the present state of life.

On the other hand, he continues, to restrict poetry to bare imagination, without discriminating qualities of imagination, is a theoretical principle too vague and general, because it is common to all the sciences and arts. The philosopher, the mathematician, the politician, the sculptor, the architect, etc., have need of a particular kind of imagination if they want to succeed in their arts. Conti will seek the nature of poetic imagination in the vivacity, the agility, the abundance, and the sensible order of systematic phantasms.

What is the imagination ("fantasia") proper to the poet? Imagination sometimes degenerates into sense, as in dreams, in drunkenness, in madness; this kind of imagination can be called, says Conti, *sensific*. At other times the imagination, fixing itself on some phantasm, forms a spectre, as in certain fixations of the mind; this sort of imagination, mother of visions, may be termed *visific*. A third type arises out of the fact that, "if the soul delights in the true, as in the good, it does not

[28] *Of the Advancement of Learning*, paragraph 13: "The parts of humane learning have reference to the three parts of Man's Understanding . . . : History to his Memory, Poesy to his Imagination, and Philosophy to his Reason."

delight less in the appearance of the one and the other . . . If opinion is the queen of the world, as Pascal said, it is for no other reason than that, in spite of the love which men have for the true, they refuse to fatigue themselves." Thus they often prefer the verisimilar to the true, an image of the true to truth itself. This kind of imagination may therefore be called the *verisimilar*.

These three species of imagination can combine together, and then a contagious imagination is born. Such is the imagination of the poet. In order to imitate things and fabricate phantasms the poet ought to have a kind of sense and of vision; further, in order to awaken passion in others, he ought to be agitated inwardly. History limits itself always to the true, oratory sometimes to the true but always to the verisimilar, and poetry joins the possible to the one and the other.[29]

Three grades of verisimilitude are distinguishable: (1) the poetry of images which correspond to portraits in painting ("ritratti"); (2) the poetry of images which correspond to natural figures ("immagini"); (3) the poetry of images which correspond to visual images ("spettri").[30] In the first grade only historically or scientifically true objects are represented; in the second, partly true and partly feigned; in the third, entirely feigned objects. The first is represented by Lucretius's *De Rerum Natura* and the *Bucolics* of Virgil; it is close to philosophy, and generates little emotion beyond the pleasure of comparing the copy and the original. The last is represented by the *Iliad* and the *Aeneid* and by the odes of Pindar; it requires the greatest enthusiasm, in order to express itself with force and energy and to excite the most vivid feelings. The second demands a certain gifted and enthusiastic temper, as may be seen in the *Georgics* of Virgil, in Silius Italicus, etc.

There follows an account of the properties of poetic images, and first of the true and the verisimilar. Though the soul loves truth and seeks it as a good, nevertheless she does not want to listen to truths that are too complicated in their proof. Therefore poets, when they sing of knowledge or of facts, will always select those that are curious rather than difficult, but wonderful rather than involved. One must not (as, for example, Buffier does) reason in poetry as one does in metaphysics, where everything reduces itself to pure spirit. Conti then indicates ways of making the wonderful credible: (1) tell a big lie with impudence; (2) join to the false a multitude of small but verisimilar circumstances;

[29] "La Poesia ha commune l'imitazione e l'allegoria colla Storia, e con la Filosofia" ("Prefazione," sig. d). "Nell'imitazione dunque delle cose universali consiste propriamente la differenza della Poesia della Filosofia, che non è imitazione; dall' oratoria e dalla storia, che non riguardano l'universale." Poetry is further distinguished from both by meter. ("Illustrazione del Dialogo di Fracastoro Intitolato il Navagero, o sia Della Poesia," II, 245.)

[30] In the "Prefazione" Conti compares the first kind of *fantasmi*, the "ritratti," to Plato's "icastic" images, the second and third to Plato's "fantastic" images (*Sophist*, 266 d; *Republic*, 598 b).

(3) among many true things hide the false, so that, when the mind finds the most part true and that the most essential, it will believe the rest too; (4) as a last resort, have recourse to supernatural powers.

Thus we end in the very casuistry of of poetics. Addison would never have dreamed of such a minute analysis, but he may nevertheless have initiated it in the subtle scholastic mind of the Italian *abate*. We must not, however, forget the example of Muratori.

Of the other British writers who come into Conti's aesthetic lucubrations, the most important name is that of Francis Hutcheson, the author of an *Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (1725) and other philosophical works.

The importance of Hutcheson's development of the Shaftesburian idea of the "internal sense" or "sense of beauty" in the history of aesthetics has been recognized.[31] This "sense" he defines as "a passive Power of receiving Ideas from all Objects in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety."[32] Thus the function of Hutcheson's "internal sense" is almost the same as that of Addison's "imagination," save that the latter adds greatness and novelty to beauty as sources of the pleasures of the imagination, and is thus closer to Aristotle.[33]

In an important article ("Addison and Hutcheson on the Imagination," *ELH*, II, 1935, 215-234) Professor Clarence D. Thorpe discussed Hutcheson's relation to Addison, and "the great services he [Hutcheson] rendered in giving Addison's ideas on the Imagination not only wider circulation, but an added dignity and influence through his interpretation and his application of them. For it was Hutcheson ... who first gave currency to Addison's phrase 'Pleasures of the Imagination' as properly descriptive of aesthetic response."[34] Equally important is the fact, which Thorpe does not note, that Hutcheson clarifies the distinction, left confused by Addison, between "original" and "comparative" beauty (Hutcheson's terms).[35] Original (or absolute) beauty consists, according to Hutcheson, in natural figures which reveal uniformity amidst variety. Comparative (or relative)

[31] Gilbert and Kuhn, *op. cit.*, pp. 236, 241 ff., and *passim*; R. L. Brett, *The Third Earl of Shaftesbury. A Study in Eighteenth-Century Literary Theory* (London, 1951), pp. 131 ff. The full title of Hutcheson's essay (first edition) is: "An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue: in Two Treatises. In which the Principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are explain'd and defended, against the Author of the 'Fable of the Bees': and the Ideas of Moral Good and Evil are establish'd, according to the Sentiments of the ancient Moralists. With an Attempt to introduce a Mathematical Calculation in Subjects of Morality."

[32] *Inquiry*, p. 75.

[33] *Poetics*, 1450 b, 34; 1461 b, 9.

[34] *Op. cit.*, p. 215.

[35] In my article cited above (note 20) I point out that Addison has not made clear to himself whether it is objective immediacy which distinguishes primary from secondary causes of imaginative pleasure, or originality, as in natural objects. It is this distinction that Hutcheson clarifies.

beauty, on the other hand, is "that which is apprehended in any *Object* commonly consider'd as an *Imitation* of some Original."[36] This second kind of beauty is founded on "a *Conformity*, or a kind of *Unity*, between the Original and the Copy."[37] The original might even be void of intrinsic beauty, e.g., rude rocks or the deformities of age. Throughout his book Hutcheson stresses the instinctive and irreducible nature of the sense which passively responds to "unity amidst variety."

At this point Conti re-enters the picture. In the letter to Ceratti, already referred to, Hutcheson plays the leading role.[38] This letter is an elaborate discourse on beauty. Conti tells us at the outset that he will discuss three types of beauty: (1) human and animate beauty in general; (2) the beauty of inanimate things; (3) the beauty of virtue. Hutcheson's ideas are in Conti's mind throughout the essay; he is mentioned at the very beginning. Conti tells Ceratti that he will seek the material and the object of the pleasure of the beautiful in resemblance, order, and harmony, and its form in the mind's experience relative to its own perfections, and will prove the inutility of the new sense invented for the beautiful by a Scottish mathematician ("un Matematico Scozzese").[39] In the entire course of his inquiry he follows the scholastic method as perfected by Wolff.[40]

Symmetry is the basis of the beauty of the human body, and human beauty the canon of the beauty of inanimate things. On this foundation Conti defines beauty as "an accord of the proportions of the parts and colors which in the most lively and easy manner represent the uses to which a body united to a mind is destined."[41] Beauty is a relative idea, a mixture of the corporeal and incorporeal. Too much uniformity bores; too much variety distracts and confuses. Ideal beauty combines the right proportions of both. Conti cites Wolff's description of the mind as engaging continually in tacit syllogizing, working with obscure and confused ideas of which it is barely conscious, as if they were so many

[36] *Inquiry*, p. 35.

[37] "The Original may be either some Object in *Nature* or some *establish'd Idea*, for if there be any known *Idea* as a Standard, and Rules to fix this Image or *Idea* by, we may make a *beautiful Imagination*. Thus a *Statuary*, *Painter*, or *Poet*, may please us with an Hercules, if his Piece retains that *Grandeur*, and those marks of *strength* and *courage*, which we imagine in that Hero."

[38] Since Hutcheson's *Inquiry* was not published until 1725, Conti's letter to Ceratti, which is undated, cannot have an earlier date. There were four editions of Hutcheson's book, each expanded beyond the preceding, but Conti's references are so general that it is impossible to determine which edition he used. I therefore cite from the first as the most likely.

[39] *Prose e poesie*, II, cxli. As a matter of fact, Hutcheson was born and lived in Ireland until his appointment as professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow in 1729. Since Conti apparently thought of Hutcheson as a Scotsman, he was probably writing some time after that date.

[40] Melillo (*Ateneo Veneto*, 1910, p. 346) calls Wolff "la guida costante ed il maestro di Conti."

[41] II, clxii.

different premises on which followed the state expressed by the conclusion.[42]

Such reasoning is instantaneous, but the brevity of time involved in the process does not diminish or change its nature as reasoning. When the mind (*ragione*) perceives a beautiful body, it discerns the proportion of parts and colors, compares them among themselves, and combines them in a complex idea. Thus, by presenting resemblance, order, proportions, harmonies to the soul, beauty ministers to the mind through a series of tacit syllogisms. Wolff is therefore wrong in speaking of the beautiful as the becoming (*il convenevole*); it is rather the true, the norm of our judgments and reasonings, which delights the mind. But, be the delight of the beautiful direct or oblique, it is always a completely intellectual pleasure; and, because the true object of beauty is incorporeal, while also dependent on the imagination and the senses, the mind does not enjoy it save through reasoning—which renders useless the new sense of beauty introduced by Hutcheson.

Why multiply the faculties? If the *sensus communis*, the *vis cogitativa*, the active and passive intellect, are banished from philosophy ... nevertheless the diverse functions of the soul do not indicate any the less the distinction of faculties diverse in themselves than the various motions of the hand, of the feet, the head, diversities of organs. Still, to reason with precision and clarity, three cogitative faculties have been distinguished, relative to their object, mode of perception, and action: sense, imagination, and intellect.

These faculties Conti defines in the traditional fashion, and mentions the important names in this tradition: Plato, Descartes, Malebranche, and Wolff, "who accurately distinguish reason from sense." Locke, however, he goes on to say, confounds the two, calling "ideas" the sensations of color, of taste, and of other sensible qualities, in which procedure many follow him.

I cannot deny that Hutcheson is right in thinking that pleasure attends the activity of the senses, the imagination, and the intellect, but before introducing a new sense for the pleasure of the beautiful, he ought to have assigned the limits of these three cognitive powers and demonstrated that the pleasure of the beautiful does not result from the pleasures of these three powers, but solely from intellectual pleasure, to which they reduce themselves if one makes a sound analysis of the operations of the soul. Hutcheson admits of intellectual or rational pleasures, which, however, he limits to the view of some advantage, even if this be nothing else than the increase of our cognitions. But is not beauty an advantage, if it is always a good which the mind admires, and if in admiring it has the consciousness of its own perfection either directly or indirectly? ... Where does the uselessness of this sense of Hutcheson appear more than in what he calls comparative beauty, and in the beauty of theorems? He calls imitations examples of comparative beauty, and such are the beauties of statuary, of pictures, of likenesses, of allegories. Nothing is more true, but it is likewise true that comparison is entirely the work of the mind, and that delight in it is entirely intellectual, depending principally on those tacit syllogisms which we recalled when speaking of resemblances, of order, of harmony.

[42] II, clxvi.

Adverting to Hutcheson's discussion of the beauty of theorems as instances of multiplicity reduced to unity,[43] Conti points out that the cognition of theorems provokes more pain than pleasure—the effort of concentration and attention is not pleasant.

But, supposing that reflection and exercise arrive at a taste for such subtle and delicate pleasures, it will always be a pleasure which the evidence determines, obliging the mind to give its assent to general truths and to their applications to particulars. If this is not an intellectual pleasure, what can be more so? In physical things it is only the evidence of the connection between effects and their causes that gives pleasure, and such connection is for the most part founded on similarities, proportions, or adequations, if you will. The more such evidence attends them, the more grows our pleasure, but sometimes it is impeded with doubts and uncertainties. Eager as we are to know the truth, when evidence is lacking we are forced to substitute degrees of the probable, frequently even of the possible; but the obscurity and indetermination that remain take away the vivacity of the pleasure we seek, sometimes suspending it by obliging the mind to hold up the consequence which, through a desire to extend our cognitions, we want to draw from the premises, and this causes displeasure... But in this activity do you perceive anything other than an intellectual pleasure or displeasure?

Admiration, as Descartes has well observed and Malebranche demonstrated, is not a passion but rather the beginning of everything. It is like a tickling of the soles of the feet: a titillation by which the mind is excited by the novelty of a situation and is moved to attend to it. In this disturbance properly consists curiosity, the mother of all the sciences and all the arts.

Now in the idea of the beautiful, or unity in variety, admiration comes from the novelty of the mixture and from the energy of the impression which variety brings with it. Perfect beauty therefore rouses the greatest admiration. Physical impulses act on inanimate bodies; just so the passions of the mind move at the impulse of admiration. Every new cognition gives pleasure, and reflection shows me that every pleasure can be attributed only to my mind.

Hutcheson could not ignore that that was an intellectual delight when he affirmed the powerful beauty of attitudes, airs, gestures, and movements to be founded on the indications of a mind morally good. Is there anything but the reason which can cognize such dispositions and, knowing, delight in them? Wisely Hutcheson transports this question to his Treatise on Moral Good and Evil,[44] where he admits a moral sense, an internal sense, which certainly has for object incorporeal things, and therefore differs from the sense which sometimes limits itself to the beauty of bodies alone; wherefore that sense is a mean proportion between that of the external senses and the imagination. But these mean proportions are not metaphysically definable any more than those entities, scholastically called modalities, which unite soul and body and which are neither altogether corporeal nor altogether incorporeal. What perhaps beguiled Hutcheson was the difficulty of separating from the idea of beauty the passions which accompany it. In admiration, joy is experienced, and joy is one of the primary passions. Now, all the passions are in themselves sweeter than honey, as Homer says of wrath. This sweetness, which is felt, and which is indeed sought for, Hutcheson separates from the passions and, considering that it follows, for the most part, the perception of the beautiful, makes of it a sense apart.

I say "for the most part" because there are cases where the sight of the beautiful

[43] *Inquiry*, sec. III.

[44] The second treatise in Hutcheson's book: "An Inquiry concerning the Original of our Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good."

does not make the least impression on the beholder. Suppose a woman more beautiful than Helen pronounced sentence of death on a man. She would make no impression on him by her beauty. He would, on the contrary, very vividly feel either a burning faggot thrust under his hand, or a jug of honey forced into his mouth. The internal sense of beauty has, therefore, no analogy with the external sense if the effect of the one is always and in every case infallible and that of the other not. Those who, before falling asleep, experience visions of a series of images which succeed one another rapidly find them very annoying even if sometimes they recognize (I am subject to asthma and have often observed this phenomenon in that disease), in the proportions of the parts of the apparitions and their colors, variety reduced to unity in the most harmonious manner. This phenomenon is inexplicable with the new sense of Hutcheson, which ought to have been roused by the notion of the beautiful, and is easily understood with the hypothesis of tacit syllogizing. The oppression or anguish born in a sick person of the blood which thickens, and cannot course through the fibres of the brain, deprives the mind of the faculty of weaving its tacit syllogisms, and their structures are thus so tenuous that they do not leave the least sentiment of that joy which is felt in seeing beautiful things, be they pictures, statues of even inferior symmetry, or the arrangement of colors in the phenomena of which I was speaking.

Even if I concede to Hutcheson that the pleasure of the beautiful is common to all men, in all places, and at all times, that it cannot be diminished by threats or increased by promises, and that more than any other thing it manifests the wisdom and the benevolence of the Creator—these reasonings do not carry with them as a consequence a new sense, but fortify the theory of tacit syllogism and of the consciousness of perfection. Hutcheson's first two propositions have already been demonstrated; the third is easy to demonstrate—one has but to consider that the wisdom and benevolence of the Creator is known through the proportions which God has created between things and the structure of our organs, between these structures and their potentialities, between these potentialities and their actuations.

Conti then considers the fifth (and longest) section of Hutcheson's book, where Hutcheson speaks of our reasonings on design and on the wisdom of the causes involved in the order of beauty. He concludes:

I therefore thank Mr. Hutcheson for the gift of a new sense which he has made, but I pray him to be content that, if my reason does not permit me to admit it to the rigor of philosophy, my imagination is more than ready to accept it poetically, as I did in my *Sogno*.[45] It is permitted to the poet to create new entities and new powers; and, if he gives passions and intelligence to things which do not have them, in order to excite greater wonder, who can prevent him from introducing a new sense of beauty into poetry, so much more agreeable since it appears to the uncritical that this new sense extends our being and increases our pleasures?

[45] "Il Globo di Venere. Sogno," an allegorical poem on the Platonic degrees of of beauty. It was published by Conti in his first volume (pp. 3 ff.), together with an explanatory preface in the form of a letter to Ceratti, in which there is a reference to Hutcheson's *Inquiry* (p. xiii): "Ciò che io quì chiamo giudizio connaturale, regolativo delle azioni morali, un Autor moderno [footnote: "*Ricerca sull'origine della Bellezza e delle Virtù*. Huctson"] lo chiama senso interno, senso morale, senso dell'ordine. Senso perchè precede ogni nostra cognizione, e si fa in noi, malgrado di noi; senso interno, perchè non è affisso agli occhi, all'orecchio, o ad altro organo esterno; senso dell'ordine, perchè la bellezza e l'armonia non sono che ordine; senso morale perchè dirige i costumi." Conti does not here criticize Hutcheson's notion of the sense of beauty, but merely describes it, compares it with the *nature* of the Stoics.

Robertson says of this letter to Ceratti, which, as a matter of fact, he discusses only superficially: "One cannot help thinking that had this letter been published when it was written, instead of not until 1756, it would have accelerated considerably the development of the science of aesthetics. Here, in this analysis of aesthetic pleasure, Conti laid the foundations of the philosophy of art."[46] But, as we have just seen, the letter is really an attack on the nascent aesthetics of Hutcheson (and implicitly of Addison); for, as Robertson himself admits on the same page, for Conti "aesthetic pleasure is an intellectual pleasure which every operation of the reason brings us." Here clearly, is no "cornerstone of the new science of aesthetics that was to be"! For the new science of aesthetics, initiated in a formal way by Baumgarten, is not a science of intellectual but of sensitive cognition.[47] Conti's exposition is rather a reassertion of the scholastic doctrine of beauty with Cartesian-Wolffian coloring, and a setback, if anything, to the sentimentalists. If this letter had been published when it was written, it would certainly not have accelerated the new science of aesthetics; it might instead, if it had received serious notice, have turned it in a diametrically opposite direction. (Furthermore, it seems to me that Conti's critique of Hutcheson is still valid, and deserves consideration in a total view of early eighteenth-century aesthetic theory.)

The aesthetic writings of Antonio Conti, though left incomplete and published only posthumously, should nevertheless interest the student, if for no other reason than that they provide a new footnote to the history of eighteenth-century Anglo-Italian literary relations.[48] Some may even see in them a valuable critique of those English forerunners of "romantic theory," Addison and Hutcheson. And those who read them in their entirety, as presented in the two volumes of the *Prose e poesie,* may find them to be keenly reasoned analyses of fundamental problems in aesthetic theory, important in their own right.

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[46] *Op. cit.*, p. 116.

[47] In Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* (1739, paragraph 533) occurs the definition: "Scientia sensitive cognoscendi et proponendi est Aesthetica, logica facultatis cognoscitivae inferioris." In his *Aesthetica* (1750) Baumgarten defines *aesthetica* as "scientia cognitionis sensitivae" ("Prolegomena," paragraph 1). Cf. Albert Riemann, *Die Aesthetik Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens* (Halle, 1928); K. Aschenbrenner and Wm. B. Holthier, *Reflections on Poetry. A. G. Baumgarten's 'Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus'* (Berkeley, 1954).

[48] Arturo Graf's book on this general subject, *L'Anglomania e l'influsso inglese in Italia nel secolo XVIII* (Turin, 1911), has only a few words to say about Conti's stay in England (pp. 56-57) and his translations from English poetry (ch. XI); Graf does not so much as mention Conti's prose writings.

KEATS AND HÖLDERLIN

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THE parallel between Keats and Hölderlin has often been suggested—so often that it tends to be taken for granted. Mr. Hamburger, in his introduction to translations of some of Hölderlin's poems, refers to it as a matter of course,[1] and it has found its way even into such semipopularizing works as Gilbert Highet's *The Classical Tradition*.[2] The fact is, however, that the only published work on record entirely devoted to this comparison was written by an obscure German Oberlehrer in 1896,[3] when the major part of Hölderlin's poetry was still entirely unknown, even in Germany.[4]

As the understanding and interpretation of Hölderlin has developed, his stature has steadily grown, to the point where he appears as one of the central figures in modern literature. Evaluation of Keats has shown a similar—though, of course, less dramatic—upward trend. A comparison may thus find a basis in the conviction of their common greatness, but it must necessarily remain confined to an enumeration of thematic analogies. The two contemporary poets were, of course, unaware of each other's existence and have no specific literary or philosophical sources in common; certainly, their respective Hellenisms are all too individual to serve as a starting point for comparison. And the language differences makes any comparison of texture a highly hazardous undertaking, which would have to be preceded by extensive comparative theories concerning English and German poetical techniques.

The most immediate value of a Keats-Hölderlin parallel is a clarification of Keats's major themes, which, as divergent opinions in recent Keats criticism well show, are far from being unambiguously defined.

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[1] Michael Hamburger, *Hölderlin* (New York, 1952), p. 89.

[2] Gilbert Highet, *The Classical Tradition* (New York and London, 1949), p. 378.

[3] G. Wenzel, *Hölderlin und Keats als geistesverwandte Dichter* (Magdeburg, 1896). There exists an Edinburgh dissertation, G. Guder, "A Comparison of Hölderlin and Keats in their Respective Backgrounds as Romantic Poets" (1938), to which I have not had access.

[4] The first reliable complete and critical edition of Hölderlin was begun by Norbert von Hellingrath, who died in 1916, and completed in 1923 by Ludwig von Pigenot and Friedrich Seebass. This edition, as well as the later one by Frank Zinkernagel (Insel Verlag), is now superseded by the definitive Große Stuttgarter Ausgabe, edited under the direction of Friedrich Beissner, of which five volumes have been published since 1946. Interest in Hölderlin has only just begun in the United States, as is clear enough from the article by P. M. Mitchell, "Hölderlin in England und Amerika," *Hölderlin Jahrbuch* (1950), pp. 131-146. Probably the most noteworthy addition since is by R. L. Beare, "Patmos, dem Landgrafen von Homburg," *Germanic Review*, XXVIII (1953), 5-22.

For this purpose Hölderlin's almost blinding clarity can be of great assistance. After a period of searching growth and experimentation, his later work succeeds in saying what he had to say with a directness and simplicity on which no discursive paraphrase can ever hope to improve. As Martin Heidegger's studies show,[5] this part of Hölderlin's work, from 1800 up to his insanity in 1806, allows for entirely internal exegesis. The burden of comprehension lies in the reader's capacity to relive the spiritual experience, which is stated with the greatest possible clarity. Keats, on the other hand, never had the opportunity to reach a degree of control over his poetic and spiritual impulses which allowed him to speak with full assurance.

His work, seen as a whole, tends to divide itself into two parts: the poems in which he accepts a limited theme and occasionally achieves a high degree of formal perfection; and those in which he tries to say everything but generally fails to maintain control of the overall texture. "The Eve of St. Agnes" or the ode "To Autumn" are clear examples of the first category, while *Endymion* and both versions of *Hyperion* undoubtedly belong to the second. Very little remains to be said about the former works, but the latter remain—and are bound to remain forever—objects of endless speculation. Whenever Keats criticism has gone astray, it has been in trying to force a thematic unity on the entire work. Some have tried to annex the entire "obscure" zone of Keats's mind by making it appear as mere sensation, on the most superficial level of the term; Mr. Newell Ford's reading of *Endymion*[6] is the most recent example of this trend. Others have searched for metaphysical complexity in purely narrative poems like "The Eve of St. Agnes"; Mr. Wasserman's book is the latest product of this school of thought.[7] Would it not be preferable to allow for the existence of a major and a minor Keats and to classify and evaluate the works accordingly? One would, of course, have to argue at some length as to where to locate such border cases as *Lamia* or even the odes.

In this study I shall undertake a close examination of the complex themes of Keats's two most ambitious works, *Endymion* and *Hyperion*, in the light of Hölderlin's treatment of similar themes. The similarity in title between Hölderlin's and Keats's *Hyperion* is misleading. In the general development of their respective work, Hölderlin's novel, *Hyperion*, corresponds to Keats's *Endymion*. After an examination of these products of the two poets' preparatory periods, we shall proceed to their maturation, to a comparison of the two versions of Keats's *Hy-*

[5] Martin Heidegger, *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung* (Frankfurt, 1951).

[6] Newell Ford, "The Meaning of Fellowship with Essence in *Endymion*," *PMLA*, LXII (1947), 1061-1076; "*Endymion*—A Neo-Platonic Allegory?," *ELH*, XIV (1947), 67-76; *The Prefigurative Imagination of John Keats* (Stanford, 1951).

[7] Earl Wasserman, *The Finer Tone* (Baltimore, 1952).

perion with the three fragments of Hölderlin's *Empedokles*. Beyond *Empedokles*, the comparison would be both meaningless and somehow unfair to Keats.

Hölderlin was more fortunate than Keats in the choice of his first master; as an example of literary excellence, Schiller is certainly preferable to Leigh Hunt. His well-known influence on Hölderlin appears very clearly in the early *Hyperion* fragment, generally referred to as the *Thaliafragment*. It was written in 1793 and appeared in Schiller's *Neue Thalia*, IV (last volume). The theoretical statement that introduces the text is very similar in tone to Hölderlin's later philosophical fragments.

> Es gibt zwei Ideale unseres Daseins: einen Zustand der höchsten Einfalt, wo unsre Bedürfnisse mit sich selbst, und mit unsren Kräften, und mit allem, womit wir in Verbindung stehen, *durch die bloße Organisation der Natur*, ohne unser Zuthun, gegenseitig zusammenstimmen, und einen Zustand der höchsten Bildung, wo dasselbe statt finden würde bei unendlich vervielfältigten und verstärkten Bedürfnissen und Kräften, *durch die Organisation, die wir uns selbst zu geben im Stande sind*. Die exzentrische Bahn, die der Mensch, im Allgemeinen und Einzelnen, von einem Punkte (der mehr oder weniger reinen Einfalt) zum andern (der mehr oder weniger vollendeten Bildung) durchläuft, scheint sich, *nach ihren wesentlichen Richtungen*, immer gleich zu sein [*Fragment von Hyperion*, II, 53].[8]

That Hölderlin should have put this key passage at the very beginning of his first important work is an impressive example, even at this early date, of the self-exegesis to which we have alluded. For it is indeed an accurate and complete summary of the novel that follows—not just the *Thaliafragment* but the final *Hyperion*, written in 1796—and contains several of the themes which will remain central through *Empedokles* and the later work. The two terms *Einfalt* and *Bildung* correspond to Schiller's "naiv" and "sentimental." In Hölderlin, the literary concepts become live experience. Simplicity is the supreme value, the state of complete innocence where a spontaneous friendship exists between man and the world that surrounds him, associated, in individual life, with the condition of childhood:

> Da ich ein Knabe war,
> Rettet' ein Gott mich oft
> Vom Geschrei und der Ruthe der Menschen,
> Da spielt' ich sicher und gut
> Mit den Blumen des Hains,
> Und die Lüftchen des Himmels
> Spielten mit mir.
> (II, 47)

Simplicity, *Einfalt*, then, is the starting point of all existence, an entirely self-sufficient and complete state in itself: "Ja! ein göttlich

[8] All quotations from Hölderlin are from the six-volume edition begun by Norbert von Hellingrath and finished by Seebass and Pigenot: *Hölderlins Sämtliche Werke* (Berlin, 1923). Italics are Hölderlin's.

Wesen ist das Kind ... Es ist ganz, was es ist, und darum ist es so schön" (*Hyp.*, II, 93). However, it does not prevail: "... ein göttlich Wesen, so lang es nicht in die Chamäleonsfarbe der Menschen getaucht ist." "Da ich noch ein stilles Kind war und von dem allen, was uns umgiebt, nichts wußte ..." (*Hyp.*, II, 93). With the development of consciousness the unity is destroyed:

> Freundlichen Götter! ...
> Zwar damals rieff ich noch nicht
> Euch mit Nahmen, auch
> Nanntet mich nie, wie die Menschen sich nennen,
> Als kennten sie sich.
> (II, 47)

The "naming" of the world and the claim of knowing disturbs the original unity and starts the long "eccentric road" which Hölderlin names *Bildung*. *Bildung*, consciousness by initiation, is thus directly associated with *Trennung* (the first negative key term)—the initial act of consciousness destroys the given fellowship of being. At this point in Hölderlin's work this is merely stated as an awareness existing within himself, as an expression of his own reality; the general philosophical and poetic motivation will come later. But he already knows that the separation is a free, self-willed human act of which we, as humans, carry the burden and the responsibility:

> Aber sage nur niemand, daß uns das Schiksaal trenne! Wir sind's, wir! wir haben unsere Lüst daran, uns in die Nacht des Unbekannten, in die kalte Fremde irgend einer Welt zu stürzen, und wär' es möglich, wir verließen der Sonne Gebiet und stürmten über des Irrsterns Gränzen hinaus [*Hyp.*, II, 101-102].

The language of Hölderlin's central subject is still vague and almost conventional, but the theme is there; controlled consciousness (*Bildung*) is the beginning of dissonance (*Trennung*) between man and nature.

The unfolding of consciousness, the "organization which we are able to give ourselves," consists of the series of means by which the original unity tries to restore itself. "Alles Getrennte findet sich wieder," says Hyperion at the end of the novel (II, 291), and the desire for unity is the prime mover of man's life, the supreme moral goal. The different stages of the initiation lead closer and closer to the final value of unity:

> Eines zu seyn mit allem, was lebt, in seeliger Selbstvergessenheit wiederzukehren in's All der Natur, das ist der Gipfel der Gedanken und Freuden, das ist die heilige Bergeshöhe, der Ort der ewigen Ruhe, wo der Mittag seine Schwüle und der Donner seine Stimme verliert und das kochende Meer der Wooge des Kornfelds gleicht [*Hyp.*, II, 91].

Such is the final destination of the "eccentric road" which, through consciousness, leads from simplicity to recovered unity. Part of this idea is familiar enough from many similar statements in the Sturm und Drang writers, in Rousseau, or in Wordsworth's "The Child is

father of the Man . . ." But, in Hölderlin, childhood is not just a state to be remembered nostalgically in the elegiac mood of the pastoral; the necessity to get beyond this mood is inscribed in reality. By means of a deliberate and totally responsible series of acts, man takes himself toward the recovery of this unity. *Bildung* is entirely aimed toward the future and takes on the urgency of a moral imperative.

Hölderlin's own thought continues to emerge in the statement that concludes the passage: "The eccentric road which takes man, individually and collectively, from one point (more or less pure simplicity) to the other (more or less complete consciousness) seems, in its essential directions, to be always the same." The idea is taking shape that this movement is not erratic or a result of individual caprice, but that its development is itself a law which the mind can seize. The *Bildungsroman* thus takes on a new significance; not only is the initiation determined by its two extreme points (from simplicity through separation to recovered unity), but the intermediate cycles are determined in kind and in order. The succession of events, instead of being mere accidents of destiny, is a first approximation to this law of gradual growth.

In *Hyperion*, the succession is clearly marked; if the sequence may seem blurred at first reading, this is due to the monotony of the amorphous texture; we are still far removed from Hölderlin's later economy. But the mere statement of events shows the hierarchy of the repeated cycles. All of them have the same inherent structure; a certain degree of unity is achieved, then destroyed, in a manner which is similar to the initial destruction of the unity of childhood. The underlying seasonal rhythm forms the natural background on which the human struggle for harmony takes place.

The first cycle is that of instruction, in which the figure of Adamas, presumably representing Schiller, accomplishes the first of a series of initiations. He introduces the hero to the existing body of human wisdom and reveals to him the greatness of the Hellenic world. The ease with which Hyperion outgrows this stage is characteristic of Hölderlin's assurance in freeing himself from influences, but the relationship between master and disciple remains an essential and growing theme to the very last poems.

The second cycle is that of friendship, exemplified in the relationship with Alabanda. The immensely exalted tone and the fact that Alabanda returns in later episodes are indications of the gravity which this experience assumes in Hyperion's quest. Friendship is one of Hölderlin's holy words; it is the specific mood of innocent man to be a "friend" of nature, not in the sophisticated manner of Theocritus' shepherds, but in a powerfully spontaneous way. In the friendship between men, this feeling prevails perhaps in its purest form. Friendship is unity and, beyond

that, it is conversation (*Gespräch*) within the sphere of unity, the worldly equivalence of the conversation between the gods and the child that was at the beginning of things. More than the ambiguous Alabanda, the invisible Bellarmin is perhaps the true incarnation of the friendship theme in *Hyperion*,[9] and the letter form is partly justified on that basis. In one of the later poems, the theme is still remembered:

> Wo aber sind die Freunde? Bellarmin
> Mit dem Gefährten? . . .
> ("Andenken," IV, 62)

The next cycle of initiation is of course love, as it appears in the Diotima episode. Taken in itself, this is probably the most traditionally "romantic" passage in Hölderlin—the lifting of earthly love to the level of experienced unity of being: "Zart, wie der Aether, umwand mich Diotima. Thörichter, was ist die Trennung? flüsterte sie geheimnisvoll mir zu, mit dem Lächeln einer Unsterblichen" (*Hyp.*, II, 215). More characteristic of Hölderlin is the place which this experience occupies within the general plan of *Bildung*. It is definitely only a step within a development, a necessary stage to be transcended. Diotima's solitary death is altogether different from the Tristan love-death, and her divinization is merely the divinization of the idea of unity and not the religious-erotic complex of Novalis' *Geistliche Lieder*. Her death marks the end of the directly lyrical love theme in Hölderlin's work. In the first version of *Empedokles*, Delia is merely a disciple, and in the subsequent fragments she disappears altogether. In "Andenken" women exist as highly stylized and remote figures, and only such women are present at the moment of divine revelation:

> An Feiertagen gehn
> Die braunen Frauen daselbst
> Auf seidnen Boden,
> Zur Märzenzeit . . .
> (IV, 61)

After the cycle of love follows the cycle of action, Hyperion's disappointing participation in the struggle of his oppressed countrymen. Of all the major experiences, this one is perhaps at its most fragmentary in *Hyperion*, particularly if compared to its later development. Its importance is clear from its position as the central episode of the novel, but the motivation of events remains arbitrary and disconnected.

Following a series of episodes which are mostly necessities of plot or side themes—Alabanda's departure, Diotima's death, the beautiful

[9] One of the complexities and probably of the weaknesses of the Alabanda episode is that the friendship is strangely interwoven with its antithesis. Aside from being the friend, Alabanda is a sort of antiself, the symbol of another "eccentric road" which Hyperion has rejected. We have a foreshadowing here of the relationship between Empedokles and his brother-opponent ("der Gegner") which was to be part of *Empedokles auf dem Aetna*.

"Schiksaalslied," the violent diatribe against Germany—come the concluding pages, which need interpretation. The last step in Hyperion's initiation, which permits the hopeful though suspended ending ("alles Getrennte findet sich wieder") is mysterious; all possible experiences seem to have failed or been transcended. The explanation may be found in the vision of Diotima's return and in the change of tone in the last passage. The apparition of Diotima is the only episode in the novel that has a supernatural dimension. And the tone of the final page changes from the elegiac memories of a defeated hero to a hymnal tone of lyrical praise. Does it not represent the inward movement of a soul which, up till then, has conducted its search for unity in a world that lies outside of itself? In the world of friendship, love, and action, the soul forgets itself in the hope of discovering a new unity. When it has failed, it turns inward and starts the same road over again, but this time with the additional dimension of inwardness. This is Hyperion's discovery, after he has run the complete course of his outward cycle. He has joined Diotima "bei den Deinen," in the life of the spirit. "Wir leben den Äther doch all' und innigst im Innersten gleichen wir uns" (*Hyp.*, II, 291). The revelation occurs in the spring; it marks a new beginning, a new cycle is going to develop; "Nächstens mehr" are the last words of the novel. The road from simplicity to harmony in consciousness leads through our inner self. The theoretical essay which connects most directly with *Hyperion* starts with the study of "der reine Geist, die reine Innigkeit" ("Grund zum Empedokles," III, 316).

Keats's *Endymion* can be, and has been, read in a great variety of ways. A recent article by Mr. Wigod[10] gives a comprehensive survey of the different schools of thought; they cover a wide range of conflicting opinions. But the main issue always seems to come down to the same point—how to relate the serious and coherent statement in Book I, the passage starting with "Wherein lies happiness?" (I, 777 ff.), with the desultory and apparently disconnected passages that follow. Is there any unity of theme or does the poem go entirely astray?

In his most ambitious works, with which *Endymion* belongs, there are good reasons to give Keats at least the benefit of doubt as far as both seriousness and unity are concerned—the most important reason being the undeniable organic growth of a work that, not unlike Hölderlin's, keeps restating its essential problems with increasing depth and lucidity. The assumption of an underlying poetic—or even metaphysical—unity of purpose is perfectly compatible with as apparently nonphilosophical a mind as Keats's. True philosophers deal with the issues common to all men. The difference between their expression

[10] Jacob K. Wigod, "The Meaning of *Endymion*," *PMLA*, LXVIII (1953), 779-790.

and that of poets (or artists, in general) is one of terminological exactness, and not of matter or intent. It is therefore possible that a deep analogy exists between a philosophically aware poet like Hölderlin and an intuitive poet like Keats, and that it is legitimate to apply, as it were, the philosophical conclusions of the first to the poetic utterances of the second. If there is indeed a definitely determined road along which human unity attempts to restore itself, the discovery of such a road in Keats's poem would substantiate the seriousness of the main theme and reveal at least some unity in the general conception.

On the basis of the "Wherein lies happiness?" passage and Book I as a whole, *Endymion* can well be described, in Hölderin's terms, as a quest to bring "our needs into a state of harmony with themselves, with the forces within us, and with everything we enter into contact with." We know of such a state by the revelation of an initial "situation of utter simplicity" in which this harmony was achieved "by means of the mere organization of nature." The pastoral opening seems to be the literary representation of this pervasive mood of natural unity which, quite fittingly, finds its symbol in the great God Pan, the god of ripening and of the dark rhythms of nature. He stands at the beginning of the mystery of original oneness. He is the "Dread opener of the mysterious doors / Leading to universal knowledge" (I, 288-289). He is asked to "be still the leaven / That spreading in this dull and clodded earth / Gives it a touch ethereal—" (I, 296-298). Awareness of natural unity is the beginning of our earthly undertaking. The theme is a persistent one in Keats; in its most implicit form, it becomes the freshness of his sensation which always maintains a kind of childlike openness.

In this situation of ideal simplicity, the torn hero appears, suffering because of his mortal condition which has destroyed his initial perfection. No longer a child, he has lost his happy innocence; Hölderlin's division has reached him. At the same time, he has attained the conviction that he must set out to restore this unity, which is no longer given him but must now be achieved "by the organization which [he] is able to give [himself]." His task becomes a quest for unity. He must feel again "A fellowship with essence" (I, 779) and step "into a sort of oneness" (I, 796). This aim is strikingly similar to Hyperion's ideal, "Eines zu sein mit Allem, was lebt, in seeliger Selbstvergessenheit wiederzukehren . . ." (*Hyp.*, II, 91). It is the main theme of both works.

Endymion, then, is a poem about unity, not about love, as Mr. Newell Ford would have it, not just about "ideal beauty that is ideal love," as Mr. Wigod argues. Neither is it about the ideal in general, in the Neoplatonic sense, but specifically about the ideal of unity—which, if need is felt for a philosophical antecedent, is a pre-Socratic concept

rather than a Platonic one. The line on fellowship with essence, in which the language, to some extent, is metaphysical, should be emphasized more than the introduction of Cynthia as "a love immortal" (I, 849); the latter line can be read as a metaphorical restatement of the former. The main reason for the confusion of the poem lies in the fact that the concept of unity is consistently expressed in a symbolic language borrowed from the experience of erotic love. Love is not a metaphysical category here, like the Platonic Eros, but a metaphor. This image is natural enough, particularly in a poet whose very concrete imagination always tends to see abstractions in terms of physical sensations—to which can be added the sensual obsession which, during the period when *Endymion* was written, seems to have made it difficult for Keats to talk about any experience in nonerotic terms. Further confusion arises from the presence, within the poem, of an actual love experience, in a literal, nonsymbolic sense. In the passages that deal with it, the language is descriptive instead of metaphorical. The actual love episode is given undue emphasis, for the very same and obvious reason which prompted the symbolization of unity as a sexual embrace. The introductory enumeration of themes generously gives "an orbed drop / Of light, and that is love..." (I, 806-807) thirty-five lines of development while none of the other themes receive more than five. This lopsided balance receives still further disequilibrium through the climaxes which, at the end of each experience, are supposed to convey the blending of achieved unity and which, in accordance with the prevalent imagery, are mostly stated in terms of "naked waists" and "fondling and kissing." No wonder it becomes difficult to keep apart the passages in which love is an actual experience, among others, from those in which it is a symbol for something else. But only at the expense of this effort can *Endymion* be given a thematic coherence which Keats's *Hyperion* amply substantiates.

Like Hölderlin's *Hyperion, Endymion* should be seen as a *Bildungsroman* in which we follow the different repetitive stages of the hero's initiation to the point where he becomes ready to recover the unity of being, lost at the start. Like Hölderlin, Keats feels this initiation as a series of experiences ordered in a general and deliberate pattern of growth. Even two such divergent critics as Mr. Newell Ford and Mr. Wasserman have emphasized the repetitive pattern in Keats's work, which they refer to respectively as "prefigurative imagination" and "the finer tone." The movement is constant in Keats, and he is himself aware of it. When it is first stated, in "Sleep and Poetry," it may seem borrowed from Wordsworth. But Keats keeps coming back to it, in moments of greatest seriousness, in the most important letters—to Reynolds on May 3, 1818, to George and Georgiana Keats on February 14, 1819, etc.—and in both versions of *Hyperion*. There can be no

doubt that this is Keats's deepest and most personal conviction; he sees life as a task of ever-growing consciousness, which has to encompass a wider and wider range of knowledge and experience, harmonized by the repeated awareness that moments of unity between the self and the world are the supreme ideal, around which the entire act of living has to be organized. This feeling is much closer to the forward-looking and deliberate *Bildung* of Hölderlin than to the elegiac recollections of Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey" or the "Intimations of Immortality."

The succession of the different stages is very close to that in Hölderlin's *Hyperion*. Book I announces the progression which is more or less adequately represented in the succeeding events. Starting from the spontaneous enjoyment of nature, we come to the "old songs waken from enclouded tombs" (I, 787 ff.). This passage refers to the discovery and study of the world of art and learning; it is of some importance that it does not refer to practice of art as a creative poet. Neither in Hölderlin nor in Keats is there a suggestion, at this point in their work, that their heroes will reach their aim by the practice of poetry. They are solicited by a wide variety of experiences, and their final choice is still much more general than the poetic act in itself. Endymion's delight in art is Keats discovering Shakespeare, Homer, and the Elgin marbles. These are the formative years of study, the discovery of the masters and of the past: "old songs," "old ditties," "ghosts of melodious prophecying." The theme corresponds to the Adamas passage of Hyperion's education, and it receives its allegorical representation in Book II, in the voyage "through the hollow, / The silent mysteries of earth" (II, 213-214). We can suppose the "dusky empire . . . with all its lines abrupt and angular" (II, 228) to be the severe world of science (of which Keats had some experience). Out of this world, Endymion moves into the more congenial world of art, mythology, and poetry, to reach the climactic ecstacy of the final scene—all in all one of the worst in *Endymion*.

It does not require much argument to present Book III as the development of "enthralments far / More self-destroying" (I, 798-799); the Glaucus episode has generally been read to express sympathy with human suffering and friendship, which then leads to humanitarian action. Perhaps the character of Peona can be added as another example of Keats's theme of friendship. Book III would then correspond to Hölderlin's Alabanda episode and to Hyperion's battle for the liberation of Greece, though the order of the two last cycles (love, action) is inverted, since Keats obviously wants to save his love theme for the end. The love symbolism, more or less incongruous in Book II, becomes more confusing here; the liberation of suffering humanity is rather bizarrely represented by the freed lovers. Significantly, it is this theme,

which is at its most fragmentary in both poems, that will become eternal in the later work.

In *Endymion*, Diotima's equivalent has become an Indian maiden, a nice illustration of Keats's lack of actual experience. He is completely stifled here by the inevitable clash between earthly love and unity represented in terms of love; this leads to the awkward complications of plot at the end. The only advantage, to Keats's credit, of the scenes of jealousy between Cynthia and her earthly rival is that the final statement, which remains rather vague in Hölderlin, stands out somewhat better here. Even Mr. Ford refers to the final decision of Endymion as an "eremitic resolution." Endymion's preference of Cynthia over the maiden is clearly a movement from the material to the spiritual, from exteriority to inwardness. If the union with Cynthia represents recovered unity, then the final statement of both works is remarkably similar; unity has to be conquered first within our inner self.

The unity of *Endymion* is thus the unity of the "eccentric road which seems, in its essential directions, to be always the same." The fact that the road actually turns out to be the same in both works is in itself an argument for Hölderlin's assumption, a more convincing one than either work could contain within itself. And it is a strong argument in favor of the true seriousness of *Endymion*. But both poems are preliminary statements of essential themes rather than their full poetical expression.

Their defects, too, are strikingly similar: oversentimentality and overintensity of tone; incoherence of structural design, despite the underlying unity of theme; overworked texture, which hides the real profundity of the idea under a superficial gloss of decorative diffuseness—with, in both cases, sudden moments of clarity which prophesy what is to come. These defects are closely linked to the actual statement of both works which, in fact, is a negative one. Unity of being cannot be achieved in the series of concrete experiences which the outer world normally offers. The coherence of existence, which Hölderlin boldly postulates and of which Keats has an ardent and groping premonition, cannot be perceived without going through the experience of inwardness. Neither Hyperion nor Endymion is capable of this, since they are incarnations of the self, which both poets have only just sufficiently outgrown to be able to objectify it. Neither Hyperion nor Endymion could see what their authors are only beginning to ponder in necessary solitude. And neither of their messages is final. The problems of the concrete lie on the other side of inwardness and will reappear within this new perspective. This will be the subject of Hölderlin's *Empedokles*.

Unlike Hölderlin's *Hyperion*, which is diffuse but perhaps all too simple, the three fragments of *Empedokles* are very difficult texts. They

were written over a period of two years, between 1798 and 1800,[11] and their difficulty is due to Hölderlin's constant growth and development during this time.[12] They form the connecting link between the early period, well exemplified in *Hyperion*, and the greatness of the later hymns. Keats's *Hyperion* occupies a similar position in his work; it accomplishes the same deepening of his original themes, in a movement that can be followed in passing from *Endymion* to the first fragment, *Hyperion* (April 1819), and then to the second, *The Fall of Hyperion* (December 1819). For no good reason *Hyperion* seems to have been neglected in recent Keats criticism, which has apparently devoted most of its attention to the odes.[13] Like Hölderlin's *Empedokles*, Keats's *Hyperion* suffers from being a work of transition towards summits which Keats, however, was never to reach. An examination of this parallel may help to bring out the considerable importance of a fragment which remains almost necessarily inadequate to the inexhaustable richness of its theme.

Hölderlin's development from *Hyperion* to *Empedokles* can be seen in the change which occurs in the central theme when, after turning inward, it rises to a new power. The ideal of unity, postulated in *Hyperion* as the final goal of a series of unconnected though necessary

[11] The original idea had first been stated in a preliminary sketch from 1797, the so-called *Frankfurter Plan*, which uses elements from Diogenes Bios (see Gisela Wagner, *Hölderlin und die Vorsokratiker*, Würzburg, 1937, pp. 97 ff.). Some of these elements remain in the first and longest version of *Der Tod des Empedokles* (*Emp. I*, III, 75-171); the second version, under the same title, is much more fragmentary (*Emp. II*, III, 172-195); and the third *Empedokles auf dem Aetna* (*Emp. III*, III, 199-227) differs entirely from the two preceding ones. There has been some question as to the order in which the three fragments were written. The Hölderlinian equivalence of Mr. Finney's thesis on Keats—putting *The Fall of Hyperion* before *Hyperion*—is represented by the dissertation of W. Böhm, *Studien zu Hölderlins Empedokles* (Weimar, 1902). Böhm considered *Empedokles auf dem Aetna* as the first text. In his later work, however, he took a different view; see W. Böhm, *Hölderlin* (Halle-Saale, 1928).

[12] This growth is reflected in the *Philosophische Fragmenten* which date from the same period. Exegesis of *Empedokles* is difficult without reference to these all-important texts, particularly the two essays, "Das Werden im Vergehen" (III, 309-315) and "Grund zum Empedokles" (III, 316-335). Some critics, however, prefer to deal with *Empedokles* without using this theoretical framework; see, for instance, Romano Guardini, *Hölderlin. Weltbild und Frömmigkeit* (Leipzig, 1939) or E. Tonnelat, *L'Œuvre poétique et la pensée de Hölderlin* (Paris, 1950).

[13] Among recent commentaries on the odes see F. R. Leavis in *Revaluation* (London, 1936); J. Middleton Murry in *Katherine Mansfield and Other Literary Portraits* (London, 1949); Allen Tate, "A Reading of Keats," *American Scholar*, XV (1946), 55-63, 189-197; Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (New York, 1945), pp. 447 ff.; R. H. Fogle, "Keats's Ode to a Nightingale," *PMLA*, LXVIII (1953), 211-222; Earl R. Wasserman in *The Finer Tone* (Baltimore, 1953). In contrast, the only recent article on *Hyperion* is by Kenneth Muir, "The Meaning of *Hyperion*," *Essays in Criticism*, II (1952), 54-75.

steps, becomes now a causally coherent and defined inner process.[14] Instead of being a static condition that can be reached as one reaches a certain point in space, unity is seen as a dialectical motion between two antithetical poles.[15] Unity (*Versöhnung*) is no longer a solution, but only an infinitesimal moment in a process. Hölderlin calls this process "Übermaß der Innigkeit," the movement by which a man rises to a new level of synthesis by going to the extreme of the opposites among which he lives.

Empedokles is the man who has lived through this process. He has transcended the dialectic of *Trennung* on the level of inward life, and has emerged with a new synthesis; in him the self stands out as never before, and through his word nature shines with an unseen splendor. Seen historically, he is the first man of the New Age, and, as such, he is bound to stand in complete opposition to his contemporaries. But, since his essential intent is precisely the reconciliation (however temporary) of opposites, he will feel his task to be the leading and instructing of his people, just as he has been led and instructed by his insight into the transcendental principle (here called nature) that stood beyond and outside of him. His situation, then, is that of a man whose inner greatness has grown in solitary but restless meditation, pledged to reestablish contact between the self and what seems to oppose and to ignore this self. The immediate consequence of this achieved greatness, however, is to involve him completely in the historical destiny of his nation. The totally inward man has to open up to the movement of history and, since he must be defining himself in opposition to the order that surrounds him, this involvement will take on the appearance of a

[14] This process is explained in the *Philosophical Fragments* that accompany *Empedokles* rather than in the drama itself. The lack of this needed theoretical background accounts to a large extent for the obscurity of the text, which also labors under the impossibility of expressing in a dramatic medium the lyrical development that precedes the concrete situation at the beginning of the action—Empedokles' inner crisis before his fellow citizens decide to reject him.

[15] The metaphysical definition of these poles is an important part of Hölderlin's thought, more essential to him than the dialectic itself, which, unlike his friend and school companion Hegel, he sees as an ontological *donnée* rather than as an intellectual act. At this stage in his development, the two poles are generally called *Natur* and *Kunst*. *Natur* is whatever is universal, infinite, undifferentiated, supratemporal—a concept which goes far beyond the idea of nature in a pastoral sense. Hölderlin summarizes these properties in the term *aorgisch*, as distinct from *anorganisch*, which would simply mean: not alive. Hölderlin's nature is intensely alive, but it is a life which has not particularized itself in an individual consciousness. (On this point, see Gisela Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 168.) *Kunst*, on the other hand, coincides with the human self, that being which, by an act of consciousness, recognizes itself as individual, particular, finite, distinct from the totality of being—summarized in this misleading term *organisch*. In the later work of Hölderlin, this polarity changes and the two poles are simply referred to as man and the gods, while nature becomes an all-encompassing, suprapolar entity. See, e.g., M. Heidegger's comment on the hymn, "Wie wenn am Feiertage," in *Erläuterungen*, pp. 72 ff.

struggle. The energy that carried him through the effort of reaching a new synthesis was fed by the knowledge that the existing order—the existing condition of opposition between self and nature—was no longer tolerable. It is clear, from *Hyperion,* that the reality offered to him could not have satisfied his need for conscious harmony. He has to seek and to fight his opposite, in the form of the static, stratified, and artificial order of the age. Seen from the point of view of his contemporaries, he appears both immensely attractive, since he holds all the promise of the new, and extremely dangerous, since he requires the destruction of all existing institutions. He will be loved by some (Delia, Pausanius) as no one ever was, but hated by others (Hermokrates) who thrive on institutional stability, while the masses of the people keep wavering between love and fear.

This is the situation at the beginning of *Empedokles;* and it is the same scene as that on which Apollo enters at the beginning of Book III of Keats's *Hyperion,* after an exposition which Keats has made more explicit than that of Hölderlin's drama. All we know about Empedokles' fellow citizens stems from the conversations between Hermokrates and Kritias (*Emp. I*) and Hermokrates and Mekades (*Emp. II*); the main focus is always on Empedokles. On the other hand, the first version of Keats's *Hyperion* devotes two entire books to the fallen Titans, the equivalent of Hölderlin's "hyperpolitischen, immer rechtenden und berechnenden Agrigentern" ("Grund," III, 329). Their relationship to Apollo is similar to the relationship between Empedokles and the leaders of Sicily. They are characterized by their strictly hierarchical, hyperconservative stratifications; they sound as would Shakespeare's Greeks, in *Troilus and Cressida,* after centuries of passive obedience to Ulysses' law of degree. Even at the brink of disaster, the undefeated Hyperion cannot freely break the rules of hierarchy ("Fain would he have commanded, fain took throne / And bid the day begin, if but for change," I, 290-291); and the speech of Oceanus, which is the opposite of Ulysses' speech in another famous council scene, is bound to be heresy to the Titans' ears. In total opposition to them, Apollo appears as the new man, the force of youth and future growing beyond the existing order.[16] Like Empedokles the self-achieved harmony of pastoral unity leaves him dissatisfied:

[16] A similar argument, with a different terminology, is made by Mr. Muir (*op. cit.,* pp. 59 ff.) in his contention that *Hyperion* describes the victory of "men of achievement" over "men of power." Men of achievement are characterized by "negative capability" which, seen historically, is the ability to conceive of the new. And the ethical problem raised by the apparent detachment of the poet gifted with negative capability is solved in *The Fall of Hyperion,* where this very ability takes on a tragic dimension which gives it great moral dignity. See particularly *Fall,* I, 161-176.

O Why should I
Feel curs'd and thwarted, when the liegeless air
Yields to my step aspirant? why should I
Spurn the green turf as hateful to my feet?
(*Hyp.*, III, 91-94)

and he grows out of his dissatisfaction by opening up to history, by becoming intellectually conscious of the dialectic of being which occurs in the world, as he knew it to occur within himself:

Knowledge enormous makes a God of me.
Names, deeds, grey legends, dire events, rebellions,
Majesties, sovran voices, agonies,
Creations and destroyings, all at once
Pour into the wide hollows of my brain,
And deify me...
(*Hyp.*, III, 113-118)

The distinctive originality of this passage and, at the same time, the deeper analogy between *Hyperion* and *Empedokles* appear in this résumé of Keats's historical awareness. History is no longer the static example of certain high achievements, as antiquity was to the neoclassic age, but a movement which includes destruction and chaos ("creations and destroyings, all at once...") as well as achievements. True historical awareness seems to be consciousness of the congruence between the curve of inner growth of an individual man and the outer real growth of the life of nations. And as nations rise and fall, live and die, so man's thought and development become a succession of agonies and rebirths, instead of the gradual and determined growth of Hölderlin's *Hyperion* or of Keats's *Endymion*. The growth of Apollo is stated in an imagery which suggests a constant interplay between life and death, culminating in the final paradox: "Die into life":

Soon wild commotions shook him, and made flush
All the immortal fairness of his limbs;
Most like the struggle at the gate of death;
Or liker still to one who should take leave
Of pale immortal death, and with a pang
As hot as death's is chill, with fierce convulse
Die into life...
(*Hyp.*, III, 124-130)

Similarly, the climax of *Empedokles*, his descent into the crater of Mt. Aetna, is to be an act of life-giving death. Seen from a point of view that transcends the individual, the point of view of the sage—Oceanus in Keats, Empedokles himself and Manes (*Emp. III*) in Hölderlin—the vision of history becomes the alternating movement of rise and fall of the often-quoted passage:

And first, as thou wast not the first of powers,
So art thou not the last; it cannot be:
Thou art not the beginning nor the end...[17]
(*Hyp.*, II, 188 ff.)

These lines have their equivalent in Hölderlin:

Es scheun
Die Erdenkinder meist das Neu und Fremde;
Daheim in sich zu bleiben, strebet nur
Der Pflanze Leben und das frohe Tier.
... Menschen ist die große Lust
Gegeben, daß sie selber sich verjüngen.
Und aus dem reinigenden Tode, den
Sie selber sich zu rechter Zeit gewählt
Erstehn, wie aus dem Styx Achill,
Unüberwindlich—die Völker.
So wagts! was ihr geerbt, was ihr erworben,
Was euch der Vater Mund erzählt, gelehrt,
Gesez und Brauch, der alten Götter Nahmen,
Vergeßt es kühn, und hebt, wie Neugeborne,
Die Augen auf zur göttlichen Natur.[18]
(*Emp. I*, III, 146-7)

The new hero who has awakened to this historical awareness—Apollo after his initiation by Mnemosyne—starts his task of leadership and instruction with a knowledge which his predecessors did not possess—the knowledge that his achievements are ephemeral. By accepting and requiring the destruction of what exists, he also accepts the transitory nature of his own undertaking and realizes that his birth contains within itself his own death. Since he takes within himself the total destiny of his people, he also assumes their failure and downfall as an inherent part of his personal destiny:

Denn wo ein Land ersterben soll, da wählt
Der Geist noch Einen sich am End, durch den
Sein Schwanensang, das letzte Leben tönet.
(*Emp. III*, III, 223)

Thus, what first appears as an act of intellectual growth and insight gradually takes on an ethical dimension of supreme sacrifice, of suicide in the highest possible sense. Both poets become increasingly aware of this as their meditation progresses, and their works shift from the theme

[17] Oceanus' speech has traditionally been interpreted as a speech on progress. But it is a very unusual idea of progress, since it states the necessity of decadence as well as that of improvement and emphasizes the discontinuity of all historical development. The new generation's main attribute is not so much any intrinsic superiority over the older, but primarily the greater strength of its youth, a transitory value as the following lines explicitly state: "Yea, by that law, another race may drive / Our conquerors to mourn as we do now" (*Hyp.*, II, 230-231).

[18] For a complete statement of Hölderlin's theory of history, see the essay, "Das Werden im Vergehen" (III, 309 ff.), of which the thought is actually ahead of the Empedokles tragedy and finds its poetic fulfillment in the later hymns.

of historical rejuvenation to the theme of sacrifice. The scene of the third *Empedokles* fragment is the slopes of Mt. Aetna, and the fragment deals exclusively with Empedokles' state of mind and vision immediately before his voluntary death; while the birth and death imagery of Keats's *Hyperion* is replaced, in *The Fall of Hyperion,* by the imagery of suffering and sacrifice which finds its supreme symbol in the Christ-like face of Moneta. The theme of love, which was so prominent in the early work, thus reappears in an altogether new light, as the sacrificial act of historical commitment by which a superior individual becomes the example which serves to regenerate his people. "Das Schiksaal seiner Zeit erforderte auch nicht eigentliche That; . . . es erforderte ein *Opfer,* wo der ganze Mensch das wirklich und sichtbar wird, worinn das Schiksaal seiner Zeit sich aufzulösen scheint, wo die Extreme sich in Einem wirklich und sichtbar zu vereinigen scheinen" ("Grund," III, 327). Before he realized this, Empedokles could rightly say that he had "Die Menschen menschlich nie geliebt, gedient" (*Emp. III,* III, 204); but, once he has seen his true role, he can die in tranquil serenity.[19]

The figures of Empedokles and Apollo thus grow from poet ("Er scheint nach allem zum Dichter geboren," "Grund," III, 326) to leader. But, by his act of supreme sacrifice, Empedokles takes on the dimension of the Savior. Both poets could identify themselves with their hero in the first two stages, but not in the last; there is no trace of *hubris* in Hölderlin or in Keats. Keats's allegory is clearer here than Hölderlin's. The identification Keats-Apollo is obvious enough, and Apollo, like Empedokles, grows to understand the necessity of love for "soul-making." He becomes one of ". . . those to whom the miseries of the world / Are misery, and will not let them rest" (*Fall,* I, 148-149). But the actual act of sacrifice is not within his power; and the poet is merely the one who has *seen* the sacrifice, with the mind's eye, as Moneta reveals it to him:

> The sacrifice is done, but not the less
> Will I be kind to thee for thy good will.
> My power, which to me is still a curse,
> Shall be to thee a wonder; for the scenes
> Still swooning vivid through my globed brain,
> With an electral changing misery,
> Thou shalt with these dull mortal eyes behold
> Free from all pain, if wonder pain thee not.
> (*Fall,* I, 241-248)

In *Empedokles,* the disciple Pausanius, who stays with Empedokles to the very last, fulfills the same function; but Pausanius is not identified with the poet as clearly as is Keats's Apollo. A later hymn of

[19] The analogy, in spite of important differences, of this theme with Hegel's *Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal* has been pointed out by several commentators.

Hölderlin, "Wie wenn am Freiertage . . . ," defines the role of the poet as necessarily distinct from that of the Savior. Before His arrival, the poet is the one who kept the minds of the people open for the perception of the sacrifice; during the crisis he is the one who has stood by Christ and understood His suffering ("eines Gottes Leiden mittleidend"), and, when all has been accomplished, he transmits the power of the supreme example:

> Doch uns gebührt es, unter Gottes Gewittern,
> Ihr Dichter! mit entblößtem Haupte zu stehen,
> Des Vaters Strahl, ihn selbst, mit eigner Hand
> Zu fassen und dem Volk ins Lied
> Gehüllt die himmlische Gaabe zu reichen.
> (IV, 153)

The thematic analogy between *Empedokles* and *Hyperion* is more profound than a quick survey of two very complex fragments can suggest. The kinship between the poets is partly ontological; both being total and very pure poets, they share elements that pertain to the being of the poetic as such. It is partly temperamental, in that both poets are, to some extent, metaphysically inclined—Keats certainly not in a technical sense but, undeniably, in his constant concern with ultimate problems, as appears in *Endymion, Hyperion,* and the letters.[20] But the kinship is also, to no small degree, historical—that is, typical of how a poetic consciousness was bound to react to the intellectual and political atmosphere of the early nineteenth century.

The Keats-Hölderlin parallel acquires a clearer relief if it is seen within the general perspective of contemporary European poetry. This cluster of problems, this specific relationship between the poetic, the historical, and the divine, has not ceased to haunt our modern consciousness. In more recent poets, the attitude toward this set of problems may have changed, but the continuity of their presence still forms the substratum of the present-day poetic mind. To explore the significance of Keats and Hölderlin as standing at the beginning of this development goes far beyond the framework of an introductory essay, but it would be a fruitful way to formulate the spiritual crisis which forms the background of twentieth-century literature.

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[20] "[Keats's] unceasing endeavor to solve the problem of sense and knowledge, art and humanity, is in itself an index of his stature." Douglas Bush, *Mythology and the Romantic Tradition in English Poetry* (Cambridge, Mass., 1937), p. 182.

JOHN GOULD FLETCHER AND RIMBAUD'S "ALCHIMIE DU VERBE"

RALPH BEHRENS

WHEN, after a dinner party in London, John Gould Fletcher first read his poems called *Irradiations,* then in manuscript, to Amy Lowell, Miss Lowell responded enthusiastically: "Why, my dear boy, you have genius," Fletcher's rejoinder was: "You will find that if you read Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Verlaine, Rimbaud, and Verhaeren carefully, that I am not so original as you think."[1] This frank admission of indebtedness to five such poets warns immediately of the difficulty that one must encounter in an attempt to ascertain any exact "influences" on Fletcher of any one of them. Since all the poets here named by Fletcher wrote in the manner that has been labelled "symbolist," and since, therefore, they employ many similar techniques and at times treat similar subjects, it is well nigh impossible to say of any single poem or phrase of Fletcher's, even when it echoes the symbolists, just whose is the influence that suggested the poem or phrase.

Perhaps because of this difficulty, the critics of Fletcher have for the most part contented themselves with speaking of general symbolist influence when they discuss his poetry; there have been only discursive attempts to study the influence of any one French poet on the work of Fletcher. Though the influence of Rimbaud has been generally recognized—by some critics more specifically than others[2]—no one has yet demonstrated the considerable importance of Rimbaud's theory of the "alchimie du verbe" in the development of both the theory and the practice of Fletcher in his composition. Nevertheless, here, it seems to me, is the very touchstone that shows most clearly the influence of the French poet upon the American, and this influence can be traced in rather great detail. My purpose in this paper is to make some specific comparisons between Rimbaud's "Alchimie du verbe" and Fletcher's poetic theories (as expressed in both poetry and prose), and to attempt some evaluation of the success of Fletcher in adapting theories that appear to derive from Rimbaud.

Although it may be relatively impossible to "prove" direct influence in all cases, it is certain that many of Fletcher's theories will be clarified

[1] John Gould Fletcher, *Life Is My Song* (New York, 1937), p. 91.

[2] Some works which indicate the general trend of Fletcher criticism over a period of five decades are: Amy Lowell, "The Imagists: 'H. D.' and John Gould Fletcher," *Tendencies in Modern American Poetry* (Boston, 1917), pp. 233-343; René Taupin, *L'Influence du symbolisme français sur la poésie américaine (de 1910 à 1920)* (Paris, 1929); Glenn Hughes, *Imagism and the Imagists* (Stanford, Calif., 1931); and Stanley K. Coffman, *Imagism: A Chapter from the History of Modern Poetry* (Norman, Okla., 1951).

and his techniques be more completely revealed if we look at them in relation to Rimbaud's. We shall need to examine only that section of *Une Saison en enfer* called "Délires II, Alchimie du verbe" and a single letter of Rimbaud's, dated May 15, 1871, to his friend Paul Demeny,[3] in order to make Rimbaud's theory abundantly clear. The letter is couched in much the same language as the prose poem and serves as a preliminary sketch of the theories that he described later as the "alchimie du verbe." We shall deal only with the Fletcher work that appeared in print between 1913 and 1918; many of his best poems are in these volumes.[4]

"The object of my own poetry . . . was, in fact," says Fletcher in writing of his work during that period, "to restate Rimbaud's theory of the 'alchimie du verbe,' and to prove that there lay in words themselves, qualities of evocation independent of their meanings."[5] Let us examine some of the passages from Rimbaud and see how Fletcher repeats, reflects, or, to use his own word, "restates" them.

Rimbaud is concerned primarily in the "alchimie," not simply with an examination of language, of the "word" itself, but with the method of the poet in his use of language also. We are not to suppose that the "alchemy of the word" lies in an alchemical action that takes place of its own accord. The poet must act in the capacity of alchemist; the poet is, so to speak, the agent whose function it is to discover and use a proper combination of word-chemicals to bring about a transmutation of the base elements of objective reality into the gold of poetic truth. For this reason, then, Rimbaud is concerned with explaining the method of becoming the poet-alchemist. He is also concerned with the question of what constitutes poetic subject matter, but more often with the "how" of the alchemical process than with the "what." Thus Rimbaud describes the method of becoming a poet:

la première étude de l'homme qui veut être poëte est sa propre connaissance, en

[3] Since the letter of May 15, 1871 was printed in *Nouvelle Revue Française* (Oct., 1912), it seems likely that Fletcher would have read it, for he was at the time avidly reading French and everything about the French symbolists. Another famous letter of Rimbaud's, to George Izambard, May 1871, in which he speaks of the poet as seer, was not published until 1926. All my references to Rimbaud are from *Œuvres complètes de Arthur Rimbaud*, ed. Rolland de Renéville and Jules Mouquet (Paris, 1951). They are taken from either "Alchimie du verbe," pp. 218-224, or from the letter to Paul Demeny of May 15, 1871, pp. 253-258. These will be referred to henceforth as "Alchimie" and "Letter," respectively. The volume of the complete works will be referred to as the "Pléiade Rimbaud." See "Bibliographie" in the Pléiade Rimbaud for first publications of both poems and letters.

[4] Fletcher himself paid for the publication of his first five volumes of verse, all of which appeared in 1913 in London under the imprint of four publishers. These volumes, to which I refer frequently, are: *Fire and Wine, Fool's Gold, The Book of Nature, The Dominant City,* and *Visions of the Evening.* Later volumes that we shall consider are: *Irradiations: Sand and Spray* (Boston, 1915), *Goblins and Pagodas* (Boston, 1916), and *The Tree of Life* (London, 1918).

[5] *Life Is My Song,* p. 90.

tière; il cherche son âme, il l'inspecte, il la tente, l'apprend. Dès qu'il la sait, il doit la cultiver! Cela semble simple:... Mais il s'agit de faire l'âme monstrueuse: à l'instar des comprachicos, quoi! Imaginez un homme s'implantant et se cultivant des verrues sur le visage ["Alchimie"].

Fletcher too had attempted to study himself, for he says "I am a poet and a mystery, / Each day myself as in a glass I see" ("The Poet, I," *Fire and Wine*, p. 71). Furthermore, he wrote a poem called "Anatomy of Myself," in which it is obvious that the young Fletcher had spent considerable time in searching his soul, inspecting it, learning it:

> Vestal withered and unkissed,
> Raphael with rheumatic wrist,
> Beautiful garment on an ape:
> Such is my poor body's shape.
>
> Orator who rants alone,
> Sisyphus rolling still his stone,
> Sunlight shining on the blind:
> Such shall be, through life, my mind.
>
> Titan fighting with a louse,
> Caesar keeping herds of cows,
> Runner starting at the goal:
> Such as these is still my soul.
>
> Emperor of desert sands,
> Don Juan in Boreal lands,
> Penniless Iscariot:
> Such, at last, must be my lot.
>
> (*Visions of the Evening*, p. 15)

Fletcher had, indeed, followed Rimbaud's advice to study himself. But we are immediately struck by some of the differences between the ways the two poets sought self-knowledge. Rimbaud conveys the idea that his study will attempt objectivity, insofar as it is possible to stand outside oneself and study one's own soul. His approach is not the romantic method of soul-searching. On the other hand, Fletcher's poem describing what he learned about himself is loaded with self-pity and a type of romanticism that approaches sentimentality.

In addition to seeking self-knowledge, Fletcher had sought knowledge in books, and he had become "monstrous":

> Encyclopaedic folios
> Have I searched, knowledge to find,
> Till my eyes became half-blind,
> And a wart grew on my nose.
>
> ("Knowledge," *Fool's Gold*, p. 19)

It is surely no mere accident that Fletcher should have employed the unusual description of himself with a wart on his nose. It seems likely that he remembered Rimbaud's recommendation to "imagine a man planting and cultivating warts on his face." And yet a difference again

appears between Rimbaud's and Fletcher's search for knowledge. Fletcher apparently believed that the knowledge necessary for writing poetry could come, at least in part, from studying "encyclopaedic folios"; Rimbaud, on the other hand, had felt that a study of himself and himself alone was sufficient.

Rimbaud continues to describe the method by which one becomes a poet:

> Je dis qu'il être *voyant*, se faire *voyant*.
>
> Le Poëte se fait *voyant* par un long, immense et raisonné *dérèglement* de *tous les sens*. Toutes les formes d'amour, de souffrance, de folie; il cherche lui-même, il épuise en lui tous les poisons, pour n'en garder que les quintessences. Ineffable torture où il a besoin de toute la foi, de toute la force surhumaine, où il devient entre tous le grand malade, le grand criminel, le grand maudit,—et le suprême Savant! Car il arrive à l'inconnu [Letter].

Rimbaud's daring in objectifying every facet of his personality is unusual. There is, in him, no sentimental attachment to any one aspect of himself. He will follow the regimen required to become a "poëte-voyant" much as a scientist trains. He will be able to study every phase of himself, as microcosm of all humanity, without bias.

Fletcher, however, though he would attempt to undergo the hardships that he felt necessary to being a poet, would not cease to be disturbed by the paradoxes of his own being. In a poem called "The Poet's Character" he tells us of his poet as he understands him:

> He is one drunken with monotonous wine
> Of rhyme divine and undivine:
> Who seeing all things scarcely shows
> He sees to the end of his own nose:
> Who hates the thing he loves, and makes
> A passion of the thing he hates:
> Who in the mountains seeks the plain:
> And in the sun desires the rain:
> Who flashes on life's evil flood
> Transient gleams of joyful good:
> Who lives in the north, and loves the south,
> And gainsays the song from his own mouth.
> Life is his death and death may be
> More of life than he ever may see;
> Hell is his Heaven: should he dwell
> In Heaven itself, 'twould be his Hell.
>
> (*Fire and Wine*, p. 47)

Fletcher does not speak of the poet as "seer," though something of the *voyant* is suggested by his description of the poet as one who cannot distinguish between "divine and undivine," who recognizes the paradoxical elements in his life, who sees all in little. But his poem leads us to believe that he has seldom objectified his experiences or himself. He, unlike Rimbaud, continues to be occupied with the contradictory elements in his own person, never viewing them dispassionately.

Fletcher also accepted Rimbaud's theory of the importance of the senses, for he says: "Through day and night and on through many days / Ever I seek sensations rude and strong" ("The Hosts of Song," *Fire and Wine*, p. 45). But "sensations rude and strong" constitute a rather mild substitute for Rimbaud's "immense dérèglement de tous les sens." Nevertheless, Fletcher, like Rimbaud, found it necessary to undergo the rigors of "suffering" and "folly," for he finds himself "freed" to write poetry by "drink, lust, starvation" ("The Price of Poetry," *Fire and Wine*, p. 60.) Again like Rimbaud, Fletcher felt that he had arrived at the "unknown" in his poetry:

> Beyond the keenest joys, beyond the realms of air,
> Beyond infinite peace where ended is all care,
> Beyond the dark abyss of the most vile despair,
> My hosts of song stream endlessly along.
>
> Sometimes they are a deep and dark-eyed pool,
> Sometimes a torrent harsh and terrible,
> Sometimes a swamp of ennui cold and dull;
> But each with all my heart and soul is full.
> The infinite only is my bound and rule:
> Stream endlessly along, you hosts of song!
>
> ("The Hosts of Song," *Fire and Wine*, p. 45)

There are, then, occasions when Fletcher feels, or perhaps only hopes, that he has objectified himself and his experiences in the manner recommended by Rimbaud. At any rate, both poets are convinced that true poetry must consist of the "infinite," the "unknown."

Rimbaud, after achieving a "dérèglement de tous les sens," had found it necessary to continue in that state: "Je finis par trouver sacré le désordre de mon esprit. J'étais oisif, en proie à une lourde fièvre: j'enviais la félicité des bêtes,—les chenilles, qui représentent l'innocence des limbes, les taupes, le sommeil de la virginité!" ("Alchimie"). And Fletcher decided that he would follow no rational pattern of thought in his poetry, for he says he plans to

> ... seize faint arrowy beams
> Of that infinite light that erratically streams
> Through the transfixed bounds of space and time,
> And I will fling them toward the deep
> Where the azure fishes sleep,
> To spear some vagrant thought or rhyme.
>
> ("The Poet's Autumn," *Fire and Wine*, p. 52)

He too had become "oisif": "So all my moments are a crime / And all are as idle as all breath ..." ("To the Public," *Fire and Wine*, p. 56). Fletcher admitted a desire to be "a cricket sun-intoxicated," "a rock, a flower, a brook, a reed," or a "quivering blade of grass." If he could become these things, he would "rejoice with nature in a new birth, / And every hour count life as fresh begun" ("A Pantheist's Wish,"

The Book of Nature, p. 22). For both poets, to return to the simple animal or vegetable state of life would be to renew innocence and truth.

Dreaming was important for both poets, whether it might be the dreams of sleep or so-called daydreams. Rimbaud tells us: "Je tombais dans des sommeils de plusieurs jours, et, levé, je continuais les rêves les plus tristes" ("Alchimie"). Rimbaud even lists for us some of the things he dreamed: "Je rêvais croisades, voyages de découvertes dont on n'a pas de relations, républiques san histoires, guerres de religion étouffées, révolutions de mœurs, déplacements de races et de continents: je croyais à tous les enchantements" ("Alchimie"). Fletcher has come to believe:

> That only in dim wonderlands of sleep
> To which the key is lost, in drowsing sleep,
> Is art transformed from out a broken cry
> To an immortal, effortless ecstasy.
>
> ("Dream Poetry," *Fire and Wine*, p. 67)

Rimbaud had had a taste for old things, faded things, dry things; he had debased himself in unpleasant things; but he had found the sun a purifying agent: "J'aimai le désert, les vergers brûlés, les boutiques fanées, les boissons tiédies. Je me traînais dans les ruelles puantes et, les yeux fermés, je m'offrais au soleil, dieu de feu" ("Alchimie"). Fletcher similarly expressed a passion for "twilight, for faded hours, / Old thoughts and seasons" ("Sorrow," *Fool's Gold*, p. 20). He desired to explore in his poetry "The steeps of the sky and the lowest depths of the gutter" ("The Poet's Desire," *Fire and Wine*, p. 48). He found his body, "once a beautiful house of marble," now "Kissed to pale rose by the passionate heat of the sun" ("The Poet, III," *Fire and Wine*, p. 73).

Rimbaud had lost his identity when he assumed the role of poet, for he tells us: "Je est un autre. Si le cuivre s'éveille clairon, il n'y a rien de sa faute. Cela m'est évident: j'assiste à l'éclosion de ma pensée: je la regarde, je l'écoute . . ." (Letter). He had said, "Depuis longtemps je me vantais de posséder tous les paysages possibles . . . " ("Alchimie"). Fletcher says similarly that he had seen himself as poet "Containing all, reality and dream." "I am a part of all," he exulted ("Time and Poet," *Fire and Wine*, p. 72). He saw himself as "Creator and created fused in one" ("The Poet, I," *Fire and Wine*, p. 71). In spite of the similarity of their two statements, however, one feels that Fletcher was never to become, like Rimbaud, another person observing himself.

Rimbaud tells us of his experiments with poetry:

> Ce fut d'abord une étude. J'écrivais des silences, des nuits, je notais l'inexprimable. Je fixais des vertiges . . . Je m'habituai à l'hallucination simple: je voyais très franchement une mosquée à la place d'une usine, une école de tambours faite par des anges, des calèches sur les routes du ciel, un salon au fond d'un lac; les

monstres, les mystères; un titre de vaudeville dressait des épouvantes devant moi.
Puis j'expliquai mes sophismes magiques avec l'hallucination des mots!

["Alchimie"]

Fletcher, though employing metaphor of his own, describes in "The Three Transformations of Poetry" a somewhat parallel process of composition:

I am the smith of words, lord of cold torrents of tone
That like flags tossed to and fro, undulate wide from my lips.
A fluid mosaic, each letter a luminous stone,
A stalactite grotto, all over which the light drips.

I am the anvil of moods: slave of the fulminate world
That, like a prismatic kaleidoscope, leaps instantaneously through
My soul: flamboyant flamingoes 'gainst torpid tortoises hurled:
Crome corollas confused with corollas chrysoprase-blue.

I am the iron of thought, the sword of singing enchased.
Let the dark clouds roll northward, the blood-red sunset pass!
I see aloft in the sky green gargoyles interlaced
Leering or scowling or dreaming from cathedrals of steel and of glass.

(*Fire and Wine*, p. 44)

We may well pause to examine this poem at some length in order to see some of the excellencies of which Fletcher is capable in his "restating" of Rimbaud's theory of the "alchimie du verbe." For Fletcher's concept of the poet as "smith," as "anvil," and as "iron" is essentially only a different metaphorical expression of the creative method Rimbaud has described. The fact that not only words and thought, but mood as well, are to be involved in writing poetry reminds us of Rimbaud's habituation to "the simple hallucination." The images presented in Fletcher's poem partake to a degree of the same quality achieved by the juxtaposition of dissociated images in the passage from Rimbaud. The unusual imagery in both works piles up to such an extent that the reader is somewhat bewildered by the variety of it. That the images are, in Fletcher's poem, often unrelated ones, does not, however, give us pause in our reading, for the word-magic operates quite well in carrying us along with it. We skip from "cold torrents," to "flags," to "mosaic," to "grotto," and to dripping "light"; but the sensory image evoked by each word is such an easily grasped one, and the rhythm moves so urgently, that following the surprising succession is not difficult.

Who pauses to consider that the water images evoked in the first two lines consort oddly with a flag? The word "undulates" draws both flag and water together, associates them in the type of movement common

to both, so that what might otherwise appear an incongruous juxtaposition becomes appropriate. We are even returned briefly at the end of the fourth line to the water image when we find that the "light drips." The opposing concepts of fluidity and solidity in the stanza are neatly epitomized and unified in the phrase "fluid mosaic." Fletcher's ability to achieve an easy flow of rhythm is here accomplished by lengthy lines, more or less divided by caesuras. The dominant anapaestic arrangement, varied frequently and unpredictably, maintains a fast movement. Verbs such as "tossed," "undulate," and "drips" serve to enhance the feeling of movement, as do frequent words with explosive consonants.

Color becomes important in the second stanza with the phrase "prismatic kaleidoscope" and continues with "flamboyant flamingoes," "chrome corollas," "corollas chrysoprase-blue," "dark clouds," "blood-red sunset," "green gargoyles," "steel," and "glass." All the tricks of alliteration, consonance, assonance, internal rhyme, and onomatopoeia tumble out in profusion. A line such as "Chrome corollas confused with corollas chrysoprase-blue" may, on close and sober scrutiny, seem to overdo the technique, but the immediate impression it makes combines well enough with the general feeling of richness that pervades the poem. The phantasmagoric coupling of "flamingoes" and "tortoises," especially having one "hurled" against the other, is of course, a reflection of the same sort of hallucination to which Rimbaud was subject and which he employed so well in, say, "Le Bateau ivre." Indeed, it seems to me that Fletcher here has equalled Rimbaud in technical proficiency, though Fletcher's poem may leave us wishing it contained more of the provocative quality, the half-hidden meaning of Rimbaud's. The brilliant images have taken first place in our minds and tend to obscure any deeper symbolic meaning that may lie in Fletcher's poem.

Most obvious of all the ideas that Fletcher borrowed from the "Alchimie du verbe," and the one most widely commented upon by the critics, is the vowel-color analogy.[6] Rimbaud had said: "J'inventai la couleur des voyelles!—*A* noir, *E* blanc, *I* rouge, *O* bleu, *U* vert" ("Alchimie"). He had also written the famous sonnet, "Voyelles," in which he gives the same colors to the different vowels. Fletcher has also written a poem which he calls "The Vowels." The development of both Rimbaud's and Fletcher's poems consists of drawing analogies between the vowel sounds and colors. In both poems the first line establishes the analogies, and the remainder is apparently, concerned with enlarging upon the anology, in an attempt to convince the reader that there does actually exist a "correspondance" between the sounds of the vowels and the colors the poet has connected with them.

After the establishment of this basic idea, however, the poems become considerably different. One of the most immediately noticeable differences is the choice of colors connected by the two poets with the several

[6] Lowell and Taupin both treat this matter at some length in their discussions.

vowels. Fletcher, in his autobiography, tells us the generally accepted story that Rimbaud "had arbitrarily given to his vowels the colors in which they had been printed, in a schoolbook of his childhood."[7] On the other hand, Fletcher tells us:

> I had tried to match mine with their appropriate vocal and tonal qualities in English, so that the combination of certain vowel sounds might suggest to the reader a summer landscape merging from blue and green to deep red and violet, while other vowel sounds might represent the light and shadow playing on the landscape in question.[8]

Fletcher's choices in the color-vowel analogies are these: "A light and shade, E green, I blue, U purple and yellow, O red" (*Fire and Wine*, pp. 42-43). To quote the lines dealing with a single letter from each of the poems will be enough for us to make a comparison. Rimbaud's lines concerning the letter "E" are these:

> ... E, candeurs des vapeurs et des tentes,
> Lances des glaciers fiers, rois blancs, frissons
> d'ombelles ...[9]

And these are Fletcher's lines on the same vowel:

> E, parakeets of emerald shrieking perverse in the trees,
> Iridescent and restless chameleons tremulous in the breeze,
> Peace on the leaves, peace on the sea-green sea,
> Ethiopian timbrels that tinkle melodiously ...
> (*Fire and Wine*, p. 42)

The colors Rimbaud has chosen, says Amy Lowell in her comments on the two poems, "bear only the most distant relation to the letters," and she calls their relationship merely "arbitrary." Fletcher, however, she feels has succeeded in making the relationships he chooses acceptable to the reader by using words which contain the vowel in question and at the same time suggest, by connotation, the color he has related to it. It is on this point that Miss Lowell bases her opinion that "Mr. Fletcher is a more original poet than Rimbaud, and has a finer ear."[10] René Taupin disagrees, saying, "il faut tout l'aplomb d'Amy Lowell pour dire que ce poème est plus parfait que le sonnet de Rimbaud ... Fletcher a le défaut d'avoir de la logique dans une occasion où l'élégance serait d'en manquer."[11]

Whether one agrees with Miss Lowell or M. Taupin, it is apparent that in this poem Fletcher is not only "restating" one of the ideas of the

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[7] *Life Is My Song*, p. 90. Other interesting theories as to the reason for Rimbaud's choice of colors are summarized in "Notes et Variantes," Pléiade Rimbaud, pp. 657-659.

[8] *Life Is My Song*, p. 90.

[9] Pléiade Rimbaud, p. 103.

[10] Lowell, pp. 292-295.

[11] Taupin, p. 195.

"Alchimie du verbe" but is beginning to expand the idea. As a matter of fact, various other arts, such as painting, music, and the ballet, were to confirm him in his belief that Rimbaud's theory was worth pursuing.[12] How these other arts influenced and enlarged Fletcher's concept of the vowel-color analogy and of the "alchimie du verbe" in general became apparent in his next volumes of verse. But the basic theories, even of these later works, still have their origin in the "alchimie."

Fletcher published in 1915 a volume called *Irradiations: Sand and Spray*. He had begun to write these poems as early as 1912, and it is in them that we see a further elaboration and extension of the theories he had borrowed from Rimbaud. He writes for the first time a preface to his volume, and in this preface he is greatly concerned with the problem of form. He says:

> Each era of man has its unique and self-sufficing range of expression and experience, and therefore every poet must seek anew for himself, out of the language-medium at his disposal, rhythms which are adequate and forms which are expressive of his own unique personality.

He insists that poetry is capable of as many gradations of cadence as music is in time, and that rhyme is not an indispensable element of poetry, but that the same richness of musical effect may be achieved as well, or better, by assonance, consonance, and alliteration. He would, as Wagner had done in music, make use of a dominant motif, with subordinate themes, repetition, variation. Poets do not become great through the views of life they express, he says, but "in their profound knowledge of their craft." The poetry of the present, Fletcher believes, is no longer adequate; poems are mere "juggling feats performed with stale form."

> It is time to create something new. It is time to strip poetry of meaningless tatters of form and to clothe her in new suitable garments... Let poets drop their formulas... and determine to discipline themselves through experiment.[13]

In his letter to Demeny, Rimbaud had said:

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[12] Fletcher has inscribed his poem "The Vowels," significantly enough, "To Leon Bakst." Bakst, the Russian painter, had designed costumes and designed and painted scenery for the Diaghilev ballets being performed in Paris during Fletcher's early visits there. Reproductions of the Bakst sets and costumes, in René Fülöp-Miller and Joseph Gregor, *The Russian Theatre: Its Character and History*, trans. Paul England (Philadelphia, n.d.), show them to have been done in violently contrasting colors, somewhat in the primitive manner. The Russian ballet performances as a whole made a tremendous impression upon Fletcher. He had "sat spellbound through the barbaric splendor of *Scheherezade* and the Polovtsian dances from *Prince Igor*." And, he continues, "I had been moved by these to make some of my own early experiments, such as the poem 'The Vowels'..." He tells us further: "... the prodigality of postimpressionist pictures and of modern music that I found in Paris were both working on me to fortify me in my determination to forget every rule and precedent, and to bring out a poetry which would follow the life spirit, the inner rhythm of my own moods, and not some preconceived outer pattern imposed by the mind upon nature." *Life Is My Song*, pp. 64-65.

[13] *Irradiations: Sand and Spray*, pp. ix-xv.

Du reste, libre aux *nouveaux* d'exécrer les ancêtres: on est chez soi et l'on a le temps... En Grèce, ai-je dit, vers et lyres rhythment l'Action. Après, musique et rimes sont jeux, délassements. L'étude de ce passé charme les curieux: plusieurs s'éjouissent à renouveler ces antiquités—c'est pour eux.

And again: "En attendant, demandons au *poëte* du *nouveau*,—idées et formes... Les inventions d'inconnu réclament des formes nouvelles." Rimbaud had, in his own poetry, as had other symbolists, broken with the time-honored idea that poetry must be written in Alexandrines. He had experimented with various stanza forms, various meters, rhymes, assonance, consonance, and alliteration as new molds in which to cast his poetic thought or feeling. He had regulated "la forme et le mouvement de chaque consonne"; he had employed "rhythmes instinctifs" ("Alchimie").

In Fletcher's new volume, the poems were, according to him, "to be exact transcriptions, not of thought, but of mood, and which, in their combination of vowel and consonant sounds, were designed to produce the effect of modern music." We have already seen something of this in an earlier poem, but the new ones were, he said, to embody "a new revolutionary theory of verbal orchestration."[14] Apparently the many impressions that had been made on Fletcher by the ballet, the new music, postimpressionistic painting—all were to become a part of the "alchimie du verbe" to an extent that Rimbaud had not known. In these new poems, says Fletcher, "I had tried to be full, clangorous, unrealistic, metaphorical, and confusedly rhetorical."[15]

Many of the new poems were to use nature as their basic subject matter, and we remember that Rimbaud had taken great delight in nature, for he had written:

Enfin, ô bonheur, ô raison, j'écartais du ciel l'azur, qui est du noir, et je vécus, étincelle d'or de la lumière *nature*. De joie, je prenais une expression bouffonne et égarée au possible:

Elle est retrouvée!
Quoi? l'éternité.
C'est la mer mêlée
Au soleil.

("Alchimie")

Rimbaud's joy in nature, even the language he chooses to express it, seems rather reserved when it is compared to Fletcher's lively and vigorous delight:

The iridescent vibrations of midsummer light
Dancing, dancing, suddenly flickering and quivering
Like little feet or the movement of quick hands
clapping,
Or the rustle of furbelows or the clash of polished
gems.

[14] *Life Is My Song*, pp. 58-60.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

The palpitant mosaic of midday light
Colliding, sliding, leaping and lingering:
O, I could lie on my back all day,
And mark the mad ballet of the midsummer sky.

(*Irradiations*, p. 6)

Here certainly "verbal orchestration" is being employed, and it serves Fletcher well in his attempt to express his pleasure in nature. The same exuberance appears again and again in Fletcher's poems, as it does in this one:

I dance:
I exist in motion:
A wind-shaken flower spilling my drops in the sunlight.

I feel the muscles bending, relaxing beneath me;
I direct the rippling sweep of the lines of my body;
Its impact crashes through the thin walls of the atmosphere,
I dance.

About me whirls
The sombre hall, the gaudy stage, the harsh glare of the footlights,
And in the brains of thousands watching
Little flames leap quivering to the music of my effort.

I have danced:
I have expressed my soul
In unbroken rhythm,
Sorrow, and flame.
I am tired: I would be extinguished beneath your beating hands.

(*Irradiations*, p. 22)

The combination in both these poems of irregular form, of color, of out-of-the-ordinary metaphor—all, one feels, could easily have been suggested by Rimbaud. But the curious quality of movement suggested by the poems, resulting in a kinesthetic response almost inevitable on the part of the reader, leaves no doubt that music and the dance have contributed to the theory of the "alchimie du verbe" as Fletcher has come to employ it.

The second part of the volume published in 1915, called *Sand and Spray*, is subtitled "A Sea Symphony." In order to carry out the notion of orchestration in these poems, Fletcher has labeled various parts with suggestions for the speeds at which they are to be read. "The Gale," for instance, is marked "allegro furioso"; a section on "Steamers" is marked "maestoso"; and "The Groundswell" is marked "marcia funebre."

Fletcher's next volume, *Goblins and Pagodas*, published in 1916, also contains a preface in which the author pursues the theories of the "alchimie du verbe." He discusses again his belief in the "aesthetic

form-basis of poetry." He draws analogies between literature and painting and between literature and music. He expatiates on his belief in an "intimate relation between color and form," and cites experiments of the musician Scriabin in constructing "colour-scales," as well as those of the English scientist Wallace Rimington in building an organ "which plays in colours, instead of notes." He says that a word is a "definite symbol of some fact," but that its sound is something aside and beyond its accepted meaning as symbol. He explains how he approaches the problem of expressing new subject matter in new form by giving us a concrete example. He recounts how a given object, such as a book, is treated in turn by traditional Victorian poets, by the realists, and finally how he himself, in the symbolist manner, treats it:

> I should select out of my life the important events connected with my ownership of this book, and strive to write of them in terms of the volume itself, both as regards subject-matter and appearance. In other words, I should link up my personality and the personality of the book, and make each a part of the other. In this way I should strive to evoke a soul out of this piece of inanimate matter, a something characteristic and structural inherent in this inorganic form which is friendly to me and responds to my mood.[16]

This is, he tells us, the method he has used in the first section of *Goblins and Pagodas,* which he calls "Ghosts of an Old House." In these poems he treats, for instance, pieces of furniture, remembered from his early home in Little Rock, Arkansas, in a manner reminiscent of Rimbaud's "Le Buffet," a resemblance which René Taupin has pointed out.[17]

The second division of *Goblins and Pagodas* is made up of a series of "symphonies," each employing a color, or sometimes two, for a purpose which Fletcher explains in the preface:

> My aim ... was ... to narrate certain important phases of the emotional and intellectual development—in short, the life—of an artist, not necessarily myself ... And here, not being restrained by any definite material phenomena, as in the Old House, I have tried to state each phase in the terms of a certain colour, or combination of colours, which is emotionally akin to that phase. This colour, and the imaginative phantasmagoria of landscape which it evokes, thereby creates, in a definite and tangible form, the dominant mood of each poem.[18]

These "symphonies," Fletcher tells us, are really "dramas of the soul," a phrase which reminds us that Fletcher is probably still working from the Rimbaldian theory that the language of the new poetry " ... sera de l'âme pour l'âme, résumant tout, parfums, sons, couleurs, de la pensée accrochant la pensée et tirant" (Letter).

Fletcher describes his particular problems in the composition of the "White Symphony." The theme of the poem was to be the "unending quest for perfection." Since white is the presence of all color, it is to be analogous to perfection. Fletcher must, then, draw a series of analogies

[16] *Goblins and Pagodas,* pp. xiv-xvii.
[17] Taupin, p. 203.
[18] *Goblins and Pagodas,* p. xviii.

between phenomena of nature and the color white, "but these analogies could not be chosen haphazardly. They had to be arranged in a given order, in a sequence that started from some given point and went on to another." He desired to make a "fusion of visual and auditory imagery, of concrete statement and abstract implications," and so, he says:

> I felt very strongly that I must clearly set the key at the outset, must select from a great stock of associations and feelings such images as would put concretely before the reader's mind the fact that this particular work dealt with the highest possible range of aesthetic experience.[19]

In a similar manner, "Blue Symphony" represents the young artist pursuing "a vision of beauty which will elude him at the very last"; blue suggests "depth, mystery, distance," and therefore is the appropriate color for such a search. "Symphony in Black and Gold" represents the artist in a "black whirlpool of struggle and failure, on which float golden specks—the illusory bliss of life." The artist leaves the city for the country, where he is intoxicated with the spring; "he vows himself to a self-sufficing pagan worship of nature"; this constitutes the subject matter of the "Green Symphony." "Orange Symphony" tells us of war, both "in the external world" and "in the artist's soul." "Red Symphony" represents the poet's "impotent rage" at his inability to achieve the perfection he desires. He arrives at old age where "all is violet, the colour of regret and remembrance." "Lastly," Fletcher tells us, "all things fade into an absolute grey, and it is now midwinter. Looking forth on the world again he still sees war, like a monstrous red flower, dominating mankind."[20] It is obvious that the use of colors has advanced beyond that employed in the earlier "vowel" poem.

This is the limit to which Fletcher pushed the "alchimie du verbe." The symphonies, he tells us, "were not devised to touch on real life except accidentally."[21] He has come to believe "The more suggestion, the more art; the more arrangement of rhythm, symbol, analogy, the more poetry." He has pushed his art as far in the direction of "the magic spell, the verbal incantation," as he could.[22] But he felt that he had not succeeded in reaching the perfection he desired, for he at last decided that "perfection was only to be achieved either through a life of physical hardship, remote obscurity, and adventurous daring, such as had come to Arthur Rimbaud, or in such an abandonment of all possessions and all family ties as had been the choice of the later Tolstoy."[23]

Fletcher was, however, able to follow the course neither of Rimbaud nor of Tolstoy. World War I and other circumstances forced him to return from Europe to Arkansas, where he wrote more poetry, which

[19] *Life Is My Song*, p. 139.
[20] *Goblins and Pagodas*, pp. xx-xxii.
[21] *Life Is My Song*, p. 175.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 143.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 293.

he published in a volume called *The Tree of Life*. In these poems there is a return to the form and subject matter of the earlier volumes. Here Fletcher has abandoned the lengthy symbolic narrative for the brief lyric-descriptive poem. He feels no need to explain their symbolic significance in lengthy prefaces, or to describe his method and elaborate upon it. These poems portray personal emotion in relatively straightforward manner, employing nature description to parallel and enhance the emotion, in something of the romantic manner. But the "alchimie du verbe" has not been completely forgotten. Though Fletcher has little to say concerning his method in these poems, he employs nature, colors, free-verse form, and the suggestive power of unusual metaphor still in the manner he had learned from Rimbaud's suggestions concerning technique, or from his poetry.

We remember that Rimbaud had "written silences," and we find Fletcher writing on the subject:

> The silence that I hear is more than words;
> The silence that I breathe is more than thought;
> The silence that I know is more than life;
> It is a silence of all silences.
> For ever and ever, to eternity
> It goes, and I go with it, well content.
>
> ("The Silence," *The Tree of Life*, p. 31)

Again we find a poem such as "The Beach," which reminds us not only of the subject matter of Rimbaud's "Le Bateau ivre," but also employs metaphor of the same deliberately phantasmagoric sort in the same way that Rimbaud employed it:

> I am a ship departing;
> Long farewells on the horizon:—
> A tall dark ship
> Feeling in its inmost fibres the wash of the sea...
>
> The haze drifts about on the sea;
> And the islands that rose in the morning,
> Headland beyond white headland,
> Are swallowed up in the afternoon.
> Yet there seems floating near me
> Something blue in the vast grey stillness;
> And a lace handkerchief of white foam
> Held close in a pale still hand....
>
> (*The Tree of Life*, pp. 38-39)

But it is also in these poems that we begin to see Fletcher's doubt that he can achieve his poetic perfection through the "alchimie":

> My poor sick brain is spinning now dreams of unreal
> aspiring,
> Dreams of impossible summers, dance-dreams of old
> delight.

Aloft the sullen stormy west with crimson glare is
firing,
The lowering clouds like jagged teeth close down,
and it is night.

("Autumn Sunset," *The Tree of Life*, p. 105)

His essential romanticism, coupled with his attachment, perhaps even against his will, to the imagists, had probably kept him from achieving the pure symbolism which he so admired in Rimbaud. But he still had hopes that what he had written under the influence of the "alchimie du verbe" would communicate to his readers—if not from "soul to soul," at least from heart to heart:

There is a song that has no beginning or ending
Or tune, or words;
Echoes of it are heard
On a deserted shore when the sun is descending,
Or when upon some day of bluest midsummer
The crickets chirp in the long grass alone,
And men are all sleeping, then it goes like a burning
Wave of sound to the sun.

This song is like a fragment slipped from blue
mountains of marble,
Over which a sculptor long dreams:
Seeing strange perfect things disengage themselves
slowly,
And then drift back again.
Idly he lifts his chisel—should he break it?
He stops and hesitates;
For the dreams that were his are vanished, un-
completed,
He rests now, without fate.

So let no one think there is beginning or ending
Or change to this my book;
It is all sunlight steadily and calmly reflected
On the surface of a dark pool;
Everything in it has been said for so many millions
of ages
That is has no longer a past;
All is what flamed in me; tomorrow, doubtless,
From my dead heart to yours it will flame.

("Alone in the Garden," *The Tree of Life*, pp. 66-67)

And so Fletcher forsook his search for perfection through the "alchimie du verbe." Except for a fleeting excursion into the realm of polyphonic prose, which again recalls briefly the influence of Rimbaud, he was to interest himself in imagism, in Japanese poetry, and eventually in a lengthy poetic history of his native state. Less and less does he employ the methods of Rimbaud. It is perhaps in part for the same reasons that Rimbaud abandoned writing poetry altogether that Fletcher gave up the methods of the "alchimie." Rimbaud had been able to throw

himself into a life of action in such a way that it might be said that his life became his poetry; but Fletcher was unable to do this, though he admitted that he would like to. This fundamental difference between the natures of the two men may also account for the fact that, delightful as much of Fletcher's poetry is, it lacks the vitality of genius that Rimbaud's has. Fletcher is an experimenter, an innovater, but he is not a revolutionary in the field of poetry. He lacks the verve and spontaneity of Rimbaud. He is unwilling, or unable, to give himself entirely to his imagination; he must categorize, plan, and systematize. In so doing, he becomes preoccupied with form to such an extent that subject matter is often spread quite thin and becomes almost lost in the wealth of rhyme, color, alliteration—technique and form in general. Rimbaud had said of the poet: " . . . si ce qu'il rapporte . . . a forme, il donne forme; si c'est informe, il donne l'informe" (Letter). Fletcher has been unable to abandon his preoccupation with form, even when he is dealing with what might better have been left unformed or unexplained. Furthermore, in his attempt to write symbolist poetry, Fletcher seems to have forgotten another of the observations of his master, Rimbaud: " . . . la chanson est si peu souvent l'œuvre, c'est-à-dire la pensée chantée et comprise du chanteur" (Letter).

And yet, it is largely for his craftsmanship that Fletcher still delights his reader and deserves still to be read. He is a master craftsman with the word, perhaps a more polished one than Rimbaud. His never ending technical virtuosity is a constant source of pleasure. Furthermore, the reader is consistently pleased with numerous word-pictures in the imagist manner, delightful miniatures that swarm his pages and make no pretense at trying to say more than what is immediately apparent.

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COUSIN AND COLERIDGE: THE AESTHETIC IDEAL

FREDERIC WILL

THOUGH Samuel Taylor Coleridge was born in 1772, twenty years before Victor Cousin, their philosophies are both in certain ways characteristic of the thought of the Romantic period, as opposed to that of the Enlightenment. I have in mind the insistence of both writers on the possibility of man's attaining supersensuous knowledge, and on an operation of the human mind, "imagination" or "reason" in Coleridge's terminology, and "abstraction immédiate" in the case of Cousin, which is especially created for apprehending such supersensuous knowledge. For Cousin, such "abstraction" was a way of knowing, in the presence of all particular objects of mundane cognition, some idea in God's mind which made those particulars "intelligible." Though Coleridge's position was at once subtler than Cousin's and quite unsystematic, he, too, often conceived of reality as pervaded by principles of divine intelligence with which reason and imagination were capable of uniting.

It is interesting to notice the relationship of both Coleridge and Cousin to Kant. Coleridge and Cousin were pioneers in their respective countries, in the attempt of non-Germans to understand the "alles zermalmende Kant," of whom Coleridge said that he was most "unintelligible," and whom Cousin for a long time knew only in the Latin translation by Born. Both the Englishman and the Frenchman admired Kant, and both profited in various ways from his understanding of the "critical" problem of modern philosophy. However, as would be expected, the two men were hostile to a major tenet of Kant, that verifiable supersensuous knowledge was impossible. The shared hostility of Coleridge and Cousin to this tenet evokes in both some of their most cogent reflections on the nature of the higher cognitive powers of man. As Shawcross has put it, in the case of Coleridge:

> Thus while agreeing with Kant that the mere intellect cannot grasp the supersensuous, he could not follow him in asserting that the supersensuous cannot be given in experience. The facts of his own conscious life told another tale: and the task still remained for him, of constructing a philosophy with which these facts were in harmony.[1]

And Cousin, after comparing Kant to Locke as a sower of the seeds of philosophical skepticism, attacks Kant's claim that all reality known only by ideas is "purement phénoménale." For Kant, "L'âme, la nature,

[1] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria* (herein referred to as *BL*), ed. Shawcross (Oxford, 1907), p. xlii of Shawcross' introduction. This introduction and René Wellek's *Kant in England* should be consulted by anyone interested in the relation of Coleridge to Kant.

Dieu sont donc des conclusions à la fois invincibles et vaines."[2] From Cousin, for whom soul, nature, and God are the highest and surest objects of knowledge, this is a heavy criticism.

Their criticisms of Kant find echoes in the aesthetic thought of both Coleridge and Cousin. To be sure, Coleridge in some details followed Kant's aesthetics, as it appeared in the *Critique of Judgment*. Thus Kant's notion of the "aesthetic imagination" seems to influence Coleridge's idea of imagination, as he expresses it in *Biographia Literaria* (1817). And in his *On the Principles of Genial Criticism* (1814) he sticks fairly close to Kant's analysis of the four aesthetic "moments." On the whole, however, Coleridge's aesthetics involves an attempt to defend a cognitive value of beauty, or of art, which far exceeds the powers which Kant was willing to concede. Coleridge does not use the term "ideal beauty," which was already growing dated, and which Hazlitt had so exuberantly criticized in Reynolds. Nor does he speak frequently and explicitly about beauty; more often his concern is with "art" or "poetry." But Coleridge did think about the intelligibility of beauty—in a manner which this paper will define—and thus continued the spirit of those aesthetic speculations which had earlier, in Winckelmann, Johnson, and Reynolds, rallied about the standard of "ideal beauty."[3]

On the other hand, it would seem that Cousin was relatively little influenced by Kant's aesthetic thought, one way or the other. Rather, Cousin's aesthetics, for which the "beau idéal" was a key concept, drew on a long tradition of vaguely Platonic thinkers, whose chief modern representative was Shaftesbury. Indeed, no aesthetics could be more hostile than Cousin's was to the implications of Kant's tentative, critical thought. Cousin wrote:

> Si le vrai, le beau et le bien nous paraissent distincts, ce n'est pas qu'ils le soient en effet, mais c'est qu'ils nous sont donnés dans des objets différents. Le vrai existe par soi-même; réalisé dans les actions humaines, il devient le bien; engagé sous les formes sensibles, il devient le beau.[4]

In other words, beauty is merely a sensible symbol of ultimate truth. And the knowledge of beauty, Cousin insists, involves immediate knowledge of ultimate truth.

It is in terms, then, of their conceptions of "ideal beauty," or of the intelligibility of beauty or art, that I propose to discuss Cousin and Coleridge in this article. I should like first to examine the nature of, and differences between, Cousin's and Coleridge's conceptions, and to

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[2] Cousin, *Premiers essais de philosophie* (Paris, 1862) (lectures and essays of 1815-16), p. 131.

[3] See Erwin Panofsky's *Idea* (Leipzig, 1924), for brief but thoughtful comments on the modern history of ideal beauty.

[4] Cousin, *Du vrai, du beau, et du bien* (herein referred to as *VBB*) (Paris 1836), p. 298.

conclude with a few suggestions about the ultimate fate of the tradition of ideal beauty. In my first two sections I shall focus my attention mainly on the years 1817-18, though I shall also draw my evidence from other years. It was at that time (1817-18) that Coleridge and Cousin were most articulate about their notions of ideal beauty. In 1818, by a piquant turn of history, Coleridge and Cousin were both giving public lectures, the former in London, the latter in Paris. Coleridge's lectures have only recently been published, by Kathleen Coburn;[5] Cousin's lectures, given at the Sorbonne when he was only twenty-five, were later (1836) to be published as *Du vrai, du beau, et du bien*, his most famous work. Coleridge, furthermore, had seen his long maturing *Biographia Literaria* published in 1817; this contains much of his best aesthetic thought.

I

Cousin's *VBB* is an essay in the different ways in which God, the ultimate truth, can be known. Cousin was charged in his time with being a pantheist, and certainly not until his orthodox, post-1830 period was he very careful to disprove this charge. It was on the premise that God's truth pervades and unifies his entire creation that Cousin believed that our particular experiences of the good and the beautiful afford direct knowledge of the ultimate truth. What interests us here is not the nature of that ultimate truth (which he came more and more to interpret through the vision of orthodox Christianity) but the kind of cognition by which he thought that truth was known.

"Abstraction immédiate" is the expression by which Cousin describes this cognition. Such abstraction, to rephrase my earlier definition, is a way of knowing (we might say of intuiting) that particular objects of apprehension, say examples of "the good" or "the beautiful," participate in ideas in God's mind, on which they depend for their intelligibility. In the presence of particular objects of knowledge, that is, our minds can (though they need not) abstract immediately to an idea in God's mind. Cousin stoutly maintained that Plato afforded a precedent for such a theory of knowledge: "le procédé constant de Platon est l'abstraction, et l'abstraction lui donne une tendance idéale."[6] It is doubtful, however, that Plato was interested in "abstraction" as Cousin conceived this concept. The Platonic Ideas, or principles of intelligibility, were probably not presumed to exist independently of the particular occasions on which they realized themselves in our knowledge, and certainly were not thought of as objects of a rarefying process of abstraction. With Cousin it was otherwise; though he often thought in terms

[5] Coleridge, *Philosophical Lectures*, ed. Kathleen Coburn (New York, 1949). The editor has a good introduction on the history and nature of Coleridge's lectures, in general, and on the philosophy in the lectures of 1818.

[6] Cousin, *Cours de l'histoire de la philosophie moderne* (Paris, 1847), p. 178.

of a pantheism, in which God's intelligence was presumed to be everywhere and each "element" of which would therefore be ultimately intelligible, if correctly understood, still his notion of "abstraction immédiate" seemed to suggest that particular objects of knowledge somehow did not embody ultimate truth within themselves. It was in the very nature of his "abstraction" that it passed from particulars to something "beyond" them, though it is hard to know just what this "beyond" means. Thus, despite a suggestion of pantheism in Cousin's overall conception of reality, his notion of "abstraction" seems to involve another attitude; for the known object and the higher ideas in terms of which it is known are so disjunctive that the difference between mundane objects of knowledge and corresponding ideas in God's mind resembles a difference between body, or matter, and spirit. Cousin could perhaps have reconciled his view of the pervading nature of God's presence in His creation with the "abstractive" way in which he thought we know ideas in God's mind; I am only indicating here that he was either unwilling or unable to smooth out this inconsistency.

It should be clear, then, that Cousin's conception of "abstraction immédiate" must raise problems when combined with such a world view as his, and probably also when combined with a dualistic view of the world. There is something about the joining of a kind of immediate intuition with the notion of "abstraction" in a single concept, "abstraction immédiate," which is hard to make clear to experience, and is perhaps an absurdity. But it is this very concept of "abstraction immédiate" which Cousin makes central to his theory of ideal beauty.

For him, as an earlier quotation showed, ideal beauty is the "vrai" (or God) "engagé sous les formes sensibles." Ideal beauty is apprehended on an occasion of the experience of "formes sensibles" and by means of "abstraction immédiate," which Cousin considered the highest faculty of cognition in all domains of experience. Ideal beauty is not to be confused with "formes sensibles," which are, in a sense, merely a body for the soul which is "ideal beauty." From this it follows that Cousin has given to the adjective "ideal," which had been used so long and so imprecisely in the tradition of "ideal beauty," a significance solidly based on that of its root noun, "idea." Ideal beauty is beauty which is pre-eminently infused with an "idea" or with the highest kind of intelligibility. There is much to be said for such a description of the cognitive significance of beauty. But Cousin purchased a kind of schematic conclusiveness at the price of almost all solid dealings with the realities of aesthetic experience, and as a result, I think, most critics would feel that Cousin's "ideal beauty" is rather an unreal beauty.

But there is more to Cousin's conception of beauty. His notion of "ideal beauty" seems primarily to be concerned with an abstraction in the mind of the perceiver of something beautiful. It should not be thought,

however, that he supposes "ideal beauty" to have merely a subjective existence, or not to have any "real" and perfecting relationship to "real beauty." He supposes that ideal beauty is definitely complementary to real beauty, and attributes to real beauty, that is, to particular beautiful objects, a number of definite characteristics.

Already in his early article entitled "Du beau réel et du beau idéal" (1816) and again in *VBB*, Cousin had said that in the experience of ideal beauty one must of course simultaneously experience some real beauty. "Real beauty" has two elements: an individual, contingent element; and an essential, unchanging element. Cousin was here ringing his change on the commonplace eighteenth-century doctrine of unity in multiplicity as the double basis of beauty. He conceived the second element, as Plotinus did, as the spiritual center of the beautiful object. For Cousin, this element, like the soul in the body, is the more spiritual element in an object of "real beauty"; yet even it is only ancillary to an "idée morale" which inheres in "real beauty." The "idée morale" in beauty is not the "beau idéal"; rather it is the "real" spiritual quality which somehow transfuses the "real beauty." Cousin holds:

> pour qu'un objet soit beau il doit exprimer une idée; présenter une unité qui fasse briller l'idée exprimée; être composé de parties différentes et déterminées; en d'autres termes, idée morale, unité et variété, telles sont les trois conditions du beau.[7]

I want to make two points about Cousin's notions of ideal and real beauty. The first is evident. Disassociation and discontinuity are marked characteristics of his aesthetics. He disassociates ideal beauty from real beauty in a way that suggests a possible difference in kind, or being, between the two "beauties." And he disassociates the elements of real beauty in an overly formal and unilluminating way. It would seem that he is simply trying to fill in the outlines of a schematic view of the world.

My second point is this: Cousin's aesthetics seems to me to be pointing toward two very different answers to the question, How does beauty give knowledge? In his doctrine of ideal beauty he finds an answer, though in a distinctive way, in the traditional terms of neoclassicism, much as his contemporary, Quatremère de Quincy, was defending these terms at the same time. By this answer, a kind of orthodox Christian dualism of soul and body is imported into aesthetics, and the "real" is consequently depreciated in favor of the "ideal" or spiritual. Despite Cousin's intention to prove the opposite, there remains something "unreal" about his "ideal" beauty.

In his doctrine of "real beauty," however, I believe that Cousin was able to make his clearest suggestion of the kind of intelligibility which beauty may have. In *VBB* he explains his notion of the "idée morale" in this way: real beauty is a material presentation of the spirit which

[7] Cousin, *VBB*, p. 272.

informs reality, and to the extent that the matter of beauty is diminished and pure expression of spirit remains, to that extent the "idée morale" of real beauty is realized. By this doctrine of expressionism, as Ravaisson later termed it, Cousin was working toward the formulation of a kind of "real" significance of beauty. Furthermore, his stress on unity in beauty, though it may seem to leave the "idée morale" somewhat superfluous, suggests such notions as organic unity, which were to serve thinkers like Coleridge in their attempts to explain the intelligibility of beauty.

II

I have discussed Cousin first, so that I can make plain in what sense I am using the notion of "ideal beauty." Since the Renaissance, this phrase had often been vaguely applied to any "excellent" beauty, but Cousin was trying to use it in a deeper and more nearly definable sense —applying it to beauty which is intelligible, which gives knowledge about the "vrai." It is in this sense that Coleridge, too, may be said to have concerned himself with ideal beauty. Furthermore, to continue in the terms of Cousin's discourse, Coleridge was concerned with the intelligibility of what Cousin would have called real, not ideal beauty. In order to show this, I shall first consider Coleridge's notions of the Idea and of organic unity; in terms of such concepts, had he attempted it, he could have made a systematic explanation of the kind of "real" intelligibility which art works have. He never made this attempt, but his ability to gather all the elements needed for it gave him an unexpressed synthetic view which enriched his various particular notions.

The concept of the Idea was one which always concerned Coleridge, and which he thought to be of ultimate importance. As with the other terms of his thinking, there is much variation in the remarks he makes about the Idea. On the whole, however, I think there is considerable consistency, and that these remarks tend toward a single concept—though it should be clear that I am excepting those merely commonplace, and unspeculative, uses of the word "idea" to refer to a purely psychological notion.

Concerning the Idea, Coleridge wrote: "Let me by all the labours of my life have answered but one end and taught as many as have in themselves the condition of learning, the true import and legitimate use of the term Idea . . ."[8] However, despite this great concern with the meaning of the term Idea, Coleridge was unwilling to rest happy with a single or static conception. It is a distinction characteristic of Ideas that they resist conceptual definition; we apprehend Ideas not by our understandings but by our reason, which is, for Coleridge, a kind of intuition. In a definition which presents this dilemma, he wrote that an Idea "is an

[8] From Coleridge MSS, cited by Muirhead, *Coleridge as Philosopher* (New York, 1930), p. 89.

educt of the imagination actuated by the pure reason, to which there neither is nor can be an adequate correspondent in the world of the senses . . ."[9] A typically evasive, and pregnant attempt to define the Idea is the following: "it is the very essential of Platonism when he says that that which exists in the perfection of distinctness and yet without separation, either from another or from the supreme cause, is an Idea."[10] And in another passage from his lectures of 1818, Coleridge says that music is the best symbol of the Idea, because music contains an invisible forming principle. Taken in conjunction with the passages above, this remark suggests that he wants his Idea to have a reality, if such it has, which one might call "essential" (as opposed to "phenomenal").

But there is a practical question which Coleridge asks himself about Ideas, the answer to which question leads us farther into his views of the qualities which characterize Ideas. The question is this: "whether Ideas are regulative only, according to Aristotle and Kant, or likewise constitutive, and one with the power and life of Nature, according to Plato and Plotinus . . ." and this question is "the highest part of philosophy and not part of its nomenclature."[11] As the phrasing of his question suggests, Coleridge considered Ideas constitutive, and "one with the power and life of Nature." This is a vague phrase, but allows me to add, to my remark above on the "essential" reality of Coleridge's Ideas, that the attribute of "life," and especially of the life of nature, seems to be another characteristic of Ideas. His late *Theory of Life* (1831) shows that he considers continuity throughout all realms of being to be a central characteristic of life, and certainly this is also true of his Ideas. As John H. Muirhead concludes, after a careful study of the evidence, Coleridge considers Ideas as a "ground" to both "mind as subject" and to the objects of mind. In fact, as Muirhead says, the continuity of all the objects it informs is typical of a Coleridgean Idea.

In this context, one should certainly reflect on the twelfth chapter of *Biographia Literaria,* in which Coleridge quotes from (or paraphrases) Schelling's *Transcendental Idealism.* Clearly Coleridge's Idea bears some relation to Schelling's "ground" of nature and art, which ground constantly synthesizes the two poles which it has produced. To use the phraseology of "romantic" philosophy, Coleridge's Idea is what makes mind and its objects, art and nature, mutually intelligible. To be sure, he sometimes refers to ideas simply as psychological states, as though they had no reference outside of our minds. But this is not common in his philosophical writing.

In sum, Coleridge's Ideas have such qualities as these: they seem to be essential, living, continuous, and intelligible constituents of nature, and nature is taken to mean "creation" or "being." Yet it must be added

[9] Coleridge, *Statesman's Manual* (London, 1852), Appendix E, p. 124.
[10] Coleridge, *Philosophical Lectures,* ed. Coburn, p. 166.
[11] Coleridge, *Statesman's Manual,* Appendix E, pp. 124-125.

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that by the very terms of Coleridge's notion of the Idea, this kind of conceptual definition of Ideas is implicitly negated.

Given this general notion of Ideas, then, it is not surprising that Coleridge constantly found the principle of the "organic" significant for his thought. In his distinction between organic and mechanical form, he praises the organic (in a close translation from A. W. Schlegel's *Dramatic Lectures*):

> The form is mechanic, when on any given material we impress a pre-determined form, not necessarily arising out of the properties of the material;—as when to a mass of wet clay we give whatever shape we wish it to retain when hardened. The organic form on the other hand, is innate; it shapes, as it develops itself from within, and the fulness of its development is one and the same with the perfection of its outward form... Nature, the prime genial artist, inexhaustible in diverse powers, is equally inexhaustible in forms.[12]

Organic form, then, is a kind of inner principle of developing life, and it would seem reasonable to say, in Coleridge's terms, that an Idea is pervading the life which is being developed. In fact, organic form shares so many of the characteristics of the Idea for Coleridge that, in view of his failure to compare the two concepts, I would prefer not to attempt any distinction between them. And it is especially important, here, to see Coleridge's implication, in his willingness to "rapprocher" Ideas with organic form, that organic growth has an intelligible aspect, and that it can, therefore, be a possible "object" of knowledge.

Something should be said about Coleridge's view of the operation of organic form in external nature and in the mind. By modern standards, we should probably call Coleridge's philosophy of nature "vitalistic," since it centers around the principle of organic development. He believed that the degree of development of a creature depends on the degree of innateness with which it determines itself. Individuation, therefore, would be the source and end of the development of animal and vegetable species; the creature becomes its own center of organization. The human mind is pre-eminently such a center of organization, or source of organic form. It is just such a position that Coleridge poses, in *Biographia Literaria,* against Hartley's mechanical interpretation of the mind. Coleridge, like Blake, was hostile to associationism as well as to a kind of Cartesian rationalism, of which Bacon and Newton were thought to be guilty.

M. H. Abrams has broken new ground, in his recent *The Mirror and the Lamp,* by showing the degree to which actual metaphors of biological growth are used by Coleridge to describe the development of the mind. The following passage provides an illustration:

> Events and images, the lively and spirit-stirring machinery of the external world, are like light, and air, and moisture, to the seed of the Mind, which would else rot

[12] Coleridge, *Shakespearean Criticism,* ed. Thomas Raysor (Cambridge, Mass. 1930), I, 223-224.

and perish. In all processes of mental evolution the objects of the senses must stimulate the Mind; and the Mind must in turn assimilate and digest the food which it thus receives from without.[13]

But Coleridge also believed, and this is fundamental to my point in this paper, that the organically growing mind strives toward an intelligible goal. He wrote: "From the first, or initiative Idea, as from a seed, successive Ideas germinate";[14] and the end toward which those Ideas in the mind germinate is the organic whole, never fully realized, in which they will find their fullest realization. That whole is simply the highest degree of intelligibility of the mind, and is dependent on its parts as much as they are on it. As in the germination of the seed of a plant, Coleridge would say, the Ideas in the mind develop toward an end which is at once their product and greater than they. I should recall here the principle of the reconciliation of opposites, of thesis and antithesis in a higher synthesis, which is found throughout Coleridge's thought, as Alice Snyder pointed out in her early work on *The Critical Principle of Reconciliation of Opposites as Employed by Coleridge*. A typical statement of the principle is this: "Great good, therefore, of such revolution as alters, not by exclusion, but by an enlargement that includes the former, though it places it in a new point of view."[15] It is in the light of such speculations that Coleridge brings his notion of organic form into his study of nature and of the human mind.

At this point we may consider briefly the kind of frame for aesthetics which Coleridge's thought about Ideas and organic form seems to provide. Cousin claimed that beauty had cognitive qualities to the extent that, in its ideal form, it participated in ideas which are in God's mind. Real beauty, for Cousin, was something less than "intelligible." But for Coleridge there was at hand a system of thought whereby the "real," in its fullest sense, might be considered to be the "ideal," that is, the Idea-filled or intelligible. Coleridge's Ideas, which seem to be constitutive principles of reality, and his organic form, which I hope I have shown to be an intelligible principle working in life, are complementary concepts. The former might be considered as a ground for the latter, or the latter as the precondition of the former's existence; Coleridge does not settle this point. But by both concepts he expressed his belief that, at the center of all natural or vital process, an intelligible force is operative. In this frame of thought, then, it is plain that there is room for a conception of some kind of "life-filled" beauty which, through its inner idea or organic unity, will combine reality with intelligibility. If Coleridge had systematically elaborated such a conception, he would have taken a position even more distant from Cousin's than the one he ac-

[13] Coleridge, *Treatise on Method*, ed. A. D. Snyder (London, 1934), p. 7.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[15] Coleridge, *Anima Poetae*, ed. E. H. Coleridge (London, 1895), p. 169.

tually took. But he did make profound suggestions that show how far he stood from admiring "ideal beauty" in the neoclassical sense.

It is clear from *Biographia Literaria,* and from numerous other writings, that Coleridge was well acquainted with Schelling's *Naturphilosophie.* Coleridge thought that he had, by a "congenial coincidence," found support in Schelling's thought for his own aesthetic thinking. Schelling had said that "To one and the same intelligence we owe both the ideal world of art and the real world of objects,"[16] and that it thereby becomes possible that

> it is in the work of art that the problem of the division which philosophy makes between thought and things first finds its solution: in this the division ceases, idea and reality merge in the individual representation.[17]

Here is the notion that art mediates between man and nature, as the expression of those intelligible and living principles which simultaneously pervade both realms. To this notion Coleridge paid great attention. He wrote of art as a "translation of man into nature," thereby positing a great "life-likeness" for art. He often thought of nature as a language of his own, in union with which he could discover the true meaning of obscure thoughts in his mind. Art, as a reconciler of the opposites of mind and nature, was the greatest aid to such discoveries. A quotation from his *On Poesy or Art* (1818)—a paraphrase of a passage in Schelling's *Über das Verhältnis der bildenden Künste zu der Natur*—may help to illustrate this point:

> In the objects of nature are presented, as in a mirror, all the possible elements, steps, and processes of intellect antecedent to consciousness, and therefore to the full development of the intelligential act; and man's mind is the very focus of all the rays of intellect which are scattered throughout the images of nature. Now so to place these images, totalized, and fitted to the limits of the human mind, as to elicit from, and to super-induce upon, the forms themselves the moral reflexions to which they approximate, to make the external internal, the internal external, to make nature thought, and thought nature,—this is the mystery of genius in the Fine Arts.[18]

The work of art, it follows, will so participate in the one intelligence which pervades mind and nature that it will reconcile those two poles of being. For man, art will be the very keystone of much real knowing. It is worth noting, in this connection, that Coleridge had written of the "essential dualism of nature" and of the two counter powers in which "life subsists; in their strife it consists; in their reconciliation it at once dies, and is born again into new forms, either falling back into the life of the whole, or starting anew in the process of individuation."[19] Though Coleridge here has in mind such phenomena of nature as magnetism

[16] Schelling, *System der transzendentalen Idealismus,* in *Sämtliche Werke* (Munich, 1927), II, 349.
[17] *Ibid.,* p. 626.
[18] Coleridge, *On Poesy or Art,* in Shawcross' edition of *BL,* II, 257-258.
[19] From Coleridge MSS, cited by Muirhead, *op. cit.,* pp. 129-130.

and electricity, he thought of life itself, in all creation, as such a process of mediation—and of art, the mediator between man and nature, as a life process. In terms taken from *Naturphilosophie*, then, Coleridge suggests that the art work is intelligibly pervaded both by the Idea and by organic unity.

However, as another passage from *On Poesy or Art* shows, Coleridge did not always defend the intelligibility of art, or beauty, in such a "high transcendental manner":

> It [poetry] is the figured language of thought, and is distinguished from nature by the unity of all the parts in one thought or idea. Hence nature itself would give us the impression of a work of art, if we could see the thought which is present at once in the whole and in every part; and a work of art will be just in proportion as it adequately conveys the thought, and rich in proportion to the variety of parts which it holds in unity.[20]

I would stress two things about this passage: Coleridge here is saying that there is a great gap between mind and nature, and that nature, perhaps just from the limitations of our minds, will always be the "beyond" for our minds; and he is also sketching his own notion of the organic work of art as the highest form of art. For Coleridge, unity in variety is the chief feature of organic works of art, in which there is interdependence of whole and parts, even as it exists in plants. Coleridge found in organic unity a critical concept which suggests the way in which a work of art may be related to a nature that is far more inscrutable than that implied by the Schellingean formulae. The notion of organic unity, I agree with Gordon Mackenzie, is the chief means by which Coleridge tries to make his philosophy useful for his practical criticism. Mackenzie has shown particularly well how organic unity serves Coleridge as a guiding concept in his criticism of Shakespeare.

Coleridge attempted, in Chapter 14 of *Biographia Literaria*, to define a poem in such a way as to avoid naive analogies between a work of art and a work of nature—such analogies as Wordsworth had tended toward in his preface to the *Lyrical Ballads*. Coleridge included "unity in multeity" as a chief component of his ideal "poem":

> A poem is that species of composition, which is opposed to works of science, by proposing for its immediate object pleasure, not truth; and from all other species (having this object in common with it) it is discriminated by proposing to itself such delight from the whole, as is compatible with a distinct gratification from each component part.[21]

It remains uncertain, however, whether he is thinking of "genuine" organic unity here, rather than of a mere, and rather mechanical, Horatian adjustment of parts to whole—until he begins his discussion of meter in poetry. This discussion is part of Coleridge's attempt to show, as against Wordsworth, that the language of poetry is essentially different from

[20] Coleridge, *On Poesy or Art*, in *BL*, II, 255.
[21] Coleridge, *BL*, II, 10.

that of prose. Wordsworth had considered meter simply a "superadded charm" which the poet imposed on his materials. Coleridge adduces several reasons for holding that meter is of the essence of poetry; in a most striking argument he traces the origin of meter "to the balance in the mind effected by that spontaneous effort which strives to hold in check the workings of passion,"[22] which balance he considers a universal aspect of poetic creation. In Coleridge's very notion of the origin of meter is symbolized the protest which he often made against any literal comparison of the art work to a work of nature. There is a striving to check passion, to combine with "a more than usual state of emotion" "more than usual order," which Coleridge considers characteristic of the artist's mind and not of the spontaneous simplicity of nature. Here is the limit of Coleridge's desire to claim the same kind of intelligibility for art which he claims for nature.

There is in Coleridge's criticism a strong genetic interest, an interest in art works in terms of the kinds of mind which must have produced them. And, since Coleridge thought of the poem as an organic unity, he could not conceive of the poem-making faculty as, in any ordinary sense, rational. To be sure, his notion of reason was "romantic"; the practical reason, which, like Kant, Coleridge distinguished from speculative reason, has as its object the whole moral life of man, and as its means the intuition of reality-pervading truths, or Ideas. But it is not creative, in the sense that imagination, the chief poetic power, is creative. Not only is imagination creative—primary imagination is "a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM"—but it has a unifying, or "coadunating" power. And "secondary Imagination"

> dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially *vital*...[23]

Continually in Coleridge, all the way from his discussion of puns to his critique of *Venus and Adonis*, there is emphasis on the way in which imagination unifies, reconciles contraries, and thereby brings to works of art that life of which a reconciliation of contraries is a chief characteristic. And the poet can create life through art because

> The poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other, according to their relative worth and dignity. He diffuses a tone and spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic and magical power to which we have exclusively appropriated the name of imagination.[24]

Coleridge attributes a unifying aspect both to the poem and to the chief faculty for the making of poems. This is also a vital aspect, drawing its

[22] *Ibid.*, II, 49.
[23] *Ibid.*, I, 202.
[24] *Ibid.*, II, 12.

powers from the inner life of the poet and the poem. And, finally, for Coleridge organic unity and intelligibility seem to be closely linked, so that he is, in his practical criticism, certainly concerned, in his own manner, with the problem of the intelligibility of art and of the artist's mind as it is revealed in its creations.

In summary: This section has presented a selective and rapid view of some of Coleridge's aesthetic ideas. I have discussed aspects of Coleridge's notions of Ideas and of organic unity, and have suggested that for Coleridge Ideas and organic unity are interconstitutive, and that both are intrinsic to reality. I have then attempted to show that there might be a notion of beauty or art such as to allow for an aesthetic ideal as the revelation of that reality. If there is such an ideal, it would provide a perfect contrast to Cousin's "beau idéal"; the "beau idéal" was an abstraction from the real, whether or not it attained some kind of higher reality, as Cousin thought, while this new kind of aesthetic ideal would be the essence of the real. In Coleridge's notion of art as intermediary between mind and nature there is certainly some notion of art as Idea-filled and revelatory. When he left his "high transcendental" position, he continued to consider art (that is, poetry) as a kind of organic unity with strong, but qualified, relations to nature. He conceived, too, of a vital faculty for the creation of poetry (that is, imagination) by means of which poems could be made profoundly organic beings. Thus the poem, Coleridge seems to be saying, is marked by a unity which can be best called organic, and which is Idea-penetrated.

III

As an illustration of a full-blown philosophic use of the aesthetic ideal, Hegel would certainly have revealed more than either Coleridge or Cousin; and Quatremère de Quincy, a contemporary of Cousin and Coleridge, would have proved the typical defender of the neoclassical aesthetic ideal. However, what has interested me, in this paper, has been the break away from the neoclassical position and the emergence of a new conception of the aesthetic ideal. It is this transformation, occurring in the early nineteenth century, that Cousin and Coleridge represent: Cousin, in his notion of the "beau réel," shows incipient dissatisfaction with the "beau idéal"; Coleridge attempts, though in a fragmentary way, to follow new directions by introducing an "organic" conception of aesthetic intelligibility.

Cousin's theory is, in many ways, still within the framework of that idealizing neoclassical aesthetics which admired artistic abstraction, allegory, and generally an ideal realm of aesthetic values in which the true value of beauty resides, rather than in the concrete object of beauty itself. Quatremère de Quincy was still defending the neoclassical position in France when Cousin wrote *VBB*. In England the position had

no strong advocate after Joshua Reynolds, who died in 1792. Coleridge was not hard pressed to overthrow neoclassical prejudices, as he was to combat his early leanings toward Hartleian psychology.

Cousin, in a sense, represents the last bold attempt of neoclassical aesthetics to retain the dignity of the "beau idéal." The future of the aesthetic ideal lay, however, with other philosophies. By the late eighteenth century, the developing disciplines of philosophy, psychology, and natural science were furnishing the writer on beauty with many new tools for interpreting his experience. Yet the old problem which had been central to the thinking of neoclassicists, that of the intelligibility of beauty, remained central to aesthetics. From the hyperjudicious suggestion of Kant that beauty might make nature more intelligible to man to Blake's frequent feeling that art is the highest vision of reality, the constant concern of the romantic theorists of art is with the intelligibility of beauty. In a sense, then, the ideal of beauty was still a living feature of the aesthetics which supplanted neoclassicism.

Coleridge, in his way, tried to refurbish and revitalize traditional notions of the way in which beauty can be intelligible. He participated actively in the attempt to redefine the aesthetic ideal. Gilbert and Kuhn write:

> What one comes to with Coleridge is that his own feelings and instincts, his own ideal presagings both in the theory of beauty and of art were right. They were clearly placed with the aesthetic opinion that was to be instead of with that which was outworn.[25]

The "opinion that was to be" was the conception of a transcendent Idea or of Ideas as grounds of value or intelligibility for beauty (or art). This opinion emanated largely from Germany, where it flourished in the first half of the last century, and provided the profoundest aesthetic thought of the period. In Coleridge's contemporaries, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, so-called absolute, or monistic, idealism as a metaphysical position involved a conception of beauty as the revelation of underlying and ultimate reality. In the writings of certain later German aestheticians and philosophers, in Solger, Schleiermacher, and Schopenhauer, the Idea also functioned as a measure for the intelligibility of beauty in various forms of dualistic metaphysics. In the more pluralistic and scientific aesthetic thought of the twentieth century, as would be expected, one seldom finds the Idea mentioned in the grand manner. That the question of the cognitive significance of beauty is still alive, however, one can discover by reading recent issues of the *Journal of Aesthetics*, where this question is continually discussed. Modern literary criticism has also done much to reawaken interest in the cognitive aspects of literature—in its concern with the problem of meaning.

One especially difficult cluster of questions Coleridge seems never to

[25] Gilbert and Kuhn, *History of Aesthetics* (Bloomington, 1953), p. 404.

have asked or answered. If nature and mind are so related that an intelligible organic principle pervades them both, how and to what extent can a work of art be said to share in that intelligible organic principle? Can an art work, a poem, be more than metaphorically conceived to be an intelligible organic unity? And, if it can, in what sense can it then be said to have meaning? Does it "participate" in reality-pervading Ideas, and if so, does it do this through actual identity with those Ideas, or through some reference toward those Ideas? Through his emphasis on aesthetic intelligibility, however, Coleridge made the answers to such questions extraordinarily important.

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BOOK REVIEWS

STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS: A STUDY IN LITERARY METHOD. By Melvin J. Friedman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955. xii, 279 p.

Mr. Friedman's book is one of three studies which, appearing almost simultaneously, should, if they do nothing else, remind us that we have lived to see the death of an important literary form. Along with Leon Edel's *The Psychological Novel* and Robert Humphrey's *Stream of Consciousness in the Modern Novel*, this essay marks the point at which a form that seemed to many people only yesterday *the* "modern novel" has become an academic subject—that is to say, dead enough for definition. I do not mean, of course, that the work of Joyce or Proust or even of Virginia Woolf can no longer move us as literature—merely that these fictions no longer matter to us in quite the same way, since they no longer seem attempts to forge the consciousness of a living generation. They have graduated from the barricades to the classroom; and we must begin judging them in new ways, now that their polemical and strategic uses have lapsed.

Such new judgments (which would involve a critical reconsideration of the whole twentieth-century notion of "modern" and a re-examination of the "modern" canon) Mr. Friedman does not undertake. Though there are occasional essays at original evaluation in his book, it is primarily a work of scholarship, of definition and literary-historical placement. But it is the nature of scholarship, not only that it deals with a relatively fixed past, but also that it draws on critical principles which are no longer moot. Just as, for instance, the leading academic literary historians of the beginning of our century assumed the standards for which the great romantics had waged a bitter struggle; so Mr. Friedman takes for granted (or in the irresistible metaphor of my freshman students "takes for granite") the values and the canon for which the "New Criticism" has until recently been battling. Quite typically, even in a "postlude," in which he tries to look beyond the collapse of the Joycean novel, he sees the shape of the future in *Nightwood*—which, whatever its virtues, belongs to an irrevocable Left Bank-*avant garde* past—and he quotes to sustain his opinion T. S. Eliot!

It is as an example of the "New Scholarship," which seems at this very moment to be emerging from the triumph and decline of the "New Criticism" (largely under the astute tutelage of René Wellek), that Mr. Friedman's essay seems to me especially interesting. I do not mean to read a movement into a single book; I do, however, find this volume one more manifestation of a development I have been watching for some time. We are, as everyone knows, in a period of recapitulation following on one of invention and advance in the arts; and, while it is certainly good that the improvisations and strategic insolence of Eliot become the pedagogy of Brooks and Warren or the Leavises and the scholarship of the younger students of Wellek, it is well to be conscious of the limitations of the new classroom science and the new literary history. We are all aware that we have been reaching a dead end in college teaching and in academic research in literature, a dead end out of which these new attempts may help deliver us—are, indeed, helping to deliver us; but we should not in an excess of gratitude lose our critical perspective.

Since Mr. Friedman's critical approach is a product of that crisis in the relations of our world to its putative artistic culture, which also gave birth to the "stream of consciousness" techniques, the subject and method would seem singularly suited to each other. But it is hard for one symptom to analyze another. One disturbing aspect of Mr. Friedman's book for me is that he cannot or, worse perhaps, will

not tell us *why* a certain cluster of techniques for rendering sensibility and consciousness triumphed so astoundingly in the novel—and yet was so soon exhausted. Maybe such a question seems to him irrelevant; and yet it is one his study raises over and over. He avoids confronting it, I am sure, only because it would lead him into questions involving the relationship of literature to society, into that uneasy blend of amateur sociology and psychology which alone (alas) can come to terms with the peculiar twentieth-century relationship of the artist to his community, of that community to its traditional beliefs, of high art to popular art, etc. But this is precisely the context in which "stream of consciousness" ought to be studied. I do not see, for instance, how else one could begin to understand these strange social enclaves, the high Bohemia of Bloomsbury or the *transition*-"Revolution of the Word" world of exile out of which such novels came—all the astonishing differences and the even more astonishing resemblances between, say, Virginia Woolf and James Joyce.

Mr. Friedman, however, though he is willing to brave alien enough contexts—the connections of literature and music, the ties between poetry and the psychology of Jung or the philosophy of Bergson—shies away from the social context. This is, I suspect, because the "confusion of criticism and sociology" has been declared by all the "New Criticisms" the most abject of heresies. I am not insisting, be it understood, that one man must deal with a literary problem in all its aspects—for sanity's sake there must be a division of labor. But I cannot help feeling that Mr. Friedman not merely leaves for someone else but utterly rejects the kind of explanation I have been asking. This is a real shame, for such a rejection keeps his book from being in any sense definitive. He has genuine enough insight into the influence of associationist psychologies on recent conventions for rendering the process of thought; but he finds it impossible to explain why there has been in our fiction such a flight from everything but that process, understood as an inwardness of flux and blurred margins. To me, one of the most fascinating aspects of the "stream of consciousness" methods is their upsidedown Platonism—their flight from the world of phenomena not because that world is too fleeting but because it is too stable and fixed. I could have spared for the sake of an examination of such problems Mr. Friedman's long, careful, quite clear, but finally (I think) vain distinctions between "stream of consciousness" and "interior monologue," etc. Such exercises in definition are attractive precisely because they are arbitrary and neat; but they seem to me centripetal.

My second major demurral is quite the opposite of the first. Though in some ways the victim of "emancipation" from the older scholarship, in others the book seems to me still trapped in traditional errors. Though much easy fun has been made of "source hunting," not nearly enough thought has been given to the problem; and there is a strange conviction among younger students that, though any quest for the sources of, say, the *Book of the Duchess* is howlingly funny, exactly the same technique applied to tracing Vico through *Finnegans Wake* is respectably modern. Tracing the development of a convention or genre from one author to another is a necessary, and potentially a useful, task, but it is beset by difficulties that must be understood. In his chapter on historical backgrounds (not, of course, historical in the broader sense, but the "pure" history of literature), Mr. Friedman poses for himself the question, "who first discovered the existence of the silent inner voice," and goes on a patient safari through European literature for "the precursors of the new form." Posed in this traditional and limited way, the question of sources gives small returns, yielding useful answers only where connections are obvious and immediate, as in the relationship of Dujardin and Joyce, but leading to confusion when the relationship is more remote. Mr. Friedman not

only bogs down in idle comparisons of Dickens' Jingle to Mr. Bloom (this hare Wyndham Lewis maliciously started—and not only Mr. Friedman but Mr. Edel, too, has gone off innocently in pursuit); but he ends up with such untenable conclusions as the contention that it is "preposterous" to consider Richardson among the precursors of the kind of novel he is treating. Yet anyone who has read both *Clarissa* and *A la recherche du temps perdu* must have felt the real resemblances between the books—and Proust is for Mr. Friedman a "stream of consciousness" novelist. What has gone wrong?

The point is, I think, that to proceed fruitfully in this area one must begin not with a quest for external technical resemblances but with some general theory of the novel as a developing form. If one recognizes with Diderot that "Richardson carried the torch to the back of the cave," that is to say, discovered the novel in discovering its chief function to be the illumination of the dark recesses of the mind, one will understand the sense in which the "stream of consciousness" novel is a moment in the main line of development of European fiction. If one thinks of a linked series of writers passing from Richardson to Rousseau and Diderot, to Goethe and the German romantics, to the *symbolistes*, he will realize how soon and how permanently the notion of rendering instantaneously and analytically the process of thought took hold in the novel; and he will further perceive that the "lyrical novel" itself, the marriage of narrative and poetry, begins with *Werther* and reaches a peak of madness with *Lucinde*, rather than waiting for *Nightwood* to be conceived.

This main line of fiction has until lately been rather concealed for English readers by the intrusion of the aberrant theatrical and pseudo-Shakespearian conventions of Fielding and Scott. Among other things the development of "stream of consciousness" has meant the return of the English novel to European literature —and we can see now that there have been since the beginnings two chief continuing modes of rendering that dark inwardness which Richardson perceived to be the real matter of the novel: the epistolatory method, which, once accepted as a convention, gives successfully the "instantaneous" feel of consciousness, even—in Goethe, for instance—breaking through conventional logic and syntax; and the Gothic method, which projects inner fantasies and fears into symbolic figures and situations. The resemblances of "stream of consciousness" fiction to these more traditional modes, and the differences, offer an extremely fruitful field for speculation. The Gothic, especially, in its transformations from Poe and Hofmann to Dickens and Dostoevsky, Melville and Hawthorne, James, Faulkner, and Kafka, offers special rewards. But from such considerations, Mr. Friedman's more traditional approach excludes him.

It remains to be said that, if one is going to play the game of scholarship, he has to live up to certain ground rules; and the new scholar's reviewer must play the old referee. I do not want to be betrayed into the pedagogue's comic role, like the "scholar" I read not long ago who believed he had demolished a recent book on Melville by pointing out that Melville was not married in 1837 as the author claimed but in 1836 (or was it vice versa?). Yet I cannot resist believing that, when one tries to interpret a book, he should know as much as the novelist—or at least as his characters! "*Alleluia. Shema Israel Adonai Elohenu*," part of Mr. Bloom's meditation on the Passover, is described by Mr. Friedman as "a Hebrew word grouping" which means "Praised be the Lord. Hear, O Israel, O Lord our God." Rendered thus, it makes no sense at all. The "hallelujah" is quite separate, as Joyce indicates with a period; and the phrase which follows is, of course the truncated beginning of the Jewish confession, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One." In the same meditation, there occurs the phrase, "Next year in

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Jerusalem"—the invariable concluding sentence of the Passover service in exile, and a potent symbol of exile wherever the phrase appears in Joyce's book. This Mr. Friedman does not know, or forgets; for, when it recurs to Bloom during the Gertie MacDowell episode in fragmentary form as "next year," Mr. Friedman tells us that it "refers to the time Bloom has set for himself to satisfy the 'Drang nach Osten.'" The phrase "Drang nach Osten" is in itself an unforgivable sort of little academic joke—and meanwhile the whole point is lost, in turning a universally symbolic and conventional phrase (a cue to Joyce's choice of a Jew for his protagonist) into a purely personal dream of a trip to Palestine.

As long as I have turned to such minor matters, a few further points are perhaps worth making. In his generally rewarding discussion of post-Joycean developments in the "stream of consciousness" novel, Mr. Friedman slights Wyndham Lewis' *Childermass*, which is at once a savage parody and an unwilling imitation of *Ulysses*, and contains a portrait of Joyce himself under the amusingly apt, though unkind, name of Bel Canto. I missed, too, a reference to Henry Roth's little known *Call It Sleep*, which seems to me by all odds the most original and moving book that has been produced in America under the influence of Joyce; and I should have liked to find some account of a certain kind of middle-brow American novel derived ultimately from *The Portrait of the Artist* via *Look Homeward Angel*. *Raintree County* is the classic example of the genre.

I do not mean to dissipate in trivia my feelings about this book, or to leave the sense that it has accomplished nothing worthwhile. Certain other approaches, which I have attempted to describe, seem to me potentially more profitable than this one; but of its kind it is, by and large, comprehensive, informed, careful, sympathetic, and lucid. It bears up remarkably well under the blight of its origins as a Ph.D. thesis; and its larger weaknesses arise not so much from inadequacies peculiar to the author as from the limitations of the kind itself. It is that kind which I have tried here to examine and judge.

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CREATION AND DISCOVERY: ESSAYS IN CRITICISM AND AESTHETICS. By Eliseo Vivas. New York: Noonday Press, 1955. xiv, 306 p.

Professor Vivas modestly points out that he is not offering his readers a complete consideration of the problems of aesthetics, even insofar as these are related to literary criticism. He insists, for instance, that he has done little more than call attention to the central problem of all, that which concerns the nature of the aesthetic symbol. There are, however, few relevant considerations that Vivas does not touch upon in these essays; and, what is more important, he makes very clear the direction that his thought is taking. Vivas is, I should say, by disposition, a romanticist, and he has undertaken to re-establish the aesthetics of romanticism upon the present scene. In doing so, he finds it helpful to consider the work of such theorists as James, Richards, Dewey, and Jordan, such critics as Eliot and Tate, and such authors as Dreiser, Dostoevsky, Kafka, and Henry James; while the influence of Bergson, Croce, and Collingwood is to be felt throughout his work. The result is a volume rich in insight and, I suspect, closer to a systematic statement than its author cares to assert.

Vivas' title is well chosen; the relation of creation to discovery constitutes his primary concern. He is clearly aware that the paradox involved cannot be avoided and that the philosopher must undertake boldly to exploit it, as indeed romantic thinkers have often done since the days when Wordsworth wrote in *The Prelude*

of the poet's "creative sensibility." Vivas develops this theme in various ways, frequently recognizing that the creative contribution of the artist is social or cultural. He stands close to Shelley's vision of the poet as an "unacknowledged legislator," a creative agent in the formation and transformation of modes of life and thought. But the "poet" need not always "solve" problems; his function may often be simply to reveal certain contrasts, tensions, or alternatives. So Vivas points out that in *The Brothers* an unresolved conflict lies between the Grand Inquisitor and Father Zossima, and that, in discerning and revealing this conflict, Dostoevsky has made a contribution of the first order.

Such an interpretation of life is not, Vivas insists, a matter of *imitation*, and certainly according to present usage this is true enough. It is, however, likely that Vivas has not fully appreciated the scope of connotation latent in the Greek term *mimesis*. This, as Cornford among others has pointed out, cannot be exhausted by the English *imitation* or representation, despite Plato's somewhat highhanded limitation of *mimesis* in *Republic*, X. As a romantic, Vivas dislikes the term, and he is inclined to distinguish his position very sharply from that of Aristotle.

"If all the artist does is represent or imitate, if he does not constitute, if he does not create in the act of discovery, all he can do with his language, at best, is to add an external adornment to the object of imitation. This is the doctrine of the Aristotelians. I believe it is easy to recognize that this view fails utterly to do justice to the way in which the language of poetry functions to say or mean what it does" (p. 90).

Vivas is, however, not thoroughly satisfied with this repudiation of Aristotle. At least once, in the essay on "Literature and Knowledge" (p. 123), he uneasily admits that there are some passages in the *Poetics* that can support an interpretation much closer to his own theories. This vacillation has already been seized upon by representatives of the Chicago school as evidence of a profound confusion in Vivas' thought. I am inclined to discount their polemic as too specialized in its orientation. Although ready to admit that Vivas does Aristotle scant justice and that he has not been consistent in his comments, I believe that, if we keep his primary purpose and total contribution in mind, this will seem a minor consideration.

After all, it is not only in the modern period that the term *mimesis*, as bequeathed to posterity by Plato and Aristotle, has seemed inadequate. The reader acquainted with the history of aesthetics may be reminded of certain Neoplatonic thinkers who seemed to have found the contemporary connotation of *mimesis* embarrassing. Thus Apollonius prefers *phantasia* to *mimesis*.

"For imitation will fashion what it has seen, but imagination goes on to what it has not seen, which it will assume as the standard of the reality. And imitation is often baffled by awe, but imagination by nothing, for it rises unawed to the height of its own ideal. If you have envisaged the character of Zeus, you must see him with the firmament and the seasons and the stars, as Pheidias strove to do in this statue; and if you are to fashion Athene, you must have in your mind strategy and counsel and the arts and how she sprang from Zeus himself."

And Plotinus himself argued as follows: "Pheidias did not use any visible model for his Zeus, but apprehended him as he would appear if he deigned to show himself to our eyes" (*Enneads*, v, 8, 1). Plotinus believed that such apprehension is carried out not by eye or ear but in and through the very activity of the artist as artist (*Enneads*, iv, 3, 18). This is why Carritt has rendered Plotinus' *techne* as "imagination," referring in a note to Coleridge's "shaping spirit of imagination" (*Philosophies of Beauty*, Oxford, 1931, p. 47). Vivas' "creative discovery" is, I suspect, an even better paraphrase of Plotinus' *techne*, except that for Vivas *techne* would have without question to indicate a psychophysical activity conceived

in its totality and recognized as operating upon a medium. On the latter points Plotinus is uncertain. For Vivas, the "activity of imagining takes place through and in a material medium which resists the artist's efforts, and without intimate familiarity with which no purely mental imaging would be possible to him" (p. 155). Since Vivas is primarily concerned with literature, the medium that he considers most frequently is language with its unlimited power of symbolic reference. He is, however, not inclined to emphasize the artist's exploitation or control of his medium as an end in itself. Such control takes place, but its outcome is a vision that transcends the medium. "The poet" for Vivas "is the man who sees ... values as they struggle to be born" (p. 87). Here is no commonplace imitation or reproduction of particulars but the simultaneous evocation and embodiment of an image whose significance and authority is apparent to the artist and to his sympathetic public. Vivas knows, as well as Aristotle, that poetry is "more philosophical than history."

Our enjoyment of the reality so revealed is said to be "intransitive" in that it is true enjoyment and not an employment, discursive or practical. An aesthetic experience involves an "intransitive apprehension of an object's immanent meanings and values in their full presentational immediacy" (p. 95). Such values are objective, but the mind is "to some extent constitutive of the manner in which it apprehends them" (p. 95). The phrase "to some extent" indicates the difficulties under which Vivas, along with all serious students of aesthetics, must work. It is, after all, the truth and significance of the aesthetic object that we delight to behold. Yet we do not and cannot compare the statue of Zeus or the "evening air" and the "thousand stars" of Marlowe with an original—except in so far as that "original" or creative origin is given us through our sympathetic participation in the *techne* of the artist who, acting freely in contact with traditional materials, shapes our world of value and contributes form to the welter of our sensibility and our feeling.

This line of thought has led Vivas to consider very seriously Elijah Jordan's theory of art and language. An excellent chapter is devoted to Jordan's work. Vivas' lucid treatment of Jordan's argument constitutes by no means the least important contribution offered in this volume of essays. One might suspect that his interest in Jordan lies in the fact that the latter has boldly followed to its conclusion the notion of the poet's creative power, creation for him having overshadowed discovery. Thus Jordan has bluntly declared that poetry is "literally the creator and legislator for the real world," and that the primary function of language is not to communicate meanings but to constitute objects. (Here we would do well, I think, to recall the Kantian definition of object as "that under the concept of which we unite the manifold of sensibility.") Vivas quotes the following passages from Jordan's *Essays in Criticism*:

"Man sought to give form to his world, and thus to infuse his words with meaning, long before he was curious to understand it, and this urge to form was the largest determinant in the development of language ... His first making instrument was his words in any case, and what he made with them first was the world of objects about him."

"The substance, stuff, of art is not merely one of the realities along with that of religion, science, industry, etc., but reality itself. And it is reality in intelligible form, reality made intelligible by the form that art imposes upon it. Art is not about experience, not about life, not about nature, not about God. It is concerned with a reality that gives to experience, life, nature, and God whatever substance they have, and it has its existence upon a higher plane of being than these. Its substance matter is reality itself; its specific or individualizing relation to experi-

ence, life, nature, and God is that it is the synthetic identification of all these in a world, a universe to which it gives constitution and form and so substance."

Vivas comments: "I agree with Jordan that an aesthetic which is not looking for facile verbal consistency, one that stubbornly sticks by the facts no matter how self-contradictory they may appear, will assert the two propositions Jordan asserts: the poet creates reality, or as he would probably prefer, *reality is created in the poem, and the poet or poem discovers reality*" (italics added). Vivas' further comment makes amply clear that he is well aware of the difficulties that beset such a position. He wisely prefers to reconnoitre tentatively and with caution, especially as he considers Jordan's interpretation of the ultimate principle lying behind imagination and metaphor, namely the principle of *analogical identity*, according to which objects overlap and interpenetrate one another in ways that only poetic imagination may ("creatively" or metaphorically) "discover." At this point, the student of English romantic poetry may recall that in *The Prelude* Wordsworth speaks of a power which Nature "thrusts forth upon the senses" and "exerts upon the outward face of things"—

> "Moulds them, abstracts, combines; and so endows
> With interchangeable supremacy
> And makes one object so diffuse itself
> Among all others and pervade and fill
> Their several frames with such commanding virtue
> That even the grossest minds must see and hear
> And cannot chuse but feel."[1]

Vivas likes to emphasize the value of a radical or antitheoretical sensibility. Thus in the amusing and penetrating essay on "Henry and William" (James) he quotes the former: "the deeper features of reality are found only in perceptual experience." And he comments: "We might indeed say—though it can not be intended literally of course—that Henry illustrates quite aptly his brother's doctrine of the stream of consciousness and of 'pure experience.'"

William's purpose seems to have been to return to philosophy the margins and backgrounds of experience that the orthodox empiricists had somehow overlooked. His brother, Vivas argues, undertook the same thing in his fiction—although William never recognized this achievement. Certainly Henry James' *techne*, as reflected in his notebooks, is a "creative discovery," passing from a participation in the *inclusion* and *confusion* of "real" life toward a revelation and an evaluation of a *way* of life, of feeling, and of thought.

Vivas recognizes the difficulties latent in the paradox of "creative discovery." He does no more than hint at their solution according to a double-aspect theory.

"But how shall we resolve the contradiction involved in the claim that the artist *creates* novel objects and that he *discovers* the hidden reality of our practical, commonsense world? The contradiction is only apparent, not real, since the two assertions were made from different points of view. From an external point of view, there is novelty in his product and spontaneity is involved in the process. From the standpoint of the artist, however, we grasp a different aspect of the creative process, since what the artist does is not to invent something new but to extricate out of the subject matter at hand its own proper structure or order" (p. 123).

For Vivas, such vision is the *raison d'être* of the aesthetic life, in a sense, the justification of the humanities. He finds this insight, as we have seen, in many

[1] *The Prelude*, Book XIII (1805), lines 79 ff., as in MS A_2, De Selincourt's edition, p. 476.

writers. In fact, Vivas' criticism is characterized by a generous readiness to sympathize with writers of diverse orientations; thus he begins with Dreiser and concludes with Allen Tate, with whose recent thoughts on the dehumanization of man he stands in sympathy. Tate's contrast, suggested by Maritain, of the human and angelic intelligence supplies Vivas with a philosophy of history and of humane letters, almost a philosophical anthropology, pertinent to our time. Vivas quotes with essential approval from Tate's *Forlorn Demon*:

"The symbolic imagination takes rise from a definite limitation of human rationality which was recognized in the West until the 17th Century; in this view the intellect cannot have direct knowledge of essences. The only created mind that has this knowledge is the angelic mind. If we do not believe in angels we shall have to invent them in order to explain by parable the remarkable appearance, in Europe, at about the end of the 16th Century, of a mentality which denied man's commitment to the physical world, and set itself up in quasi-divine independence. This mind has intellect and will without feeling; and it is through feeling alone that we witness the glory of our servitude to the natural world, to St. Thomas' accidents, or, if you will, to Locke's secondary qualities; it is our tie with the world of sense. The angelic mind suffers none of the limitations of sense; it has immediate knowledge of essences; and this knowledge moves through the perfect will to divine love, with which it is at one. Imagination in an angel is thus inconceivable, for the angelic mind transcends the mediation of both image and discourse. I call that human imagination angelic which tries to disintegrate or to circumvent the image in the illusory pursuit of essence. When human beings undertake this ambitious program, divine love becomes so rarified that it loses its human paradigm, and is dissolved in the worship of intellectual power, the surrogate of divinity that worships itself. It professes to know nature as essence at the same time that it has become alienated from nature in the rejection of its material forms."

The human usurpation of the angelic imagination results in disaster—the sort of disaster, we might point out, that Wordsworth encountered in the philosophy of William Godwin. If modern man caricatures himself as a thinking machine or as an angel (there is, strangely enough, not much difference), creative discovery, as Vivas understands it, is impossible and we deprive ourselves of the very activity from which the individual derives his self-consciousness and contributes to the pattern of his culture, namely a free imagination or creative sensibility. Vivas has found in Tate's argument a subtle defense of poetry, indeed of literature and the humanities in general. Those of us who have followed Mr. Tate's career as a critic may note with kindly, even grateful amusement how close he has come, I suppose unwittingly, to Shelley's position in the *Defense of Poetry*.

In conclusion, we may note that Vivas' thought is gradually turning here, as in his writings on morals, in the direction of existentialism. "Through art," he writes, "man makes himself into a human being." He is moving beyond the romanticism, to which he is by temperament disposed, toward a theory of self-creation. Croce's *homo nascitur poeta* no longer quite satisfies Vivas. He would seem to prefer a new maxim. It should run, I think, somewhat as follows, *Poeta se hominem facit*. Through the arts man fashions his own humanity.

One further comment may be in order; Vivas, like Wheelwright in his recent work, has throughout somewhat overestimated his opponents, the positivists. At times his attitude seems one of desperation. This is quite unnecessary; he has more friends than he thinks.

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LIBERALES Y ROMÁNTICOS. UNA EMIGRACIÓN ESPAÑOLA EN INGLATERRA (1823-1834). By Vicente Llorens Castillo. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1954. 382 p. (Publicaciones de la Nueva Revista de Filología Hispánica.)

Las actividades literarias de los emigrados españoles en Londres en las dos etapas de su destierro político, 1814-1820 y 1823-1834 ya habían sido acuciosa, aunque esquemáticamente estudiadas por E. Allison Peers.[1] El autor del presente libro se concreta exclusivamente al segundo período y proyecta sus investigaciones en forma minuciosa más allá de lo literario, abarcando temas como "Vida de los refugiados en Londres" (cap. II, págs. 21-64), "Impresiones de Inglaterra" (cap. III, págs. 65-73), y "Actividades políticas" (cap. IV, págs. 74-125).

Esta circunstanciada relación nos permite conocer datos tan interesantes como el número aproximado de refugiados, el tipo de personas que componía este grupo, sus ocupaciones en la capital londinense, sus relaciones con el gobierno inglés, las amistades con individuos particulares de la sociedad inglesa. Abundando en este grupo los militares y los políticos, era de esperarse que una de sus mayores preocupaciones fuera el derrocamiento del gobierno imperante en España y el restablecimiento del régimen constitucional por el cual ahora sufrían el destierro. Dentro de estas maquinaciones políticas conocemos el interés que algunos grupos de ingleses mostraban por la causa española y en particular el de los jóvenes que redactaban el *Atheneum*, algunos de los cuales como Trench se mostraban ya como incipientes hispanistas.

El capítulo de las "Actividades literarias" (págs. 126-171) señala el campo de acción en que se ejercitó la pluma de los más aptos para escribir, ya se tratara de traducciones, de ediciones como los "Catecismos" de Ackermann, de gramáticas como la de Salvá para la enseñanza del español en Inglaterra, de obras técnicas, históricas y científicas, y aun de cuestiones religiosas y políticas. Las "polémicas literarias" (págs. 166-171) prosperaron principalmente a través del antagonismo creado entre don Joaquín Lorenzo Villanueva y don Antonio Puiblanch, filólogo éste que a pesar de su escasez de medios logró finalmente publicar sus *Opúsculos*.

El capítulo VI "Verso y prosa" (págs. 172-218), tal vez el más importante desde el punto de vista literario, revela algunos datos nuevos en cuanto al contacto de los emigrados con la cultura inglesa en este momento decisivo para el advenimiento del romanticismo en España. Para Ángel Saavedra el autor confirma, por ejemplo, la opinión de Menéndez Pidal de que "la formación romántica del Duque no recibe... los primeros influjos en Malta, según comúnmente se cree" (pág. 177). En el caso de Espronceda obtenemos datos más precisos sobre algunos de sus poemas fechados en Londres (pág. 180) y un mayor conocimiento sobre el aspecto de sus imitaciones que tuvieron más importancia de lo que comúnmente se cree: "Espronceda, el más personal de los poetas románticos españoles, imitó mucho" (pág. 184). Otros autores menos conocidos como Ruiz de la Vega y Juan Florán escriben poesía que según el autor parece datar de esta época de Londres. De mayor importancia es la actividad literaria de José Joaquín Mora, especialmente en relación con los *No me olvides* publicados por Ackermann y de muy amplia difusión en Hispanoamérica. A través de estas publicaciones inspiradas en una sensibilidad claramente romántica debió de haber un influjo positivo en el Nuevo Mundo, ya que no en España, para la difusión del Romanticismo. Como una secuela al libro de Llorens sería interesante estudiar en forma sistemática lo que la emigración española en Londres significó para Hispanoamérica a través de los productos de las empresas editoriales dedicados exclusivamente a este Hemisferio. De menor repercusión para lo español en general serían las

[1] E. Allison Peers, "The Literary Activities of the Spanish *emigrados* in England (1814-34)," *MLR*, XIX (1924), 315-324, 445-458.

"Obras en inglés" (cap. VII, págs. 219-239), novelas y teatro, que algunos desterrados como Valentín Llanos y Telésforo de Trueba publicaron, ayudando, sin embargo, a difundir el interés por la cultura española en Inglaterra. Los "Periódicos de la emigración" (cap. VIII, págs. 240-288) publicados en abundante número sirvieron en casos limitados a propósitos literarios. Las "Colaboraciones en revistas inglesas" (cap. IX, págs. 289-326) hechas por los desterrados trataron en ocasiones cuestiones de literatura española para el público inglés.

El último capítulo "La emigración y el romanticismo" (págs. 327-362) está dedicado en buena parte a la labor literaria de Don José María Blanco y Crespo, un andaluz quien con el nombre de Blanco White residía en Inglaterra desde 1810 y que por consiguiente no puede considerarse propiamente como del grupo de los desterrados, pero quien por sus relaciones con éstos y por la importancia de sus escritos en revistas y libros, representa lo más característico de una actitud romántica frente a lo español. La relación entre política (liberalismo) y romanticismo no aparece, por lo demás, demasiado clara con este grupo de emigrados. La escisión entre ellos y el tradicionalismo de Boehl de Faber, no vino a quedar superada sino más tarde cuando críticos como Blanco White, Mora y Alcalá Galiano propugnaron el estudio del romanticismo inglés como una manera de dar impulso al genuino romanticismo español. Pero como nos dice el autor del libro las lecciones de estos críticos no fueron oídas y cayeron en el vacío, en la misma forma en que los sacrificios de los emigrados habían traído la desilusión política.[2]

GUSTAVO CORREA

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UN PRÉCURSEUR DE MADAME DE STAËL. CHARLES VANDERBOURG, 1765-1827. SA CONTRIBUTION AUX ÉCHANGES INTELLECTUELS À L'AUBE DU XIX^{e} SIÈCLE. By Roland Mortier. Paris and Brussels: Librairie Marcel Didier, 1955. 272 p.

This monograph grew out of Mortier's interest in the journal, *Archives littéraires de l'Europe* (Paris-Tübingen, 1804-08, 17 vols.) and in Charles Vanderbourg's important contributions to it. The study has a twofold object: first, to present a definitive biography of this cultural intermediary, now almost forgotten (the biographical material heretofore available was incomplete, vague, and full of inconsistencies); second, to show the focal role played by Vanderbourg in the literary cosmopolitanism of France during the Consulate, the Empire, and the Restoration.

The first two parts ("Biographie de Charles Vanderbourg," pp. 13-86, and "Mystificateur ou mystifié? L'affaire Clotilde de Surville," pp. 87-100) give a full analysis of Charles Vanderbourg the man and of his literary-journalistic accomplishments. Mortier presents for the first time a spirited, scholarly, and full biography. He traces Vanderbourg's ancestry back to the fourteenth century; he portrays the budding classical scholar; he follows the young naval officer who, because of royalist leanings, has to flee his fatherland; he sees Vanderbourg settle in Düsseldorf in the early 1790s and become an intimate of the Emkendorf circle and a firm friend of the German philosopher Jacobi (whose *Woldemar* he translated into French in 1796); he sketches Vanderbourg's departure for the Antilles and his return to Holstein towards the end of the century; he lays em-

[2] La conclusión general del libro de Llorens en su aspecto literario viene a coincidir con la tesis de E. Allison Peers en *A History of the Romantic Movement in Spain*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1940), de que en España nunca hubo un verdadero movimiento romántico de características propias y definidas. Véase principalmente I, 80-81.

phasis on Vanderbourg's translation (1802) of Lessing's *Laokoon* as a result of this second visit; and, finally, he records Vanderbourg's return to France, his debut as a journalist, and his subsequent career until his death.

A deep and abiding interest in Germany and the promotion of French translations from the German were central to Vanderbourg's intellectual life after his return to France. Curiously enough, however, it was not his translations from the German that most enhanced his literary reputation among his contemporaries, but a two-volume French translation of Horace's *Odes* (1812-13). Vanderbourg possessed a sense of humor, which allowed him to write in 1822 to his old friend Schweighaeuser: "Je suis entré à l'Institut sous les auspices de bon Horace."

After carefully weighing all the evidence, Mortier concludes that in the "Affaire Clotilde" Vanderbourg was merely a scrupulous editor of the text and in no way personally responsible for the perpetration of that famous literary fraud.

Vanderbourg's role as literary cosmopolite is shown in greatest detail in Part III, "Vanderbourg et les lettres allemandes" (pp. 101-186), and on a much smaller scale in Part IV, "Vanderbourg et les lettres anglaises" (pp. 187-199). His excursion into English literature was of minor significance, except for his respect and admiration for Byron. Part V, "Le Domaine français" (pp. 200-222), makes apparent his traditional criticism of French literature, and Part VI, "Le Traducteur" (pp. 223-236), reveals his originality as a translator. Translating was for Vanderbourg a dedicated mission. His ideal was to broaden the horizon of the French reading public by recasting original texts into tasteful French through a happy combination of fidelity, grace, and brevity.

The important subject of Vanderbourg and German letters (Part III) is the core of the book. When he appeared on the French literary scene about 1800 his countrymen's enthusiasm for *l'outre-Rhin* was negligible. What little interest there was was prejudiced, ill informed, and distorted—based principally on Gessner's *Idyllen* (1756), Huber's *Choix de poésies allemandes*, and Goethe's *Werther* (1774). In order to counteract the concept of German obscurity and irrationalism, which has always prevented the French, nurtured on clarity and restraint, from justly appraising the neighbor's literature, Vanderbourg deliberately stresses the liberal, the humanistic, and the rational elements in German authors. In Lessing, he sees the judicious critic and humanitarian dramatist of *Nathan*; in Voss, a translator of repute, spreading the humanizing tradition of the classics in Germany; in Wieland, some of whose work Vanderbourg faithfully translated and whom he consistently prefers among the three Weimarians, a Gallic German of the eighteenth century with great polish and affability. In Goethe, for whom he shows little sympathy or enthusiasm, he praises the talented novelist and accomplished dramatist of classical bent, but deplores the penchant for the mystic and mediaeval, i.e., the romantic. In Schiller he finds a dramatist who eliminated the French concept of tragedy from his plays; and in Schlegel and Tieck, repudiators of all that German literature had owed to France —orderliness, respect for reason, and the concept of literary taste.

Vanderbourg's views on German letters appeared in articles and reviews in many French journals over a long period of years. They were based on first-hand contact with a contemporary Germany which he had come to know during his enforced emigration, and with many German authors whom he had met personally. This hitherto unknown material shows his seriousness of purpose, and his zeal as a literary missionary. Mortier uses as a heading for Chap. III of Part III a phrase from one of Vanderbourg's letters, "Nous autres, demi-germains"; Charles Vanderbourg well deserved his own appellation.

All the essential apparatus of a serious and thorough study is included: a portrait of Charles Vanderbourg, a genealogy, a list of Vanderbourg's poems and

translations, an autographed letter, a list of archival material used, a complete bibliography, an index, and an analytic table of contents.

Dr. Roland Mortier, now an *Assistant* at the University of Brussels, published his doctoral thesis, *Diderot en Allemagne (1750-1850)* in 1954. He has earned for himself a well-deserved niche in Franco-German literary relations. The Fondation Universitaire de Belgique aided in the publication of his work.

Some fifty years ago Louis Wittmer published his study on *Charles de Villers, 1765-1815. Un intermédiaire entre la France et l'Allemagne et un précurseur de Mme de Staël.* It is helpful now to have this contribution on Vanderbourg, another cultural forerunner of Mme de Staël.

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ESTUDIOS DE LITERATURA ESPAÑOLA Y COMPARADA. By Alejandro Cioranescu. Universidad de la Laguna, 1954. 306 p.

We have in this volume a collection of eleven articles, in part previously published (1943-52). The articles in the field of comparative literature are with one exception concerned with Spanish-French relations. Some of these, as well as some others, are at the same time chapters from unexplored parts of the literary history of the Canary Islands.

The most original and substantial contribution Professor Cioranescu has made is the resurrection of the Canarian writer José Viera y Clavijo. Two articles are concerned with him: "José Viera y Clavijo y la literatura francesa" (pp. 205-248) and "Viera y Clavijo, escritor" (pp. 249-268). Hardly mentioned in the manuals of Spanish literary history, this late eighteenth-century *encyclopédiste* has been hitherto known chiefly for his *Historia de Canarias*, re-edited by Professor Cioranescu (Santa Cruz de Tenerife, 1950), and his *Diccionario de historia natural de las Islas Canarias* (published in two volumes, Las Palmas, 1866-69). Now he emerges as a writer with far-flung scientific and literary interests, whose spiritual homeland was Paris, where he spent a number of years in the late 1770s, who wrote didactic poetry without lyric talent to speak of and translated somewhat indiscriminately from French into Spanish. Some of his poems, as for instance *Los ayres fixos*, seem to be versified lecture notes, based on a course he had taken with Sigaud-Lafond. He translated Delille, who interested him most among the French didactic poets, and Voltaire's *Henriade*, a remarkable feat of intellectual independence for a Spanish priest, even of the eighteenth century. He was the most liberal Spanish censor of his time, perhaps of all times (p. 245).

Yet, despite his 163 titles mentioned in Millares Carlo's *Bio-bibliografía de escritores naturales de las Islas Canarias*, there is a tragic air of futility about Viera y Clavijo. With more sensibility and literary talent he could have been the Bernardin de Saint-Pierre of Spain (p. 243). The drive underlying all his imitations and translations from the French was pedagogic; and yet little of his literary activity issued in publication, and Professor Cioranescu had to work from manuscripts in Canarian public libraries. Instead of exerting a broad and stimulating influence upon eighteenth-century Spanish intellectual life, working in Madrid, Viera y Clavijo lived practically exiled in the Canary Islands, his *patria chica*. "Viera se encontró en desacuerdo con sus contemporáneos y con el medio en que vivía," is Professor Cioranescu's obvious conclusion (p. 246). The true Viera y Clavijo is to be found in his correspondence, containing satirical *cuadros de costumbres* and sound literary criticism, and in the didactic prose of his above-mentioned main works. It is to be hoped that it will be possible for Professor Cioranescu to use the first of his two Viera articles as an introduction to a generous anthology from Viera's unpublished writings.

"Calderón y el teatro clásico francés" (pp. 137-195) shows that it was the Calderón of the comedies of intrigue who delighted the French public, chiefly between 1640 and 1660. A number of playwrights based their plays on his, despite the fact the French critics rejected the Spanish *comedia*. The article takes up one by one the ten plays (of which *La dama duende* is the best known) which, according to Professor Cioranescu, were the only ones by Calderón adapted by such playwrights as Boisrobert, d'Ouville, Thomas Corneille, and others, and shows in some detail the style of those transplantations. "Su resultado más importante fué ... la afición por los refinamientos sentimentales y algunas fórmulas nuevas para desenvolver la intriga" (p. 157). The geometric balance of the plot appealed to the French mind, but in general their *refundición* worked towards simplification of plot in observance of the three unities and towards loss of poetic and lyrical exuberance. The article presents objectively the degree and the mode of the imitation of the Spanish *comedia* in the French theater, free from any national bias. At the end Professor Cioranescu points out the vast repercussions of the Spanish *comedia* in Beaumarchais' *Mariage de Figaro*, for example, and through him, we might add, in Mozart and Rossini. He also convincingly traces a line of development which leads from Calderón via French imitators of Calderón to Marivaux, who combines French psychological analysis with Spanish intrigue, so that we can say about him: "en todo el teatro francés, nada más español ni más calderoniano, aún sin serlo; porque todo este armazón prestado no impide la originalidad de los análisis sentimentales ni el gracejo y la frescura de los personajes" (p. 192). In addition to these tangible results of comparative research in literature, the article is distinguished by some of the finest pages of literary criticism of Calderón in his own right (especially pp. 154-156 and 188-191).

"Víctor Hugo y España" (pp. 269-292) analyzes what we could call the *Spanienerlebnis* of the poet. "Resulta más o menos inútil buscar fuentes o modelos para los dramas españoles de Víctor Hugo" (p. 272). The Spanish atmosphere of the plays goes back to the childhood experience of his travel to Madrid, filtered and intensified by his powerful imagination: "el conocimiento de España se confunde ... con la imaginación, y la síntesis es toda una visión artística y humana, que ofrece la llave de la creación de Víctor Hugo" (p. 274). Childhood memories of cities and landscapes, light and atmosphere, fuse and transform themselves into characters and àction. Places acquire personality (Hernani, Torquemada); "la ciudad se hace hombre" (p. 280). Life and fantasy are the same for Victor Hugo. Yet, there is more. The poet's whole dramatic art was formed by his contact with Spain, namely "la mezcla permanente y característica de un realismo a veces violento con un idealismo que suele perder el contacto con la realidad" (p. 291). Although the final result is not too different from the opinion of Menéndez Pelayo (*Historia de las ideas estéticas en España*, V, Madrid, 1947, 405) and Emilia Pardo Bazán,[1] the Victor Hugo article is the most original of the collection, as far as the critical approach is concerned.

In a few pages, "Sobre Iriarte, La Fontaine y fabulistas en general" (pp. 197-204), Professor Cioranescu compares La Fontaine and Iriarte. La Fontaine made the fable, originally an allegorical, didactic genre, into poetry, surrealistic poetry. For Iriarte the fable is "un instrumento de combate" against the literati (p. 202). Iriarte creates a different formula and within its limits he is successful.

"Dante y las Canarias" (pp. 7-27) offers a new interpretation of the Ulysses episode in *Inf.*, XXVI. The mountain in sight of which Ulysses' ship sinks in a storm is identified as the Canary Islands' highest peak, the Teide. The importance of the article, however, rests on the new attempt made to explain the "un-Homeric"

[1] See Gabriel Laplane, "Víctor Hugo y España," *Clavileño*, IV (1953), 29-34; summarized in *Les Lettres Romanes*, IX (1955), 317-318.

twist given to the character of Ulysses by Dante, making the Homeric hero an almost modern explorer. Professor Cioranescu offers the hypothesis that under the heroic Ulysses there is hidden the actual character of Ugolino Vivaldi, a Genoese explorer who, in 1291, sailed through the Straits of Gibraltar to find the route to the East Indies, but never returned. Professor Cioranescu, it seems to us, has not laid sufficient emphasis on the Ulysses of the *Odyssey*, who besides his shrewdness is possessed by a considerable intellectual curiosity (cf. *Od.*, I, 3). Dante could have developed this side of the Ulysses of the Homeric tradition under the stimulus of the knowledge of the Vivaldi expedition. But, whether one does or does not accept this and other ingenious hypotheses,[2] we read with profit and pleasure the keen analysis of the problems connected with the Ulysses passage.

The rest of the articles must be reported more summarily. "La conquista de América y la novela de caballerías" (pp. 29-46) pursues the idea of the effect of literature upon reality: the *forma mentis* of the Conquistadores is conditioned by the *caballero andante* of the novel of chivalry. "Caballerismo para salvajes," he calls it (p. 36). "Un poema inédito de don Pedro Manrique" (pp. 47-65), entitled *La victoria*, was written in 1573, and celebrates the battle of Lepanto. The manuscript is preserved in the Mazarine Library in Paris. "El teatro de Cairasco," a Canarian author of the late sixteenth century, is concerned with four dramatic compositions found in manuscript form in the Biblioteca de Palacio of Madrid. One is an *auto*, two are dramatizations of saints' lives, and the fourth is a command performance written upon the installation of a new bishop. There is a notable element of *costumbrismo* in some of these plays. A thorough source study is offered by the article, "El autor del *Príncipe Transilvano*" (pp. 91-113). As others have suggested before him, Professor Cioranescu makes a case for the authorship of Luis Vélez de Guevara, but with new arguments, and fixes the date of composition for 1597.[3] "Las *Rodomontades Espagnoles* de Nicolás Baudouin" (pp. 115-135) traces the *empeoramiento* of the term "rodomontadas" from the figure of Rodamonte of Boiardo and Ariosto to its present usage and follows its history as a case study of the reflection of the "temperamento español" in the "espíritu francés" (p. 117).

If one desideratum may be mentioned, it is that the articles studying general questions and well-known authors would show somewhat more clearly their acceptance or rejection of preceding research. But this observation does not diminish our feeling of grateful appreciation. These studies are stimulating and well written, based on a firm theory of literature, and when necessary constructed with keen hypotheses. May Professor Cioranescu soon give us some more results of his investigation and criticism, particularly of the great figures and movements.

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[2] We are puzzled by the identification "sin duda" of "el Atlas de los antiguos" with "El Teide de hoy" (p. 16).

[3] We deem it entirely unlikely that the seventeen-year-old page, Luis Vélez de Guevara, had access, either direct or indirect, to an ambassadorial report. Spencer and Schevill, *The Dramatic Works of Luis Vélez de Guevara* (Berkeley, 1937), p. 371, cite an anonymous *Relación verdadera del linaje y descendencia del serenísmo Sigismundo Bartorio, príncipe de Transilvania* (Seville, 1597) as a likely source. Although they list the play among the *comedias dudosas*, they find it to be "very characteristic of the muse of Luis Vélez" (p. 372). Cioranescu's date of 1597 ("muy probablemente," p. 111) agrees with Bruerton's 1597-1601 ("The Date of Schaeffer's *Tomo Antiguo*," *HR*, XV, 1947, 358).

VISSARION BELINSKY, 1811-1848: A STUDY IN THE ORIGINS OF SOCIAL CRITICISM IN RUSSIA. By Herbert E. Bowman. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954. viii, 220 p.

Vissarion Belinsky is doubtless one of the most representative figures in Russian intellectual history. The leading Russian essayist of his day, he laid the foundations for a highly influential trend in Russian literary opinion, known as social criticism. Often referred to as the father of the Russian intelligentsia, he embodied in his torrential prose some of the characteristic attitudes of this unique intellectual fraternity—fervent social idealism and a capacity for emotional involvement in abstractions, which often verged on an ideological frenzy.

In this monograph, the first full-length study of the famous Russian critic to appear in English, Dr. Bowman undertakes a "critical analysis of Belinsky's intellectual career." He outlines Belinsky's ever-shifting views on literature and its role in society, and probes the philosophical assumptions and the social or emotional pressures which at each successive stage were instrumental in shaping Belinsky's critical position. Quoting copiously from Belinsky's theoretical pronouncements as well as his assessments of contemporary literary figures, Dr. Bowman traces the critic's evolution from a vague romantic idealism through a quasi-Hegelian "rationalization of reality" to the radical humanism of his later years, with the concomitant notion of literature as a vehicle of social progress.

While he remains throughout eminently fair to his subject, Dr. Bowman is aware of Belinsky's shortcomings and inconsistencies. He indicates clearly the pitfalls of that lofty but exacting view of the writer's social responsibility which Belinsky bequeathed to his heirs: "by the very urgency of the public mission which he assigned to art, he threatened the precarious integrity of the artist" (p. 201). At the same time Dr. Bowman refrains wisely from confusing Belinsky's critical position with the crude utilitarianism of his successors, such as Pisarev or Dobrolyubov. The fact of the matter is that Belinsky was never prepared to abandon aesthetic criteria. The tenets of German romantic aesthetics which he had absorbed at a formative stage—the notion of the work of art as an organic whole, the insistence on the distinctive character of artistic creation—had apparently provided an effective antidote to a purely didactic approach to literature.

During his lifetime, the "furious Vissarion" was the center of many a literary skirmish. It is rather fitting that he should have been a controversial figure after his death as well. To several subsequent generations of the Russian intelligentsia he remained *the* critic, the supreme authority on literature. During the last two decades he has been revered in the Soviet Union as a distinguished ancestor of "Socialist Realism"—a dubious honor which, in all fairness, Belinsky scarcely deserves. Yet, ever since the turn of the century, serious students of Russian literature have disagreed widely in assessing the texture of Belinsky's thought and his critical acumen. Few have failed to admire his moral purity and his genuine devotion to literature or to acknowledge the flashes of his critical insight. But there were those who have deplored the looseness of his verbiage, the amateurish quality of his philosophizing, and the not infrequent lapses of his critical judgment.

In the opinion of this reviewer, the evidence adduced in the present study bears out this latter view of Belinsky to a somewhat greater extent than Dr. Bowman is willing to concede. He admits that Belinsky's understanding of Hegel could hardly "have been full and precise." But he does not seem to appreciate fully how much crude vulgarization of Hegel was involved in Belinsky's undiscriminating acceptance of Russian "reality." Likewise, Dr. Bowman points up sagaciously occasional tensions between Belinsky's doctrinal commitments and his critical

sensitivity. However, as D. Cizevsky argued in *Hegel in Rußland*, the main "trouble" with the philosophical categories cited in Belinsky's critical essays is often not so much their rigidity as their irrelevance to the problem under discussion. Generally, one of the most distressing features of Belinsky's writings is verbal fetishism, an irresistible urge to invoke in vain the formidable abstractions of German philosophy.

The samples of Belinsky's practical criticism presented here add up to a fairly spotty picture. Clearly, in being one of the first to acclaim Gogol's greatness Belinsky showed a keen sense of literary values. In his interpretation of "The Inspector General" as a series of phantoms emerging from the Mayor's bad conscience, he gave proof of originality and perspicacity. But he was much less astute when he pioneered the immensely influential notion of *Dead Souls* as a realistic portrayal of mid-nineteenth-century Russia. (Since this view has been very effectively challenged during the last fifty years or so, one is a bit surprised to find Dr. Bowman refer casually to Gogol's "realism," as if this quality could be taken for granted.)

Belinsky's reactions to the early Dostoevsky present a similar picture. As we are properly reminded, Belinsky was quick to see in Dostoevsky's modest debut, *Poor Folk*, a promise of greater things to come, and was somewhat more appreciative of *The Double* than has often been assumed. However, Dr. Bowman fails to mention the fact that, in deploring the "fantastic" bent of *The Double*, Belinsky went so far as to declare: "There is no room in contemporary literature for the fantastic; it belongs in the insane asylum." Dr. Bowman does quote Belinsky's description of the Hoffmannesque tale, *The Landlady*, as "dreadful rubbish," but he treats this dictum as "further evidence of the perspicacity of his judgment" (p. 196) rather than as further testimony to the limitations of Belinsky's "realistic" bias.

In dealing with a topic as complex and controversial as Belinsky there is room for many differing emphases and approaches. Whether or not one always agrees with Dr. Bowman, one must admit that most of his points are closely argued and well documented. Indeed, it is a tribute to the essential soundness of his research that the materials which he so carefully assembled can at times provide a viable basis for conclusions somewhat different from his own.

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AUTORES GERMANOS EN EL PERÚ. By Estuardo Núñez, Lima: Ministerio de Educación, 1953. 192 p.

In 1946 Luis-Alberto Sánchez sketched, in a paragraph, a brief history of the literary and intellectual impact of German literature and thought upon Peruvians.[1] One might have expected a book bearing the title *Autores germanos en el Perú* to be an orderly and perhaps even imaginative elaboration (or refutation) of the highly condensed and suggestive statements of Sánchez. This little study by Estuardo Núñez does not fulfill that expectation. Núñez' first chapter, "La literatura alemana en el Perú," is in one way an expansion of Sánchez, since it comprises nine pages; but in another way it is a reduction, since Schopenhauer, Novalis, Stirner, Nietzsche, Wundt, and George are hardly mentioned, though Sánchez had posited their influence. The next three sections of Núñez' study deal respectively with Goethe, Lessing, and Heine. The second half of the book is a "Florilegio de la poesía alemana en versiones peruanas."

[1] *La literatura peruana* (Lima, 1946), I, 248-249.

Mr. Núñez' book suffers principally from a lack of clarity in direction and organization. In his introduction he says that he is going to study not only the Peruvian interest in the Germans, but also the Germans' "emoción del Perú." Possibly finding the emotion awakened by Peru a bit indeterminate, he moves into the broader field of the *hispanismo* of Goethe, Lessing, and Heine, although he has nothing to add to the subject, and fails to acknowledge the best sources of such information. Nor does the long and enthusiastic exposition of Lessing's aesthetic and dramatic theories have pertinence or originality, but rather detracts from our interest in the Peruvians. The focus is disturbed by private and provincial polemics, an understandable national pride (for the Peruvians did produce some of the earliest Spanish translations of German poems, frequently secondhand through French translations), and a less pardonable prejudice against the French classical theater. This last seems to reflect a general Francophobia in Mr. Núñez. How curious that he should say (p. 14) that the free translation of *Werther* by José Mor de Fuentes in 1797 antedates "en muchos años a las traducciones francesas," when there had been at least three different French translations of *Werther* by 1777.

The study lacks a sense of historical perspective that might have indicated the changing influence of the German writers upon the Peruvians, or at least might have made clearer a distinction between the response of the pioneers in the 1870s and that of the poets of the twentieth century. This evolution could be particularly interesting in a country where the enthusiasm for Lessing and Geothe was separated by only a few years from the enthusiasm for Rilke.

The "Florilegio" is an anthology of German poetry translated by Peruvians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is in some ways a curious collection, presented without comment, that includes four of Lessing's fables but only the *Ritter Toggenburg* by Schiller, Brentano's *Lorelei* but not Heine's, suggesting questions of initiation and taste. The translations are of uneven quality, which is not surprising in view of the fact that some are translations of French translations. Few sink to the level of More and Haas' (a translating team) "Y corrí, hasta caer en la hondura sutil de la nocturnidad," for von Platen's "Wie rafft' ich mich auf in der Nacht, in der Nacht." There are some misprints ("1763" for "1663" in Rilke's *Canción de los amores y la muerte del abanderado Cristóbal Rilke*, p. 177), and at least one mistaken identification. (The bad translation on p. 119 entitled "Canción nocturna del caminante" is identified by the first line in German, "Der Du von dem Himmel bist," of the "Wanderers Nachtlied," which is almost right. The Spanish poem is a translation of the "Wanderers Nachtlied II," and the line is, of course, "Über allen Gipfeln.")

If Mr. Núñez' book had appeared with fewer pretensions, we should have praised it as a popular introduction to some important Germans in whom some distinguished Peruvians have shown an interest, plus a small anthology of German verse turned into Spanish by Peruvians. For the student of comparative literature, however, the book on German authors in Peru remains to be written.

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HERMAN HEIJERMANS AND HIS DRAMAS. By Seymour Flaxman. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954. 266 p.

If Herman Heijermans is at all remembered today it is for *The Good Hope* (1901), a crusading socialist attack on shipping conditions, somewhat after the model of Ibsen's *Pillars of Society*. Ellen Terry brought the play to America

in 1906, along with *Captain Brassbound's Conversion*, and it was revived by Eva Le Gallienne in 1927. Joseph Wood Krutch's comment at that time, that the play "will not take its place quietly upon the shelf," has not been borne out by theater history. Neither this play, nor the others by the greatest Dutch playwright since Vondel, which have traveled outside Holland, namely *The Ghetto* (1899), *A Case of Arson* (1903), *Jubilee* (1906), and *The Devil to Pay* (1919), have had more than the most intermittent life in the theater. This neglect is attributable partly to the somewhat dated social issues which are the substance of Heijermans' drama, and perhaps even more to the impression that Heijermans is a warmed-over olio of Ibsen and Hauptmann.

Seymour Flaxman's book is designed to dispel such illusions and rehabilitate Heijermans. Quoting his observation, "Zola had no ideal, no horizon," Flaxman takes pains to dislodge Heijermans from his assigned place in the transfixed exhibits of naturalism. He acknowledges Heijermans' failures in play structure, atmosphere, and, to a lesser extent, the handling of character, but effectively demonstrates his social combativeness and his graphic skill in creating stage pictures reminiscent of the brilliance of genre painting in seventeenth-century Holland. In short, Flaxman illuminates an important chapter in the literary life of a small country and contributes perceptively to theater history. If his book, replete with plot summaries, is somewhat prolix, we should be grateful to know so much more about a dramatist who is inadequately represented in translation or in the original on most library shelves. We may even wish, as Max Beerbohm did in 1903, that some of our dramatists could, "through their coldly observant eyes, see life half so clearly and steadily as it is seen through the somewhat flashing eyes of Heijermans."

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